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Abstract
Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the recent literature in economic history and
long-run development, and summarizes the main findings of the three essays presented in
this dissertation.
In Chapter 2, I examine the subject of villagization in Tanzania, a major episode of
development planning in post-independence Tanzania. I revisit this period of Tanzania’s
economic history, focusing on the legacy of developmental villages (vijiji uya maendeleo)
introduced in mainland Tanzania over the period 1974-1982. Combining historical data on
Tanzania from the 1970s with data from population censuses and recent national house-
hold surveys, I investigate whether variation in the intensity of the governments villagiza-
tion program explains within-region variation in social and economic outcomes today. I
document that, in the short-run, developmental villages led to an increase in various educa-
tional outcomes, such as primary school completion rates, literacy rates, and total years of
schooling. Today, districts which experienced a high share of developmental villages have
greater availability of some public goods and citizens report higher rates of participation
in community activities, but there is worse perception of corruption among government
officials and greater rejection of one-party rule. Per capita household consumption is also
significantly lower in districts with historically high levels of the treatment measure. To
address potential endogeneity in village formation, I report instrumental variable results
based on variation in ethnolinguistic fragmentation and the occurrence of droughts in the
1970s which facilitated the resettlement of peasants into villages. I conclude by provid-
ing some preliminary evidence on the lack of economic diversification as well as political
alignment to the TANU/CCM party as possible channels which explain the legacy of the
villagization experiment.
In Chapter 3, I turn to the subject of disease eradication, and examine the impact of the
successful control of a highly infectious tropical disease, yaws, in Ghana over the period
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1956-1963. The availability of cheap, mass-produced penicillin following World War II re-
sulted in a mass treatment campaign by WHO/UNICEF aimed at controlling the prevalence
of yaws and other bacterial infections. I examine the effect of this penicillin campaign in
which over 70 percent of the estimated Ghanaian population received a single dose of an
intramuscular penicillin injection. Data collected by the WHO/UNICEF program before
and after the campaign indicates that penicillin-based treatment resulted in an immediate
reduction in the prevalence of infectious yaws among the Ghanaian population. Using a
microsample from the 2000 Ghanaian census, I estimate a difference-in-difference model
exploiting spatial variation in pre-treatment prevalence of yaws infections and variation in
exposure due to the timing of the penicillin campaigns. My results indicate that, follow-
ing the penicillin campaigns, cohorts born in districts with higher initial yaws prevalence
achieved higher education outcomes than prior generations when compared with cohorts
from districts with lower yaws prevalence. The results are particularly robust for the female
subsample, where I observe increases in educational attainment for cohorts born just prior
to the penicillin campaigns.
In Chapter 4, I study the development of political partisanship, examining the plausibly
random spread of the cocoa swollen shoot disease in the Gold Coast/Ghana in the 1940s.
In 1948, the Watson Commission which investigated riots in colonial Ghana sparked by
the cocoa swollen shoot pest noted the political motivations of the disturbances. In this
chapter, I utilize novel data on cocoa farm acreages and the spatial variation in the spread
of the swollen shoot virus to investigate the impact of the pest on the development of lo-
cal political movements. Based on responses from the Afrobarometer surveys, I find that
today, individuals in districts which historically experienced a high intensity of the disease
pest report stronger anti-government opinions, and are more likely to attribute success in
life to individual effort than government support. I trace the historical roots of these po-
litical views by examining electoral results from the 1956 Legislative Elections in colonial
Ghana. Conditional on region fixed effects, and various pre-epidemic district controls, I ob-
serve that more adversely affected districts were more likely to vote against the new center-
left (Nkrumahist) government. By 2000, with multiparty democracy, these areas still vote
against the center-left (Nkrumahist) party. This partisan opposition has an impact on the
allocation of resources today. Using an instrumental variable strategy, I examine the impact
Abstract v
of government opposition on local government transfers received in various districts, with
the historic intensity of the pest shock as an instrument. I examine possible violations to the
exclusion restrictions of the 2SLS strategy by ruling out the impact of the cocoa swollen
shoot disease on other economic and social outcomes. Based on the approach developed
by Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012), I also document that the 2SLS results remain robust
to moderate forms of violations to the exclusion restriction assumptions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The three essays in this dissertation are broadly concerned with understanding the im-
portance of historical events and development programs on economic and social outcomes
today. This introductory chapter briefly reviews the existing research literature in economic
history and development, and summarizes the main findings of the three essays presented
in this dissertation.
There has been renewed interest in understanding the historical determinants of long-
run economic development (Nunn, 2009). Recent empirical research has highlighted the
importance of factor endowments as well as the legacy of various colonial institutions in ex-
plaining comparative development today (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002; Acemoglu
et al, 2001, 2002; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Two strands of work may be identified in
the recent research literature in economic history and development. The first group of work
focuses on the importance of historical institutions and institutional persistence, while a
second body of work examines specific channels, notably cultural norms, through which
historical shocks have persistent impacts. The recent literature on the importance of insti-
tutions in explaining comparative development may be traced to the work of Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) and La Porta et al, (1997, 1998), building on ear-
lier contributions by North and Thomas (1973). Acemoglu et al (2001) exploit European
settler mortality during the colonial period as an instrument for contemporary institutions,
and show that these institutions are important in explaining cross-country income per capita
today. Examples of institutional persistence in specific country contexts are provided by
1
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Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and Dell (2010). Banerjee and Iyer (2005) examine the long-term
impacts of land tenure institutions introduced in colonial India. They provide evidence
of differences in the levels of agricultural investments and local public goods provision
today, which may be traced to the type of colonial land tenure institution implemented.
Dell (2010) also examines the legacy of the mining mita implemented in colonial Peru and
Bolivia, and documents the long-term impacts of the mita in lowering household consump-
tion today. An interesting component of this body of research examines the importance
of state antiquity in explaining current economic outcomes (Bockstette et al. (2002)), and
in the context of Africa, there is evidence of the importance of pre-colonial institutions
for contemporary development outcomes (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou, 2011).
A related strand of research focuses on how changes in underlying cultural norms serve
as a specific channel through which historical shocks can have persistent impacts today
(Nunn, 2012). Cultural norms serve as heuristics to assist individual decision-making in
uncertain settings. Recent empirical research provides examples of historical persistence
operating via changes in cultural norms. For example, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) doc-
ument that ethnic groups in Africa which historically experienced high levels of the slave
trade report lower levels of trust in others today based on data from the Afrobarometer
Surveys. Alesina et al (2011) examine the origins of gender roles in the household. They
examine the well-known Boserup hypothesis, and provide evidence that variation in farm-
ing technologies used in traditional societies resulted in male specialization in agriculture
and female specialization in domestic activities, and are reflected in gender norms today.
Guiso et al. (2008) also investigate social capital of Italian city states dating from 1000-
1300 AD, and its persistent impacts on city-level measures of social capital today. Tabellini
(2008) examines the impact of trust in others and belief in individual effort on comparative
economic development in Europe today.
For economists and historians working on Africa, the recent empirical economics re-
search work has revived previous scholarly debates on the determinants of long-run de-
velopment in Africa (see Hopkins, 2009; Fenske, 2010). Despite methodological difer-
ences, the increased availability of cartography-based datasets provides interesting research
questions for both economists and historians, and enables more careful analyses of causal
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mechanisms relating to Africa’s long-run economic development. This provides an oppor-
tunity to provide quantitative assessments of economic history in Africa, building on earlier
contributions in the history literature by scholars such as Hopkins (1973), Austen (1987),
Feinstein (2005) and Zeleza (1993). In particular, the study of the interaction of historical
shocks with institutions and cultural norms raises new and interesting research questions in
understanding the history of economic development in Africa.
The three essays in this dissertation aim at contributing to work on economic history and
development in Africa. In the following three chapters, I successively examine the villag-
ization experiment in Tanzania in the 1970s, disease eradication in the Gold Coast/Ghana
in the 1950s using penicillin, and the impacts of the cocoa swollen shoot disease (in the
1940s) on political developments in the Gold Coast/Ghana.
In Chapter 2, I examine the subject of villagization in Tanzania, a major episode of
development planning in post-independence Tanzania. A large literature in politics, an-
thropology and economics examined the subject of village formation in mainland Tanza-
nia following its national independence in 1961 (Coulson, 1983; Hyden, 1980; McHenry,
1979; von Freyhold, 1979; Putterman, 1986; Collier et al., 1986). In the first chapter, I
revisit this episode of Tanzania’s economic history, focusing on the experience of devel-
opmental villages (vijiji uya maendeleo) introduced in mainland Tanzania over the period
1974-1982. Combining historic data on Tanzania from the 1970s with data from popu-
lation censuses and recent national household surveys, I investigate whether variation in
the intensity of the government’s villagization program explains within-region variation in
development outcomes today. I document that, in the short-run, developmental villages
led to an increase in various educational outcomes, such as primary school completion
rates, literacy rates, and total years of schooling. Today, districts which experienced a high
share of developmental villages have greater availability of some public goods and report
higher rates of participation in community activities, but citizens report a worse percep-
tion of corruption among government officials and greater rejection of one-party rule. Per
capita household consumption is also significantly lower in districts with historically high
levels of the treatment measure. To address potential endogeneity in village formation, I
report instrumental variable results based on variation in ethnolinguistic fragmentation and
the occurrence of droughts in the 1970s which facilitated the resettlement of peasants into
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villages. I conclude by providing some preliminary evidence on the lack of economic di-
versification as well as political alignment to the TANU/CCM party as possible channels
for persistence.
In Chapter 3, I turn to the subject of disease eradication, and examine the impact of the
successful control of a highly infectious tropical disease, yaws, in Ghana over the period
1956-1963. The availability of cheap, mass-produced penicillin following World War II,
resulted in a mass treatment campaign by WHO/UNICEF aimed at controlling the preva-
lence of yaws and other bacterial infections. I examine the effect of this treatment campaign
in which over 70 percent of the estimated Ghanaian population received a single dose of an
intramuscular penicillin injection. Data collected by the WHO/UNICEF program before
and after the campaign indicates that penicillin-based treatment resulted in an immediate
reduction in the prevalence of infectious yaws among the Ghanaian population. Using a
microsample from the 2000 Ghanaian census, I estimate a difference-in-difference model
exploiting spatial variation in pre-treatment prevalence of yaws infections and variation in
exposure due to the timing of the penicillin campaigns. My results indicate that, follow-
ing the penicillin campaigns, cohorts born in districts with higher initial yaws prevalence
achieved higher education outcomes than prior generations when compared with cohorts
from districts with lower yaws prevalence. The results are particularly robust for the female
subsample, where I observe increases in educational attainment for cohorts born just prior
to the penicillin campaigns.
In Chapter 4, I study the development of political partisanship, examining the plausibly
random spread of the cocoa swollen shoot disease in the Gold Coast/Ghana in the 1940s.
In 1948, the Watson Commission which investigated riots in colonial Ghana sparked by
the cocoa swollen shoot pest noted the political motivations of the disturbances. In this
chapter, I utilize novel data on cocoa farm acreages and the spatial variation in the spread
of the swollen shoot virus to investigate the impact of the pest on the development of lo-
cal political movements. Based on responses from the Afrobarometer surveys, I find that
today, individuals in districts which historically experienced a high intensity of the dis-
ease pest report stronger anti-government opinions, and are more likely to attribute success
in life to individual effort than government support. I trace the historical roots of these
political views by examining electoral results from the 1956 Legislative Elections in colo-
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nial Ghana. Conditional on region fixed effects, and various pre-epidemic district controls,
I observe that more adversely affected districts were more likely to vote against the new
center-left (Nkrumahist) government. By 2000, with multiparty democracy, these areas still
vote against the center-left (Nkrumahist) party. This partisan opposition has an impact on
the allocation of resources. Using an instrumental variable strategy, I examine the impact
of government opposition on local government transfers received in various districts, with
the historic intensity of the pest shock as an instrument. I examine possible violations to the
exclusion restrictions of the 2SLS strategy by ruling out the impact of the cocoa swollen
shoot disease on other economic and social outcomes. Based on the approach developed
by Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012), I also document that the 2SLS results remain robust
to moderate forms of violations to the exclusion restriction assumptions.
Chapter 2
The Legacy of State Planning: Evidence
from Villagization in Tanzania
2.1 Introduction
In States and Power in Africa, Jeffrey Herbst (2000) observes a recurring challenge
concerning state development in Africa: that central authorities have often faced the dif-
ficulty of broadcasting their power throughout their territories. Since precolonial times,
he argues, state development in Africa has been limited partly because of an unfavorable
political geography characterized by low population density. Given the relative land abun-
dance in many parts of Africa, scattered peasant populations presented a problem of state
consolidation in newly independent African states in the 1960s. The ability of the state
to raise taxes, to defend its territorial boundaries, and to provide public goods (enforcing
property rights and providing social services) was hindered by large peasant populations in
the hinterland that often tended to avoid the control of central governments.1
Since Chayanov (1966), the unique features of peasants in pre-capitalist societies has
1The existence of scattered peasant settlements in pre-colonial Africa may partly be the result of the
dispersion of human populations as a means of escaping coercion (e.g. labour exploitation or taxation) by
a centralized authority (see for example, McIntosh (1999, pp 22)). In the case of Tanganyika in the early
twentieth century, many people moved away from formal settlements as a means of avoiding tribal wars
and also escaping coercive enlistment by German officials for head porterage services during World War I
(McHenry, 1979, pp 14; Iliffe, 1979, Chapter 8).
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been noted in the literature, particularly the primary concern with subsistence production
and catering to needs of the household. Peasant households in Africa were also different
from smallholder farming communities in South Asia, where land scarcity and the need
for investments in irrigation often required some dependence on the state or markets for
survival. In contrast, peasant communities in Africa relied predominantly on rain-fed agri-
culture, and so remained independent of (”uncaptured by”) the state or other social classes
such as capitalist landlords (Hyden, 1980, pp.31). The exercise in state formation in newly
independent Africa necessarily involved bringing many such rural communities effectively
under state administration.
This paper examines the effects of an historical experiment in state planning in rural
Africa. Specifically, I examine the case of villagization which commenced in mainland
Tanzania in 1973, and resulted in an experiment of developmental villages between 1973
and 1982 in rural parts of Tanzania. Villagization refers simply to the agglomeration of
rural living units to facilitate state administration. However, these government-planned vil-
lages in Tanzania in the 1970s (termed as developmental or registered villages) involved
more than the concentration of rural populations. These villages introduced state capacity
at the local level by introducing village councils responsible for taxation, enforcement of
property rights, and provision of public goods. The experiment of development villages
was largely halted in 1982 following the repeal of the villages legislation and the com-
mencement of an IMF economic liberalization program. State-led development planning
and big-push theories served as the economic orthodoxy in many post-independence states
in Africa. Therefore, the case of Tanzania, and its subsequent economic collapse, provides
a poignant example of the legacy of state planning.
Using historical data from the 1978 Tanzania Census, I construct a measure of villagiza-
tion as the fraction of a district’s population living in registered or developmental villages.
I then investigate impacts of the villagization treatment on various short- and long-run out-
comes. Using the IPUMS microsample for the 1988 Tanzania census, I first examine the
short-run impact of the program on completion of primary education. I exploit variation in
the intensity of villagization across Tanzanian districts and differences in exposure to vil-
lagization across birth cohorts due to the timing of the program, and document an increase
in primary school completion for cohorts exposed to the program. Based on responses
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from the Tanzania Afrobarometer survey, I provide some evidence that a higher level of
the treatment variable is associated today with greater political participation and greater
support for democracy, but a rejection of one-party rule and worse perception of corruption
among government officials.
For contemporary outcomes, I examine impacts of the program on household consump-
tion, public goods provision and community participation. Using the 2009 Tanzania Na-
tional Panel Household Survey, I find evidence of higher provision of some public goods
and greater participation in community activities in treated districts today. However, there
are significant consumption losses, and I find that increasing the district treatment intensity
variable from zero to 1 results in approximately a 38 percent loss in per capita househod
consumption today. The OLS regression results are conditional on region fixed effects,
and remain robust to controlling for various pre-treatment covariates such as geographic
characteristics (latitude, slope, altitude, mean and standard deviation of long-run precipita-
tion), agricultural characteristics, health and education infrastructure, and per capita local
government revenues.
A primary concern in my analysis is the problem of selection into the villagization
treatment and the need to explain the source of the observed variation in the treatment
measure. The historical account of Tanzania during this period highlight the occurrence
of a drought in the mid-1970s which supported the government’s villagization program
(Hyden, 1980; Nyerere, 1977). The droughts in 1973-1975 facilitated peasant resettle-
ment since with a bad harvest and the need for famine relief many peasants agreed to relo-
cate to new government-planned villages. In addition, ethnographic accounts suggest that
higher ethnolinguistic fragmentation in a district hindered cooperation and thus inhibited
village formation (McHenry, 1979). I construct an instrument based on the interaction of
the drought severity and pre-treatment ethnic fragmentation which helps to explain the ob-
served variation in villagization treatment across districts. I conduct falsification tests with
this instrument by showing that the interaction of ethnic fragmentation with similar rainfall
shocks in the three-year period preceding, and immediately following, the period of villag-
ization do not explain the observed variation in intensity of villagization. My instrumental
variable estimates support the OLS results above.
Next, I explore the possible channels of persistence. To explain the severe consumption
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losses reported, I argue that economic diversification (i.e. a transition away from peasant
agriculture) has been limited in areas which historically experienced high levels of villag-
ization. This is supported by quantitative evidence based on the 2002 Tanzanian census. I
also present some preliminary evidence that the treatment effect results in lower oppostion
vote shares, suggesting that districts which experienced high levels of villagization in the
1970s remain loyal supporters of the ruling TANU/CCM party. This may partly explain the
higher availability of public goods in these districts today.
This study contributes to several strands of research in the literature. First, it contributes
to the broad research project examining the persistent effects of historical institutions (Ace-
moglu et al, 2001, 2002; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Dell, 2008; see Nunn 2009, for recent
review), and the importance of past institutions in explaining comparative economic de-
velopment in Africa (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Huillery, 2009; Michalopoulos and Pa-
paioannou, 2011). A related objective of this paper is to examine the impact of state-led
planning in modifying cultural norms and individual perceptions on economic and political
attitudes. In this regard, this paper contributes to the current research agenda examining
how changes in cultural norms serve as a channel through which historical shocks have
persistent effects (see Nunn, 2012 for a review). In a related vein, Alesina and Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln (2007) examine the impacts of German separation and reunification on prefer-
ences for redistribution in West and East Germany, while Jacob and Tyrell (2010) trace
the erosion of social capital in East Germany to the density of state surveillance under the
German Democratic Republic (GDR). In additional examples related to social capital and
community participation, Guiso et al. (2008) also observed the persistence of social capital
of Italian city states dating from 1000-1300 AD, and its impacts on city-level measures
of social capital today. Tabellini (2008) also examined the impact of trust in others and
belief in individual effort on comparative economic development in Europe today, using
nineteenth century literacy rates and historical political institutions as instruments. Finally,
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) also document that ethnic groups in Africa which histori-
cally experienced high levels of the slave trade report lower levels of trust in others today
based on data from the Afrobarometer Surveys.
Second, this project revisits an earlier body of social science research in economics
and the multidisciplinary field of Peasant Studies, particularly examining village forma-
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tion and development planning in Tanzania. This large body of scholarship had important
contributions in the economics literature (Putterman, 1981, 1986; Collier et al, 1986; Ellis,
1982). Based on extensive data collection in Tanzania, Putterman (1981, 1986) provides a
theoretical and empirical discussion on the design of an incentive structure for collective
agriculture. Collier et al. (1986) surveyed households in eight regions in Tanzania, and ex-
amine patterns of rural inequality and the provision of social infrastructure in villages. Ellis
(1982) documents the impacts of declining real prices and incomes in the agricultural sec-
tor on living stanards of peasant households. More recently, Putterman (1995a) discusses
the effects of agricultural market liberalization on smallholder producers, as well as social
capital and development in rural Tanzanian (1995b). Major debates in the peasant stud-
ies literature surrounded the extent of within-village rural inequality among the peasantry
(Shivji, 1976; Ergas, 1980; von Freyhold, 1979; Raikes, 1978), on bureaucratic control
(Raikes, 1975; Fortmann, 1980), on changes in land holdings following villagization (de
Vries and Fortmann, 1979), and on the collapse of collectivised agriculture (Lofchie, 1978;
Samoff, 1981). McHenry (1979), Hyden (1980), and Coulson (1982) provide useful ac-
counts of this period of Tanzania’s history. A useful bibliography of parts of this earlier
literature is summarized by McHenry (1981).2
Third, this paper also provides lessons on the legacy of large-scale development plan-
ning projects which were widely implemented in the mid-twentieth century in many African
states (Killick, 1976, 1983). The intellectual basis for national planning programs may
be traced to structuralist development models following Rosenstein-Rodan’s big-push ap-
proach (see Chenery (1971, 1975)). Development plans were generally aimed at tackling
coordination failures in investments, and addressing differences in private and social valu-
ations of various goods. The experience of development planning in Tanzania is reviewed
by Rweyemamu and Mwansasu (1974, eds) and van Ardakie (1972). More recently, Scott
(1999) examines the case of villagization in Tanzania, and provides a cautionary note on
2This Chapter is not intended to provide a normative assessment of Tanzania’s villagization experiment
which resulted in significant welfare losses and the country’s economic collapse in the early 1980s. Rather,
the goal is to study the legacy of this major episode of state planning, and provide an initial assessment of its
impacts on various economic and social outcomes today. Data limitations also prevent me from examining the
effects of villagization on land holdings in this present chapter, but this subject has been recently examined
in the report of the Shivji Commission (see Shivji et al, 1994; Coldham, 1995).
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the consequences of state planning.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I present a historical
overview of post-colonial Tanzania, highlighting attempts by the government to encourage
village formation and communal production. In section 2.3, I describe the various data
sources. Next, I examine the impacts of the villagization program on educational outcomes
and on political attitudes in sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. In section 2.6, I present results
on household consumption, public goods provision and community participation, reporting
both OLS and 2SLS estimates. I briefly discuss channels of persistence in section 2.7, and
conclude in section 2.8.
2.2 Historical Overview of Village Formation
2.2.1 Phase I: 1961-1973
At independence in 1961, about 90 percent of the mainland Tanzanian population lived
in the rural countryside in scattered hamlets which were not organized into formal villages.
A visiting World Bank team in 1959 urged the country’s leadership to consider the set-
tlement of sparsely populated areas which had agricultural development potential (World
Bank, 1961).3 The country’s low population density had often been highlighted in official
records by German and British colonial staff as an obstacle to economic development of
the colony. Julius Nyerere, president of the newly independent Tanzania, however advo-
cated a more voluntary resettlement plan in which exhortations and inducements (such as
provision of clean water and schools) served as the major tools to encourage village forma-
tion. The use of exhortation to promote villagization and thus obtain economies of scale
in the provision of social infrastructure and agricultural machinery was clearly evident in
Nyerere’s inaugural address:
So if you ask me what our Government is planning to do during the next
few years the answer is simple. For the next few years Government will be
3Other proposals were also offered to the Tanganyika leadership, for example, one based on the Israeli
model of moshav village communities which were similar to the kibbutzim but involved a lesser degree of
communalization (Kaplan, 1961).
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doing all it can to enable the farmers of Tanganyika to come together in village
communities. And if you ask me why the Government wants us to live in
villages, the answer is just as simple: unless we do we shall not be able to
provide ourselves with the things we need to develop our land and to raise our
standard of living. We shall not be able to use tractors; we shall not be able
to provide schools for our children; we shall not be able to build hospitals,
or have clean drinking water, it will be quite impossible to start small village
industries, and instead we shall have to go on depending on the towns for all
our requirements; and even if we had a plentiful supply of electric power we
should never be able to connect it up to each isolated homestead. (President’s
Inaugural Address, Nyerere (1966) pp 183-4).
There were isolated settlement schemes which autonomously formed in some parts of
the country, often with a nucleus of youth activists of the governing TANU party. The
approach to rural development in the period following independence involved largely the
use of persistent persuasion to encourage progressive (yeomen) farmers to adopt modern
agricultural techniques in cultivating the main cash crops (sisal, coffee, cotton, tobacco
and maize). There were also a few government-planned settlements which were developed
in mainland Tanzania (Hyden, 1980). With the exception of the Ruvuma Development
Association (RDA), many such village settlements failed. In a landmark speech in 1967,
called the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere outlined a socialist vision for the Tanzanian state,
which involved a policy of national economic self-reliance, nationalization of commercial
farms and industries, and the promotion of socialism in the villages (ujamaa vijijini).
The idealized ujamaa villages would involve a collection of peasant households work-
ing on communal farms organized using modern agricultural methods, and generating sur-
plus income to finance various social infrastructure. However, as the ujamaa philosophy
was seen as extension of traditional norms of cooperation in villages, Nyerere’s TANU
party prevented the use of compulsion in starting new villages. In the years following
the Arusha Declaration, various inducements, such as the provision of social infrastructure
(schools, clean water and dispensaries), were used to promote village formation. By 1973,
official estimates suggest that nearly 10 percent of rural households lived in some form of
a village.
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2.2.2 Phase II: 1973-1982
However, given the slow pace of village formation, in November 1973, the Nyerere ad-
ministration announced the mandatory resettlement of all peasant households into villages
by the end of 1976. Villages were to be established within the stipulated 35-month window,
and were to be termed as registered or developmental villages (vijiji uya maendeleo). The
major relocations were broadly termed as Operation Sogeza (meaning moving in Swahili).
In a span of 20 months, there was a remarkable transformation of the Tanzanian country-
side, with nearly 85 percent of all rural households now living in some form a village. New
villages were rapidly planned and with a minimum of 250 families needed. The actual im-
plementation of Operation Sogeza varied across regions, but in most cases operations were
divided into a number of stages with a time-table involving: identifying existing location
of farmers, selecting new village sites, and final resetttlement (McHenry, 1979).
What factors accounted for the relative success of the villagization resettlements across
districts? While there are potentially many factors which contributed to the observed in-
tensity of villagization in each district, I focus here on two main factors highlighted as
important in the historical literature: the use of compulsion by local TANU party cadres,
and the occurrence of widespread droughts in Tanzania during the mid-1970s. First, there
are several documented cases in which local TANU party activists used compulsion in mov-
ing local residents into new villages (Coulson, 1982:250-253). To account for the relative
effectiveness of local TANU party activists in my emprical analyses, I specifically control
for the share of votes received by the TANU Party in the 1970 Tanzania National Presi-
dential Elections. Second, drought conditions which hit several parts of Tanzania in the
mid-1970s appear to have been important in causing many peasant households to relocate
to planned villages. The anthropological literature has often highlighted the independence
of the peasant mode of production in Tanzania, as many rural households often engaged
in subsistence rain-fed agriculture without much concern for the broader activities of the
nation-state. The droughts of the mid-1970s however created the need for famine relief
which was provided in newly planned villages, and for farmers without a harvest, the costs
of relocation into villages was lowered. I revisit the use of the drought severity as an instru-
ment for the intensity of villagization at the district level in Section 5 on my instrumental
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variable 2SLS results.
2.2.3 Institutional Features of Developmental Villages, 1973-1982
The new developmental villages were not simply agglomerations of rural households
but involved institutional changes legislated in the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of July
1975 (Verhagen, 1980). The reforms in village administration in rural Tanzania approxi-
mately spanned the period 1974-1982 until the repeal of the Act, the commencement of an
economic liberalization program, and the announcement of President Nyerere’s imminent
resignation (Shivji and Peters, 2003; Nord et al., 2009). Chieftaincies which had served
as a focal point of native administration during the colonial period had been abolished by
the TANU administration in 1963, and all lands nationalised to be under the control of the
Presidency4. Villagization therefore reorganized the Tanzanian countryside with four main
institutional changes (Verhagen, 1980; Fortmann, 1980; Collier, Radwan and Wangwe,
1986).
First, all adult residents in a village became members of a Village Assembly, which met
at least once a year. Policy-making at the village level was delegated to a Village Council
(with a Chairman and CEO), and elected by the Village Assembly. Further, the Village
Council established five committees responsible for finance, production, education, works
and defense. Second, once registered, the developmental village was legally entitled to
contract loans and engage in economic activity such as marketing of crop produce. Co-
operatives which had previously dominated the crop marketing chain were abolished, with
their functions now handled by village councils. Third, the village also mobilized the lo-
cal community to support the provision and maintenance of social infrastructure. With all
lands effectively nationalised, the Village Council was also empowered to allocate land
among private cultivators. Finally, the village became the center of development planning.
Village development plans were designed and forwarded to the district and regional ad-
ministrators for review and implementation. In 1978, about 4000 development managers
were appointed and deployed to live in registered villages to assist in preparation of village
4Chiefaincies were abolished following the legislation of the African Chiefs Ordinance (Repeal) Act,
1963.
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development plans.
This episode of village participatory development was largely halted in the early 1980s
following Tanzania’s economic collapse. Village councils lost their significance as units
for economic planning or for governance and decision-making. Specifically, in 1982, the
Villages and Ujamaa Village Act was repealed and replaced with the more orthodox Local
Government (District Authorities) Act (1982, No 7). Decision making in these new local
governments was directed from central government officials, and suffered from the “lack
of democratic participation from below” (Shivji and Peters, 2003, pp. 13). Nyerere also an-
nounced his decision not to contest the 1985 presidential election, while Tanzania embarked
on an economic liberalization program supported by the IMF (Nord et al., 2009; Freund,
1981). The IMF adjustment program involving liberalization of agricultural markets, re-
moval of domestic price controls, and reform of parastatals withdrew many government
subsidies previously channeled to village councils (Skarstein, 2005).
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics
2.3.1 Data
I examine the long-run effects of the late 1970s villagization by examining their im-
pacts on education, consumption, community participation and public good provision in
Tanzania today. The villagization treatment varies at the district level and is constructed
using data from village gazetteers in the 1978 Tanzania National Census. I focus on the
district, as this administrative unit remained the center of political and economic activity
in the period following independence (Iliffe, 1975). Using 1978 boundaries, I calculate the






where Pd,r refers to population in all registered villages in district, d and Pd,t is the total
population in district, d. Figure 2.1 provides a graphical illustration of the spatial variation
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in the treatment intensities.
For outcome measures, I use data from a variety of sources: the IPUMS microsample
for the 1988 and 2002 Tanzania National Census, the 2000 Tanzania Household Budget
Survey, the 2008/2009 Tanzania National Household Panel Survey, and the Afrobarometer
Surveys for Tanzania (Rounds 1, 3 and 4).
The IPUMS dataset provides a 10 percent microsample of the 1988 Tanzania census,
with about 2.4 million persons. In the subsection examining short-run education outcomes,
I restrict my analyses to cohorts aged between 1 and 24 in 1974 comprised of about 820,000
individuals in mainland Tanzania. I examine contemporary occupational outcomes using
IPUMS microdata from the 2002 Tanzania census containing about 3.7 million observa-
tions. Next, consumption data is obtained from the Tanzania Household Budget Survey
(THBS) conducted in 2000. Although there are more recent consumption surveys for Tan-
zania, the 2000 HBS provides data covering the largest available sample of 22,178 house-
holds. I focus on the total consumption per adult equivalent (standardized for a 28-day
period, and stated in nominal Tanzanian Shillings) as my main consumption outcome. This
is the standard consumption aggregate measure used in poverty analyses in Tanzania.
For outcomes on participation in community activities and public goods provision, I use
the Tanzanian National Panel Survey (2008/9). The 2008/9 Tanzania NPS is the first wave
of a nationally representative household survey conducted by the Tanzania National Bureau
of Statistics, and forms part of the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Surveys
(LSMS). The survey includes separate units for a household survey, a community module,
and an agricultural survey. The household survey is comprised of 3,280 households and
16,709 individuals. The household module records respondents’ districts of birth, thus
enabling me to link migrants to their initial districts of birth. I also examine outcome
variables related to perceptions on corruption, democracy and national identity which are
obtained from the Afrobarometer Surveys for Tanzania. The Afrobarometer Surveys are
nationally representative surveys of voting age citizens in Africa, and have been previously
used elsewhere in the literature (see, for example, Nunn and Wantchekon, 2009). I utilize
results from Rounds 1, 3 and 4 of the Tanzania surveys which provide district identifiers
for respondents.
In examining electoral outcomes today as a possible channel of persistence, I utilize








Figure 2.1: Treatment Intensity Rates (fraction of population living in registered vil-
lages). Region boundaries are darkened.
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results of the 2010 Tanzania presidential election results obtained from the National Elec-
toral Commission of Tanzania. I also include district-level election results from the 1970
Tanzanian National Election as a control for the popularity of Nyerere’s TANU Party prior
to village formation (see Election Study Committee, 1970). The 1970 electoral results
provide district-level outcomes on voter turnout and the fraction of the population voting
yes in support of Nyerere in the one-party election. Local government tax revenues (for
agricultural produce cess) are also obtained from the Tanzanian Government PMO-RALG
office.
Precipitation data is obtained from the Tanzania Meteorological Agency (TMA). Pre-
vious research on Africa with climate data often utilized global gridded datasets in which
rainfall data is obtained by spatially interpolating information from selected rainfall sta-
tions. For most parts of Africa, the low density of stations used in the spatial interpolation
implies that very local climate variability may not be adequately detected. For example, the
East Anglia Climate Research Unit (CRU) data for Tanzania is based on observations for
only three stations (Dar es Salaam, Songea and Tabora). Therefore, in this project, in order
to investigate the local variation in drought conditions needed for my instrumental vari-
ables estimates, I obtained monthly precipitation data on 108 rainfall stations in Tanzania
covering most of the period 1960-2010. Many rainfall stations in the TMA network have
been in existence since the colonial period under the East Africa Meteorological Agency
(see Johnson, 1962; Nieuwolt, 1977). I calculate district-level mean precipitation for the
main long-rains planting season (masika) which approximately covers March to June each
year.
Finally, I also control for various district pre-treatment characteristics using data com-
piled by Jensen and Mkama (1968). The authors served in the UN Team in Physical Plan-
ning in the Tanzanian Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water Development. They com-
pile district-level data based on various primary sources available in Tanzania in the 1960s
(see Jensen and Mkama, 1968, pp 81). Specifically, they provide district-level data on de-
mographic characteristics, health infrastructure (number of hospital beds per inhabitant),
schools and education enrollment rates, local government revenues, agricultural charac-
teristics and economic activity. Geographic controls are also used, including the long-run
precipitation (mean and standard deviation), latitude, mean area weighted elevation and
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slope, distance from the centroid of each district to the coast and to the nearest railway line
(in 1975).
Details of the data compilation process are provided in Appendix A.
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 provides a summary of district characteristics. The mean level of the villagiza-
tion treatment variable across all districts is 0.727. I group all districts into three categories
of high, medium and low treatment areas and also report additional pre-treatment charac-
teristics. Most pre-treatment characteristics are fairly balanced across all three categories.
The notable exception is the level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, ELFd. Districts with
high levels of village treatment were less ethnically diverse. High treatment districts also
tended to have a slightly lower share of moslems in the population. Tanzania was very
sparsely settled with mean population density of 32 persons per square mile (based on the
1967 population census), and with high treatment districts tending to have slightly higher
density of persons prior to village formation. In subsequent regressions, I control directly
for the effects of pre-treatment ethnolinguistic fragmentation and various pre-treatment
characteristics. Support for the ruling TANU party was also uniformly high across all dis-
tricts in 1970. About 66 percent of registered voters, and 97 percent of total votes cast in
the 1970 Presidential Election voted in support of the ruling TANU party.
2.4 Short-run Effects on Education
I begin by studying the expansion of educational outcomes in Tanzania in the 1970s
which was viewed as a central component of the villagization program (Nyerere,1977;
Mbilinyi, 1976). In contrast to other large education expansion programs financed by re-
source booms during this period (e.g. in Indonesia (Duflo, 2001), in Nigeria (Osili and
Long, 2008)), Tanzania’s program was achieved via village councils in development vil-
lages using informal labor for the construction of primary schools and teachers’ quarters
under the direction of regional government officials (Stabler, 1979; Sheffield, 1979). The
sudden implementation of the villagization program (1974-1976) and its variation across
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TABLE 2.1: CHARACTERISTICS OF DISTRICTS
All Low Medium High P-value P-value
Variables Districts Districts Districts Districts (2) vs (3) (3) vs (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.727 0.357 0.880 0.965 0.0000 0.0000
(Frac. of pop. in registered villages, 1978)
Demographic Characteristics in 1967
Share of Moslems 0.293 0.403 0.267 0.202 0.2445 0.1882
Share of Christians 0.324 0.307 0.312 0.352 0.6848 0.2088
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.610 0.738 0.624 0.460 0.0196 0.0181
Population density (persons per sq. m) 32.42 30.09 30.87 36.53 0.9176 0.6401
Geographic Controls
Latitude -5.661 -5.609 -5.866 -5.506 0.6316 0.6566
Longitude 35.24 36.10 35.35 34.21 0.4522 0.0542
Altitude 1,005 848.0 1,017 1,160 0.4082 0.1284
Slope 3.639 3.559 3.446 3.925 0.5932 0.3861
Distance to railway 107.3 75.09 126.6 121.8 0.0736 0.7706
Distance to coast 510.7 392.8 499.5 648.2 0.3387 0.0401
Mean rainfall (total for masika season, in mm) 492.71 520.67 425.74 529.71 0.1359 0.2243
Std. deviation of rainfall (in mm) 156.73 154.97 145.64 169.72 0.6730 0.4840
Social infrastructure in 1967
Inhabitants per dispensary 10.10 11.46 9.851 8.912 0.4267 0.3739
Hospital beds per capita 2.084 4.018 1.125 1.010 0.0819 0.6600
School enrollment rate 76.04 81.84 72.42 73.58 0.5418 0.9712
Agricultural Characteristics in 1967
Mean land area 1.529 1.808 1.514 1.247 0.3521 0.7043
Fraction of land under smallholder farms 0.0954 0.0940 0.0915 0.101 0.9922 0.8510
Cattle per capita (e-03) 0.919 1.20 0.708 0.837 0.3435 0.8962
Sheep per capita (e-03) 0.277 0.461 0.173 0.188 0.1736 0.7925
Goats per capita (e-03) 0.389 0.554 0.309 0.295 0.2405 0.9017
Donkeys per capita (e-06) 15.7 26.9 13.4 6.04 0.2891 0.2836
Pigs per capita (e-06) 1.21 0.874 1.27 1.50 0.6242 0.7707
Local Government Revenues
Local government revenue per capita 8.56 8.42 8.51 8.76 0.7687 0.9518
(in Tz. Shillings x e-03)
National Election Results, 1970
Registered to eligible voters ratio 0.744 0.738 0.747 0.746 0.4001 0.5664
Voter turnout (voters to eligible pop. ratio) 0.513 0.506 0.526 0.507 0.2402 0.2279
Share of votes for Nyerere among total votes cast 0.969 0.969 0.968 0.970 0.3361 0.4649
Share of votes for Nyerere among registered voters 0.663 0.653 0.669 0.668 0.4229 0.8348
Share of votes for Nyerere among eligible population 0.494 0.486 0.502 0.494 0.8230 0.6403
Observations 90 31 30 29
NOTES: Data compiled from Tanzania National Census (1978); Jensen and Mkama (1968); the Election Study Commit-
tee (1974). Additional information available in data construction appendix.
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districts induces differences in exposure across various year of birth cohorts. This moti-
vates a difference-in-differences estimator of the treatment effect as in Duflo (2001). The
program commenced in 1974, and Tanzanian government policy stipulated school enroll-
ment for children aged 7-13 years. Therefore children aged 1-6 years in 1974 were fully
exposed to the villagization experiment whereas cohorts aged 14-19 fall out of the pre-
scribed education window and may have made their primary education decisions prior to
the commencement of the program5. The IPUMS subsample for the 1988 Tanzania census
provides educational attainment and district of residence on about 2.3 million observations.
I assume that the district of current residence is highly correlated with the district of edu-
cation.
An overview of the results of the program on completion of primary education is pre-
sented in the two-by-two matrix in Table 2.2. High and low treatment areas are respectively
districts that fall in the top and bottom quintiles of the villagization distribution. Panel A
presents the experiment of interest comparing primary school completion rates for children
aged 1-6 years in 1974 (and thus were fully exposed to the villagization experiment during
their primary school years), to those aged 14-19 years who had little or no exposure. Pri-
mary education rates increase over the period in both high and low treatment areas by 0.29
and 0.18 points respectively. Under the identifying assumption that high and low treatment
areas would have experienced similar increases in educational attainment, the difference in
differences may be interpreted as the causal effect of the program. As shown in Table 2.2,
primary school completion rates increased by about 11.5 percentage points more in high
treatment areas compared with low treatment areas during the villagization period.
In Panel B, I provide results for a control experiment which compares education com-
pletion for two cohorts of children, aged 14-19 and 20-25 in 1974. As both cohorts were
not exposed to the program during their years of primary education, we would not expect
to see any significant difference between primary completion rates for these two groups.
The difference in difference estimate in Panel B is about 0.9 percentage points, and not
significantly different from zero — suggesting that primary school completion would not
5Delayed enrollment and grade repetition implies that some of the older cohorts would be treated, and in
this case should bias my results downwards against finding a treatment effect.
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TABLE 2.2: MEANS OF EDUCATION BY COHORT AND LEVEL OF VILLAGIZATION PROGRAM
Dummy for primary school completion
Low Treatment Areas High Treatment Areas Difference
Panel A: Experiment of Interest
Aged 1 to 6 in 1974 0.756 0.694
Aged 14 to 19 in 1974 0.579 0.403
Difference 0.176 0.291 0.115
(0.005)
Panel B: Control Experiment
Aged 14 to 19 in 1974 0.579 0.403
Aged 20 to 25 in 1974 0.451 0.264
Difference 0.129 0.138 0.009
(0.006)
NOTES: Data is obtained from IPUMS microsample of 1988 Tanzania Census. Villagization program
commences in 1974 and primary school attendance spans ages 7-13 years. In the main experiment, I com-
pare children aged 1-6 years in 1974 who are fully exposed to the program, those aged 14-19 years in 1974
who are not exposed to the program. The control experiment compares children aged 14-19 in 1974 to
those aged 20-25 in 1974. Outcome variable is a dummy equal to 1 for primary school completion.
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have evolved differently in high and low treatment areas in the absence of the program.
Below, I provide more precise estimates of the effect of the program in a regression
framework. Consider the fixed effects regression:
Pidc = αd + βc + (Td ∗ Ei)γ1 + (Xd ∗ Ei)δ1 + idc (2.2)
where Pidc is a dummy equal to one for primary school completion, Ei is a “young” ex-
posure dummy equal to one if the individual was 6 years or younger in 1974, and thus ex-
posed to the program, αd and βc are respectively fixed effects for districts of birth and year
of birth, Td refers to the villagization intensity in district d, and Xd is a vector of controls
of pre-treatment characteristics for district d. The identification assumption here requires
that no omitted time-varying and district-specific factors are correlated with the treatment
intensity of the program. Therefore, to address possible omitted variables, I present results
controlling for the interaction of the “young” dummy with various pre-treatment district
characteristics such as primary school enrollment rates, health infrastructure, demographic,
agricultural and geographic characteristics.
Table 2.3 presents the results, comparing cohorts aged 1-6 years in 1974 to those aged
14-19 years in 1974. The baseline regression without controls is presented in column 1,
while in columns (2), (3) and (4) I successively control for pre-treatment education enroll-
ment, health characteristics and finally all controls. The results indicate that moving from
zero to full villagization increased the probability of primary school completion by about
13 percentage points. In Panel B, I repeat this exercise but now comparing cohorts aged
14-19 years in 1974 to those aged 20-25 in 1974 (i.e. the control experiment in Table 2.2
above). In this case, the coefficients are are much smaller, and not significant.
Next, I extend the analysis in equation (2.2) above to examine impacts of the treatment
on education completion for various age cohorts. I run the following regression:
Pidc = αd + βc +
24∑
l=1
(Td ∗ bil)γ1l + (Xd ∗ Ei)δ1 + idc (2.3)
where bil refers to a year of birth dummy for individual i. The omitted dummy category
is for l=25. For each cohort, the coefficient γ1l provides estimates for the impact of the
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villagization treatment compared to the omitted category or control group (i.e. for l=25).
We would therefore expect no impact of the program on cohorts aged 14 and above in 1974
who would have completed their primary education prior to the introduction of develop-
ment villages. Similarly, we expect the effect of the treatment to be positive for cohorts
aged 13 and below (in 1974) and for this effect to increase for younger cohorts. Figure
2.2 displays these coefficients and provides evidence in support of this observation (see
Appendix Table A1). The coefficients on the interaction of age cohort and treatment in-
tensity are positive and significant for younger cohorts up to cohorts aged 14 in 1974. For
older cohorts, aged between 15 and 24 in 1974, the coefficient is smaller and no longer
significant. The rise in the coefficients begin for cohorts aged 17, although the 95 percent
confidence intervals include zero. As expected, the coefficient is positive and increases in
magnitude, and becomes significant precisely for children aged 13 years and below in 1974.
The positive coefficients for cohorts aged 14-17 may be the result of these cohorts being
partly treated if some older individuals were still enrolled in school in 1974. This may be
likely given previous evidence of delayed primary enrollment in Tanzania (Bommier and
Lambert, 1999).
In Table 2.4, I present results examining additional educational outcomes. I repeat the
regression in equation (2.2) but now with literacy (defined as ability to read and write in
any language) and total years of schooling as outcome variables. Consider the results re-
ported in column (1) of Table 2.4, Panel A. The first row repeats results for the probability
of primary school completion in Table 2.3. I find that literacy increases by 8.85 percent-
age points, while years of schooling completed increase by approximately 1.1 years. The
results in increased educational outcomes also remain when I consider male and female
subgroups in Panels B and C of Table 2.4. Overall, the discussion in this section provides
some evidence that the villagization program yielded some short-term impacts in educa-
tional attainment.
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TABLE 2.3: EFFECT OF PROGRAM ON PRIMARY EDUCATION COMPLETION
Dependent variable: Dummy for Completion of Primary Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Experiment of Interest (cohorts aged 1-6 or 14-19)
Young cohorts are aged 1-6
Young * TreatmentIntensity 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.118*** 0.0832***
(0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0276) (0.0198)
Observations 469,034 469,034 459,164 446,484
R-squared 0.119 0.119 0.120 0.122
Panel B: Control Experiment (cohorts aged 14-19 or 20-25)
Young cohorts are aged 14-19
Young * TreatmentIntensity 0.0154 0.0162 0.0163 0.00853
(0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0132) (0.0138)
Observations 293,758 293,758 291,599 283,549
R-squared 0.089 0.089 0.090 0.089
Young dummy * primary enrollment rate in 1970 NO YES YES YES
Young dummy * health infrastructure in 1970 NO NO YES YES
Young dummy * other pre-treatment district characterstics NO NO NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is dummy for completion of primary education. Data is
obtained from IPUMS microsample of 1988 Tanzania Census. All columns include fixed effects for year of birth
cohorts and districts. Controls enter the regression interacted with the young dummy. Column 2 controls for pre-
treatment primary enrollment in 1970. Column 3 includes controls for health infrastructure in 1970. Column 4
includes various geographic and demographic controls (for latitude, slope, altitude, ethnic fragmentation, share
of christians, livestock populations, and local government revenues - see Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district boundaries.
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TABLE 2.4: EFFECT OF PROGRAM ON EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES (CONTD.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE
Primary education completion 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.118*** 0.0832***
(0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0276) (0.0198)
Literacy 0.0885*** 0.0858*** 0.0849*** 0.0588***
(0.0187) (0.0194) (0.0221) (0.0164)
Years of schooling 1.079*** 1.067*** 1.025*** 0.826***
(0.198) (0.201) (0.221) (0.167)
PANEL B: MALE SUBSAMPLE
Primary education completion 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.117*** 0.0899***
(0.0237) (0.0244) (0.0260) (0.0247)
Literacy 0.0584*** 0.0566*** 0.0573*** 0.0310**
(0.0135) (0.0144) (0.0174) (0.0146)
Years of schooling 1.074*** 1.064*** 1.045*** 0.903***
(0.173) (0.179) (0.206) (0.196)
PANEL C: FEMALE SUBSAMPLE
Primary education completion 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.0937*** 0.0632***
(0.0284) (0.0282) (0.0309) (0.0233)
Literacy 0.0897*** 0.0856*** 0.0843*** 0.0682***
(0.0268) (0.0270) (0.0304) (0.0241)
Years of schooling 0.864*** 0.848*** 0.797*** 0.633***
(0.227) (0.229) (0.252) (0.199)
Young dummy * primary enrollment rate in 1970 NO YES YES YES
Young dummy * health infrastructure in 1970 NO NO YES YES
Young dummy * other pre-treatment district characterstics NO NO NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table reports coefficients on Young * TreatmentIntensity. Data is obtained
from IPUMS microsample of 1988 Tanzania Census. All columns include fixed effects for year of birth co-
horts and districts. Controls enter the regression interacted with the young dummy. Column 2 controls for pre-
treatment primary enrollment in 1970. Column 3 includes controls for health infrastructure in 1970. Column 4
includes various geographic and demographic controls (for latitude, slope, altitude, ethnic fragmentation, share
of christians, livestock populations, and local government revenues - see Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Robust
standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district boundaries.
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2.5 Effects on Political Attitudes
Political socialization was a secondary objective of the villagization campaigns, and
aimed at developing norms of citizenship in the new nation (Nyerere, 1977). Nation-
building in newly independent African states often required programs aimed at re-orienting
citizens away from parochial ethnic loyalties (Koff and von der Muhll, 1967). In the case
of Tanzania, specific policies of nation-building implemented by the post-independence
government included emphasizing civic education in the public school curriculum and pro-
moting Swahili as a national language (Prewitt et al, 1970, 1971; Miguel, 2004). In this
section, I turn to recent Afrobarometer Surveys, and examine changes in political attitudes
of cohorts born before and after the villagization campaigns. Specifically, I examine out-
comes related to political participation, support for one-party rule, support for democracy,
perceptions of corruption among government officials and perceptions of ethnic versus na-
tional identity. The Afrobarometer surveys are conducted for citizens aged 18 years and
above. In this analysis, I omit individuals aged between 38 and 48 in 2008 (i.e. born in the
1970s during the villagization campaigns) and compare older cohorts, aged 48 and above,
to younger cohorts aged 38 and below.
I run a regression similar to equation (2.2) above:
Yidc = αd + βc + (Td ∗ Ei)γ1 + (Xd ∗ Ei)δ1 + idc (2.4)
where Yidc is the outcome variable of interest; Ei is a “young” if the individual was aged
between 18-38 in 2008, and thus born following the villagization programs, αd and βc are
respectively fixed effects for districts of birth and year of birth, Td refers to the villagization
intensity in district d, and Xd is a vector of controls of pre-treatment characteristics for
district d. The coefficient, γ1 on (Td ∗ Ei) therefore provides the difference-in-difference
estimate comparing the mean outcome variable for older cohorts aged 48-78 years to a
younger cohort aged 18-38 years, in high versus low treatment districts.6
6In additional results reported in Appendix C, Tables C1-4, I extend the analyses by categorizing the old
and young cohorts into further age bins, and then running a regression similar to equation (2.4) above. In this
case, the dummy Ei takes on four values for cohorts born between 1980-1989, 1970-1979, 1960-1969 and
1950-1959. The omitted category is for cohorts born prior to 1950.
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The results on political attitudes are reported in Tables 2.5-2.8. All outcome variables
are coded as dummies for whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the question
posed. For each table, in moving from columns (1) to (6), I successively introduce con-
trols for geographic characteristics, and pre-1970 demographic composition, agricultural
characteristics, education enrollment and local government revenues. The difference-in-
difference estimates in Table 2.5 indicate that younger cohorts in more treated districts, are
more likely to have contacted their local government or civil service officials, and more
likely to be able to correctly name their local MPs.
In Table 2.6, I find that the γ1 coefficient on (Td ∗ Ei) is negative in response to the
question of whether the respondent supports one party rule. From the results in column
(6) of Panel A, a one standard deviation increase in the treatment measure results in a 4
percentage point decrease in support for one-party rule. In Panel B, I also observe stronger
support for democracy among the younger cohorts in more treated districts. Again, increas-
ing the district-level treatment measure by one standard deviation results in an approximate
4 percentage point increase in support for democracy.
Table 2.7 reports results on perceptions of corruption, focusing on elected leaders, gov-
ernment officials and the police in Panels A, B and C respectively. Existing survey research
on Tanzania indicates widespread perceptions of corruption in public officials (Chaligha et
al, 2002). For example, in Panel C, 78 percent of respondents regarded corruption to be
prevalent among the police service. For the preferred specification in column (6), the γ1
coefficient is statistically significant and meaningful in magnitude. Increasing the district-
level treatment measure from zero to 1 increased perception of corruption among MPs,
government officials and the police by approximately 23 percent points, 30 percent points
and 20 percent points respectively. The rejection of one-party rule, support for democracy
today, and perception of widespread corruption among public officials is consistent with
anecdotal evidence of disillusionment following the era of socialist planning, particularly
following the interactions of peasant farmers with government bureaucrats and technical
staff (von Freyhold, 1979; Fortmann, 1980).
Finally, in Table 2.8, I examine the outcome variable related to perceptions of ethnic
versus national identity and trust of Tanzanians of other tribes. In Panel A, the outcome
variable is a dummy which equals 1 if the respondent prefers national (i.e. Tanzanian iden-
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TABLE 2.5: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if respondent contacted local government official in the past year?
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.279
Young x Treatment 0.0954** 0.130*** 0.154** 0.160** 0.159** 0.156**
(0.0415) (0.0448) (0.0633) (0.0645) (0.0651) (0.0633)
Observations 3,439 3,439 3,439 3,359 3,359 3,359
R-squared 0.114 0.116 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117
PANEL B
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if respondent contacted any government civil service official in the past year?
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.109
Young x Treatment 0.0669* 0.0985** 0.0949* 0.0914* 0.0988* 0.0887*
(0.0397) (0.0455) (0.0497) (0.0505) (0.0502) (0.0455)
Observations 3,434 3,434 3,434 3,354 3,354 3,354
R-squared 0.083 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.086 0.088
PANEL C
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if respondent able to correctly name local MP?
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.748
Young x Treatment 0.219*** 0.266*** 0.220** 0.219** 0.234** 0.224**
(0.0773) (0.0794) (0.0937) (0.0979) (0.101) (0.0993)
Observations 1,864 1,864 1,864 1,838 1,838 1,838
R-squared 0.213 0.214 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218
Geographic Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Agricultural Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Education Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES
Local Govt Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
NOTES: Data is obtained from the Afrobarometer Tanzania Surveys: Rounds 3 and 4 data are used in Pan-
els A and B; and Round 1 data for Panel C. Results are based on the regression model in equation (2.4). The
coefficient on young x treatment (i.e. Td ∗ Ei) provides the difference-in-difference estimate comparing the
mean outcome variable for older cohorts aged 48-78 years to a younger cohort aged 18-38 years. Geographic
controls are for latitude, mean weighted slope and altitude. Demographic controls are for mean pre-treatment
ethnolinguistic fragmentation, fraction of moslems and fraction of christians in the population based on the
1967 Tanzania Census. Agricultural controls are for per capita populations of cattle, sheep, and goats (Jensen
and Mkama, 1968). Education control is for school enrollment rate in 1967 and local government controls are
for per capita local government revenues in 1968-1970 (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Robust standard errors are
in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district boundaries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 2.6: ONE PARTY RULE AND DEMOCRACY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if respondent supports one party rule
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.429
Young x Treatment -0.0483 -0.115 -0.218* -0.206 -0.222* -0.209*
(0.0968) (0.111) (0.122) (0.126) (0.126) (0.125)
Observations 1,582 1,582 1,582 1,527 1,527 1,527
R-squared 0.175 0.177 0.180 0.176 0.179 0.180
PANEL B
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if respondent supports democracy
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.644
Young x Treatment 0.0108 0.0838 0.145 0.162 0.175 0.190*
(0.0910) (0.0916) (0.104) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107)
Observations 1,582 1,582 1,582 1,527 1,527 1,527
R-squared 0.219 0.222 0.224 0.224 0.226 0.227
Geographic Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Agricultural Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Education Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES
Local Govt Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
NOTES: Data is obtained from Round 1 of the Tanzania Afrobarometer Survey. Re-
sults are based on the regression model in equation (2.4). The coefficient on young x
treatment (i.e. Td ∗ Ei) provides the difference-in-difference estimate comparing the
mean outcome variable for older cohorts aged 48-78 years to a younger cohort aged
18-38 years. Geographic controls are for latitude, mean weighted slope and altitude.
Demographic controls are for mean pre-treatment ethnolinguistic fragmentation, frac-
tion of moslems and fraction of christians in the population based on the 1967 Tanza-
nia Census. Agricultural controls are for per capita populations of cattle, sheep, and
goats (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Education control is for school enrollment rate in
1967 and local government controls are for per capita local government revenues in
1968-1970 (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and
clustered at the 1978 district boundaries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 2.7: PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if corruption is prevalent among elected leaders (MPs)?
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.531
Young x Treatment 0.165** 0.228** 0.212* 0.252** 0.227* 0.227*
(0.0745) (0.0932) (0.117) (0.120) (0.134) (0.135)
Observations 1,835 1,835 1,835 1,809 1,809 1,809
R-squared 0.174 0.176 0.177 0.171 0.171 0.171
PANEL B
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if corruption is prevalent among government officials?
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.597
Young x Treatment 0.222** 0.248** 0.251* 0.304** 0.298** 0.300**
(0.101) (0.118) (0.136) (0.138) (0.145) (0.147)
Observations 1,835 1,835 1,835 1,809 1,809 1,809
R-squared 0.138 0.139 0.139 0.136 0.136 0.136
PANEL C
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if corruption is prevalent among the police?
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.784
Young x Treatment 0.117* 0.172** 0.155 0.173* 0.189 0.196*
(0.0617) (0.0675) (0.0978) (0.103) (0.119) (0.116)
Observations 1,835 1,835 1,835 1,809 1,809 1,809
R-squared 0.108 0.112 0.113 0.110 0.110 0.110
Geographic Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Agricultural Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Education Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES
Local Govt Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
NOTES: Data is obtained from the Afrobarometer Tanzania Surveys (Rounds 3 and 4). Results are based on the
regression model in equation (2.4). The coefficient on young x treatment (i.e. Td ∗ Ei) provides the difference-in-
difference estimate comparing the mean outcome variable for older cohorts aged 48-78 years to a younger cohort
aged 18-38 years. Geographic controls are for latitude, mean weighted slope and altitude. Demographic controls
are for mean pre-treatment ethnolinguistic fragmentation, fraction of moslems and fraction of christians in the pop-
ulation based on the 1967 Tanzania Census. Agricultural controls are for per capita populations of cattle, sheep,
and goats (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Education control is for school enrollment rate in 1967 and local government
controls are for per capita local government revenues in 1968-1970 (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district boundaries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 2.8: PERCEPTIONS ON ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if respondent prefers national to ethnic identity
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.753
Young x Treatment -0.0710 -0.121** -0.167** -0.170** -0.173** -0.163**
(0.0568) (0.0598) (0.0700) (0.0714) (0.0719) (0.0695)
Observations 3,396 3,396 3,396 3,316 3,316 3,316
R-squared 0.085 0.087 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.090
PANEL B
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if respondent trusts Tanzanians of other tribes
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.672
Young x Treatment 0.0278 0.0614 0.0280 0.0229 0.0138 0.0211
(0.0560) (0.0603) (0.0592) (0.0592) (0.0562) (0.0550)
Observations 2,546 2,546 2,546 2,484 2,484 2,484
R-squared 0.102 0.106 0.107 0.107 0.108 0.108
Geographic Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Agricultural Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Education Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES
Local Govt Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
NOTES: Data is obtained from the Tanzania Afrobarometer Survey. Panel A is based on
results from Rounds 1, 3 and 4. Panel B is based on results from Rounds 1 and 3. Results
are based on the regression model in equation (2.4). The coefficient on young x treatment
(i.e. Td ∗ Ei) provides the difference-in-difference estimate comparing the mean outcome
variable for older cohorts aged 48-78 years to a younger cohort aged 18-38 years. Geo-
graphic controls are for latitude, mean weighted slope and altitude. Demographic controls
are for mean pre-treatment ethnolinguistic fragmentation, fraction of moslems and fraction
of christians in the population based on the 1967 Tanzania Census. Agricultural controls are
for per capita populations of cattle, sheep, and goats (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Educa-
tion control is for school enrollment rate in 1967 and local government controls are for per
capita local government revenues in 1968-1970 (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district boundaries. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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tity) to ethnic identity. I find that the coefficient on the interaction (Td ∗ Ei) is negative.
Thus, the younger cohort in more villagized districts are more likely to state their identities
in ethnic categories, rather than with the Tanzanian nation. Note that Tanzania is anec-
dotally viewed as an “ethnically” cohesive nation, and the mean for the national identity
variable (approximately 0.75) is among the highest recorded in the Afrobarometer surveys
for African nations. Yet, the results in Panel A appear initially surprising as the village
formation process was also aimed at curbing ethnic loyalties and forging a greater sense of
Tanzanian citizenship. Perhaps, in spite of the 1963 abolition of chieftaincies in Tanzania,
ethnic loyalties remained in communities with large pre-Independence ethnic polities. If
village formation was greater in such communities, then ethnic loyalties are likely to persist
despite a history of high village formation in the 1970s.
2.6 Effects on Consumption, Community Participation and
Public Goods Provision
2.6.1 OLS Results
In this section, I present OLS results on the impacts of the villagization program on
current levels of consumption, community participation and public goods provision. My
baseline estimating equation examines the relationship between the degree of villagization
in an individual’s district and the outcome variable, Yid. This is presented in a regression
framework as:





where Yid refers to various outcome variables (log per capita consumption, participation in
community activities or presence of school infrastructure), Td refers to a historical measure
of treatment intensity in district d, δr is a region fixed effect, and Zd andXi are respectively
district and individual controls. In all specifications above, standard errors are clustered at
the district level based on 1978 boundaries. When examining district-level outcomes, I run
regressions similar to (2) above, but with district level outcomes. The coefficient of interest
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is β, which provides a point estimate of the relationship between villagization treatment
and the outcome variable of interest. The individual level controls X ′i are for age, gender,
and marital status; while the district controls are for pre-treatment characteristics such as
geographic characteristics, demographic composition, agricultural output, economic activ-
ity, local government revenues, and health and education infrastructure. The OLS results
based on equation (2.5) above are presented for household consumption, community par-
ticipation and public goods provision in Tables 2.9 to 2.11.
The outcome variable in Table 2.9 is log of consumption per adult equivalent. I include
region fixed effects in all columns, and thus examine whether variation in the treatment
variable explains within-region differences in consumption. Column (1) presents the base-
line specification, controlling only for geographic characteristics (namely latitude, slope,
elevation and the mean and standard deviation of long-run precipitation) as well as the
district-level of ethnic fragmentation. The results indicate that areas which experienced
high levels of village formation are significantly worse off today. Increasing the district
treatment intensity variable from zero to 1 results in approximately a 37.7 percent loss in
per capita househod consumption today. I extend the analyses in columns (2) to (6) by
introducing additional pre-1970 controls. In column (2), I control for district-level demo-
graphic characteristics by including the population density, fraction of the moslem popula-
tion and the fraction of the Christian population. Agricultural controls are also introduced
in column (3). The pre-1970 district agricultural characteristics provide information on the
relative importance of agricultural employment across Tanzania, and also serve as proxies
for pre-villagization district incomes. In column (3), I specifically include controls for the
fraction of the population employed in agriculture, and the district per capita population
of cattle, sheep, goats and donkeys. The point estimates increase in columns (2) and (3),
and remains significant at the 5 percent level. To account for the availability of government
services prior to 1970, I include controls for health and education infrastructure, and local
government revenues in columns (4) and (5). Finally, in column (6), I also control for the
relative support of the TANU party using district-level election outcomes from the 1970
Tanzanian presidential elections. The result in column (6) remains significant at the 10
percent level.
Overall, the adverse effects on household consumption reported in Table 2.9 is consis-
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tent with earlier and contemporary accounts which point to the welfare losses which oc-
curred following village formation in Tanzania (Ergas, 1980; see Edwards, 2012 for recent
discussion). The estimates of the consumption losses are also of comparable magnitude to
estimates by Dippel (2011) on the welfare losses following the formation of Native Amer-
ican reservations in North America. Dippel estimates that forced integration of previously
autonomous Indian bands into reservations lowered per capita incomes by about 30 percent
today.
In Table 2.10, I examine outcomes on community participation. The results indicate
that, conditional on region fixed effects, individuals born in more treated districts today
report higher levels of attendance of local community meetings, and also are more likely to
correctly name their village executive officer. These results remain robust to the inclusion
of a variety of controls. In columns (5) and (6), I successively introduce pre-1970 controls
for agricultural activity and for education enrollment. Thus, a 1 standard deviation increase
in villagization treatment increases the probability of participating in village meetings to-
day by about 6 percentage points, and also results in a 5 percentage point increase in ability
to correctly name the local community leader.
Next, Table 2.11 examines the impact of treatment on provision of health and education
infrastructure. Again, the treatment measure is associated with an increased probability of
a community having a government primary school and a health facility. For example, a 1
standard deviation increase in treatment is associated with a 9 percentage point increase in
the probability of having a school in the local community today. For both the availability of
primary schools and local health facilities, the treatment effect remains significant across
various specifications in columns (2) to (5) after including region fixed effects and various
geographical and pre-1970 agricultural and economic controls.
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TABLE 2.9: HOUSEHOLD PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var: log per capita household consumption
TreatmentIntensity -0.377** -0.434** -0.414** -0.386** -0.354* -0.305*
(0.180) (0.169) (0.173) (0.161) (0.178) (0.169)
Geographic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Agricultural controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Education and health controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Local gov’t revenues controls NO NO NO NO YES YES
TANU party (1970) controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 19,912 19,912 19,098 19,098 18,751 18,751
R-squared 0.165 0.184 0.195 0.197 0.201 0.202
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data is obtained from the Tanzania Household Budget Sur-
vey (2000). All columns include region fixed effects, and control for ethnic fragmentation and
geographic characteristics (latitude, slope, altitude, mean and standard deviation of long-term
precipitation). Additional pre-treatment controls (pre-1970) are as follows: demographic con-
trols (population density, fraction of moslem population and Christian population), agricultural
controls (share of population employed in agriculture, per capita population of cattle, sheep,
goats and donkeys), education controls (primary school enrollment rate), health controls (num-
ber of inhabitants per dispensary, number of hospital beds per capita), and local government
revenues controls (per capita total local government revenue). TANU party (1970) controls are
for 1970 electoral outcomes (fraction of population voting in favor of Nyerere/TANU and for
voter turnout). Regression weighted using household sampling pweights provided in the Tan-
zania Household Budget Survey. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the
1978 district boundaries.
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TABLE 2.10: COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Attendance of community meetings (mean depvar: 0.568)
TreatmentIntensity 0.259*** 0.178*** 0.173*** 0.221*** 0.191*** 0.171***
(0.0499) (0.0518) (0.0542) (0.0686) (0.0555) (0.0573)
Dep. var.: Ability to name village chief executive officer (mean = 0.328)
TreatmentIntensity 0.236*** 0.233*** 0.234*** 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.257***
(0.0626) (0.0803) (0.0880) (0.0743) (0.0770) (0.0806)
Geographic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Agricultural controls (1970) NO YES YES NO YES YES
Education controls (1970) NO NO YES NO NO YES
Region Fixed Effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 2,561 2,460 2,460 2,494 2,393 2,393
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data is obtained from the community module of the Tanza-
nia National Panel Survey (2008/9) conducted by NBS/World Bank. Region fixed effects are in-
cluded in regressions for columns (4) to (6). All columns control for ethnic fragmentation and ge-
ographic characteristics (latitude, slope, altitude, mean and standard deviation of long-term precipi-
tation). Agricultural controls are for: share of the district population employed in agriculture (from
1967 Tanzania National Census) and for per capita populations of cattle, sheep, goats and donkeys
(from Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Other controls include pre-treatment primary education enroll-
ment, share of population employed in manufacturing and local government revenues in 1967 (from
Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 dis-
trict boundaries.
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TABLE 2.11: PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dep. Var: Is there a government primary school within this community? (mean: .877)
TreatmentIntensity 0.286*** 0.380*** 0.398*** 0.450*** 0.483***
(0.0589) (0.105) (0.114) (0.136) (0.139)
Dep. Var: Is there a health facility in this community? (mean: 0.452)
TreatmentIntensity 0.102 0.445*** 0.367*** 0.438*** 0.379**
(0.111) (0.114) (0.122) (0.149) (0.158)
Geographic controls YES YES YES YES YES
Agricultural controls NO YES YES YES YES
Employment, LGA revenues NO NO YES NO YES
Region FE NO NO NO YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data is obtained from the community module of
the Tanzania National Panel Survey (2008/9) conducted by NBS/World Bank. Region
fixed effects are included in regressions for columns (4) and (5). All columns control for
ethnic fragmentation and geographic characteristics (latitude, slope, altitude, mean and
standard deviation of long-term precipitation). Agricultural controls are for: share of the
district population employed in agriculture (from 1967 Tanzania National Census) and
for per capita populations of cattle, sheep, goats and donkeys (from Jensen and Mkama,
1968). Other controls include pre-treatment primary education enrollment, share of pop-
ulation employed in manufacturing and local government revenues in 1967 (from Jensen
and Mkama, 1968). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978
district boundaries.
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2.6.2 Instrumental Variable Results
In this section, I consider the use of instrumental variables. The results in the previous
section suggest that, conditional on various controls, there is a relationship between the
treatment measure and current levels of household consumption, community participation
and public goods provision. However, these results could still be biased if there are omit-
ted variables correlated with the historical measure of villagization treatment. To address
this problem, an instrument is needed which is correlated with historic treatment intensi-
ties, but uncorrelated with any other district or individual characteristics which may affect
our outcome variables today. I consider an instrument motivated by two historical obser-
vations which influenced villagization: the incidence of prolonged droughts in the 1970s
which coincided with the time period for implementation of villagization, and secondly,
the variation in ethnolinguistic fragmentation across districts prior to village formation.
First, the incidence of droughts which occurred across parts of Tanzania between 1973-
1975 is well documented in the historical literature (Nyerere, 1977). Scholars debated
the importance of these droughts in explaining the government’s economic policies and
Tanzania’s subsequent economic decline (Lofchie, 1978; Hyden, 1980). However, for the
purposes of village formation, the droughts of the 1970s were important for two reasons.
First, famine relief (such as imported maize) which was typically provided following such
natural disasters would be selectively allocated to new village sites to encourage resettle-
ment. Indeed, prior to the villagization campaigns, some initial resettlement was conducted
following natural disasters, for example, when the Rufiji River flooded its banks in 1969
(Coulson, 1982, pp 247)7. Secondly, the droughts of the 1970s resulted in poor harvests
which reduced the costs of relocation for many peasant farmers.
Goran Hyden (1980, pp 146-147), a noted Swedish scholar of this period, summarized
the impact of the droughts on the villagization program:
Villagization coincided with the drought that hit large parts of Tanzania in
1973/74. It is fair to say that from the viewpoint of the objectives of villagiza-
tion, the drought was a blessing in disguise in that in many areas it facilitated
7Mamdani (1996), also documents a similar strategy adopted in neighbouring Mozambique in 1977-78
to villagize scattered rural households in Maputo and Gaza provinces following the flooding of the Limpopo
and Incomati Rivers.
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the movement of people. There was little they left behind on the land and con-
sequently it was easier for them to accept living in new villages. It is one of the
reasons why some people did not object to moving but did so without govern-
ment pressure...[W]eather continued to play havoc with agricultural production
in some areas during 1974/75 and there was clearly a limit to what the peasants
could produce before having settled in properly.
Below, I examine the variation in drought severity across Tanzania in the 1970s as an
instrument for my IV/2SLS strategy. Using precipitation data covering 108 stations in Tan-
zania for the period 1960-2010 from the Tanzania Meteorological Agency, I examine the
relationship between drought severity and the intensity of village formation in the 1970s.
Maize served as the major food crop for most peasant communities (Herrick et al, 1968),
and I focus on total precipitation recorded during the main planting season (masika) which
approximately spans March to June each year. I compute a precipitation index for each dis-
trict in two ways. First, I calculate a ratio rainfall index by dividing the total mean monthly
precipitation during the masika seasons in 1973-1975 by the long-term average masika
precipitation for the 50-year period, with this index censored at 1. A higher precipitation
index means less severe drought. Second, I also examine a standardized rainfall index (Z-
score) by subtracting the district long-term mean rainfall from the 1973-1975 mean, and
dividing by the standard deviation, with this index censored at zero. The censoring of the
drought measure is based on agricultural field experiments for maize which suggest min-
imal benefits from increasing rainfall above its long-run mean levels (see Hollinger and
Chagnnon, 1993; and Dell, 2011). Figure 2.3 displays the variation in drought severity
across Tanzania, based on the ratio rainfall index for the period 1973-75.
Besides the droughts of the 1970s, ethnic and linguistic diversity hindered communi-
cation and cooperation, so that village formation was likely to be more successful in less
ethnically fragmented districts (McHenry, 1979, pp 175-6)8. I calculate a measure of eth-
8von Freyhold (1979, pp 142) also provides an example of such an encounter between two neighboring
ethnic groups in Ilala district attempting to move into a common village during the ujamaa period prior to the
national villagization program: “According to the Tibili villagers it was the Tibili site that was intended to be
the site of the Ujamaa village all along. According to the Chanika villagers it was the Chanika site, and it was
only when they went to cut poles to start house building that they realized that the village was to be at Tibili,
for the government lorry dropped the poles at the Tibili site. When the villagers complained, there was an
argument during which the divisional executive officer announced that Tibili was the approved site and that
those who were not interested in building at Tibili could stay out.”









































































































Figure 2.3: Map of Drought Severity Index for 1973-75. The mean rainfall for 1973-75
masika seasons is divided by the corresponding long-run average. Region boundaries are
darkened. Black dots point to location of rainfall stations.








Figure 2.4: Map of Ethnolinguistic fragmentation, ELFd (Based on 1957 Tanzania Na-
tional Census). The district-level measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is computed
as ELFd = (1 −∑ e2id), where ei is the fraction of the population in district, d, belonging
to ethnic group, i. Region boundaries are darkened.
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nolinguistic fragmentation, ELFd, using the 1957 Tanzania National Census (prior to the
Arusha Declaration), which is the most recent national census with data on ethnic popula-
tions at the district level. The district-level measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is
computed using the usual formulation in the literature, ELFd = (1−∑ e2id), where ei is the
fraction of the population in district, d, belonging to ethnic group, i (Mauro, 1995; Posner,
2004).910 Figure 2.4 displays the variation inELFd across Tanzanian districts in 1957. The
historic levels of ELFd is potentially correlated with the error term in equation (2.5), and
thus does not satisfy the exclusion restrictions. I therefore consider the interaction of the
drought and ethnolinguistic fragmentation as an instrument, while controlling for the direct
effect of ELF.
Specifically, I examine two possible first stage regressions. First, using the drought
measure as an instrument, and next, using the interaction of the drought and ELF while
controlling for the level of ELF. The first-stage regressions are stated below:
Td = γ0a + γ1aRainfalld +X
′
dλa + d (2.6)
Td = γ0b + γ1bRainfalld ∗ ELFd + γ2ELFd +X ′dλb + φd (2.7)
where (Td) is the treatment measure,Xd is a vector of controls including geographic charac-
teristics and district pre-treatment characteristics. The geographic controls include controls
for latitude, slope, altitude, and the mean and standard deviation of precipitation over the
period 1960-2010. We expect the coefficients γ1a < 0 and γ1b < 0 since both higher rainfall
and higher ELF result in less village formation.
Table 12 reports results of the first-stage relationship. Columns (1) and (2) present re-
sults with the ratio of mean precipitation to the long run mean, while columns (3) and (4)
utilize the standardized precipitation index (Z-score). Columns (1) and (3) control only
for geographical characteristics (namely: latitude, slope, altitude and the mean and stan-
dard deviation of long-run precipitation), while in columns (2) and (4), I include additional
9This measure represents the probability that any two randomly chosen individuals in district, d, belong
to different ethnic groups.
10The district-level ethnic composition appears relatively stable in the early independence period: for
example, the correlation between ELFd,1957 and ELFd,1948 is 0.978.
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controls for pre-1970 agricultural characteristics and education enrollment. In Panel A,
the instrument used is only the rainfall measure, while in Panel B, I use the interaction
of the rainfall measure with ELF. In all specifications in both Panels A and B, there is a
significant and negative relationship between the instrument and the intensity of villagiza-
tion. The instruments are however weak (F-statistics ranging between 6.00 and 9.4), and
thus suggesting that the 2SLS estimates are likely to be biased towards my OLS estimates
(Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997).
The validity of the instrument rests on two conditions (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
First, the existence of a first stage relationship showing the correlation of the instrument
with the endogenous regressor (village treatment intensity). This is shown in Table 2.12
above. The second condition for the IV strategy is the exclusion restriction, which requires
that the instrument be uncorrelated with other determinants of the outcome measure of
interest. The exclusion restriction is comprised of two parts: first, that the instrument be
as good as randomly assigned conditional on covariates, and second, that the instrument
affects outcome variables today only via the village formation channel.
The exclusion restrictions cannot be directly tested, but I conduct two further falsi-
fication exercises as further checks of the validity of the instrument. In particular, it is
necessary to check that village formation is not simply occurring in drought-prone areas,
but rather occurs specifically in areas which experienced droughts during the stipulated
time period for villagization of 1973-75. In the falsification exercises, I examine placebo
droughts which may have occurred in the three-year period just prior to (1970-1972), and
just following (1976-1978), the time window of the implementation of the villagization
policy. The results of the placebo checks are reported in Table 2.13. Although the point
estimates are still negative, I do not find a significant relationship between drought severity
and the intensity of villagization for the specifications in Panels A and B of Table 2.13.
Tables 2.14-2.16 report results for the 2SLS regressions for log equivalent consumption,
community participation and public goods provision outcomes using the rainfall instrument
only. The results for consumption are presented in Table 2.14. Columns (1)-(3) repeat OLS
results while columns (4)-(6) present the 2SLS results. I report LIML results in columns
(7)-(9) as it may provide better finite-sample properties in the case of weak instruments. I
also report Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals, which are robust to weak instruments, in
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TABLE 2.12: FIRST STAGE REGRESSIONS
Percent ofmean Percent of mean Z-score Z-score
(1973-75) (1973-75) (1973-75) (1973-75)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A
Rainfall -0.528** -0.709** -0.191** -0.236**
(0.253) (0.281) (0.0818) (0.0918)
[0.261] [0.258] [0.085] [0.086]
Geographic controls YES YES YES YES
Agric. and education controls (1970) NO YES NO YES
F-statistic: 4.37 6.37 5.43 6.63
Observations 82 79 82 79
R-squared 0.319 0.398 0.325 0.401
PANEL B
Rainfall * Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation -0.993** -1.257*** -0.353*** -0.415***
(0.403) (0.413) (0.129) (0.135)
[0.410] [0.352] [0.134] [0.121]
Geographic controls YES YES YES YES
Agric. and education controls (1970) NO YES NO YES
F-statistic: 6.08 9.28 7.43 9.42
Observations 82 79 82 79
R-squared 0.334 0.416 0.341 0.418
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table based on monthly precipitation data from the Tanzania Meteo-
rological Agency for 108 rainfall stations over the period 1960-2010. I calculate the rainfall index over
the period 1973-75 in 2 ways: first, using mean total precipitation during the main (masika) rainy sea-
son divided by the corresponding long-term average, with the index censored at 1. Or secondly, using
a standardized rainfall index (Z-score) with the index censored at 0. A higher rainfall index means less
severe drought. In Panel A the insturment is only drought severity. In Panel B, the instrument refers to
the interaction of the rainfall index and ethnolinguistic fragmentation (ELF). All columns control for the
direct effect of ELF. Geographic controls are for latitude, slope, altitude, mean and standard deviation of
long-run precipitation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Conley errors are in square brackets.
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TABLE 2.13: PLACEBO FIRST STAGE REGRESSIONS
Percent of mean Percent of mean Percent of mean Percent of mean
(1970-72) (1970-72) (1976-78) (1976-78)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A
Rainfall -0.162 -0.119 -0.443 -0.464
(0.198) (0.233) (0.404) (0.461)
[0.185] [0.208] [0.430] [0.492]
Geographic controls YES YES YES YES
Agric. and education controls (1970) NO YES NO YES
Observations 78 75 77 74
R-squared 0.232 0.304 0.266 0.359
PANEL B
Rainfall * Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation -0.542 -0.504 -0.483 -0.379
(0.328) (0.436) (0.621) (0.657)
[0.307] [0.408] [0.645] [0.694]
Geographic controls YES YES YES YES
Agric. and education controls (1970) NO YES NO YES
Observations 78 75 77 74
R-squared 0.252 0.319 0.262 0.352
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table based on monthly precipitation data from the Tanzania Meteorological
Agency for 108 rainfall stations covering the period 1960-2010. Rainfall index calculated for the three-year period
prior to villagization (1970-72) and following villagization (1976-78). Rainfall index is calculated as the mean total
precipitation during the main (masika) rainy season divided by the corresponding long-term average, with the index
censored at 1. In Panel A, the instrument is only the Rainfall index. In Panel B, the instrument refers to the interac-
tion of the rainfall index and ethnolinguistic fragmentation (ELF). All columns control for the direct effect of ELF.
Geographic controls are for latitude, slope, altitude, mean and standard deviation of long-run precipitation. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Conley errors are in square brackets.
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square brackets in Table 2.14. The 2SLS and LIML results indicate even larger magnitudes
for consumption losses compared to the previous OLS results. The increase in magnitude
of the point estimates in the IV regressions may be because the instrument, in this instance,
provides a local average treatment effect (LATE) of the impact of villagization treatment
on consumption for those districts (compliers) in which village formation was particularly
induced by the drought.
For the results on attendance of community meetings in Table 2.15, the 2SLS estimates
yields a treatment effect with a point estimate of 0.66 (s.e.=0.25) in the preferred regression
in column (6). This result includes controls for geographic characteristics and pre-treatment
agricultural, health and education characteristics. Thus a 1 standard deviation increase in
treatment intensity measure resulted in about a 12 percentage point increase in participation
rates in community meetings. Similarly, the size of the point estimates for the treatment
effect for the ability to name the local village official similarly remains positive, although
the IV estimates are now not precisely estimated. In Table 2.16, the size of the estimated
2SLS treatment effect for the primary school outcome variable is positive and significant
in all specifications, and larger in magnitude than the corresponding OLS estimates. For
example, for the primary school outcomes in Table 2.16, the probability of having a gov-
ernment primary school increases from about 0.398 (s.e.=0.114) in the OLS regression in
column (3), to 0.795 (s.e.=0.401) in the IV regression in column (6). The 2SLS results for
the health facility outcome variable are however not precisely estimated.
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TABLE 2.16: PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var: Is there a government primary school within this community? (mean: .877)
TreatmentIntensity 0.286*** 0.380*** 0.398*** 0.441** 0.797* 0.795**
(0.0589) (0.105) (0.114) (0.186) (0.423) (0.401)
Dep. Var: Is there a health facility in this community? (mean depvar: 0.452)
TreatmentIntensity 0.102 0.445*** 0.367*** -0.305 -0.0725 -0.0975
(0.111) (0.114) (0.122) (0.214) (0.429) (0.387)
Geographic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Agricultural controls (1970) NO YES YES NO YES YES
Education controls (1970) NO NO YES NO NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data is obtained from the community module of the Tanzania
National Panel Survey (2008/9) conducted by NBS/World Bank. Columns (1) to (3) repeat the
OLS regressions in Table 6 for comparison. Columns (4) to (6) provide instrumental variable
estimates using the ratio of 1974-1976 mean precipation to long-term average as instrument.
All columns control for ethnic fragmentation and geographic characteristics (latitude, slope, al-
titude, mean and standard deviation of long-term precipitation). Agricultural controls are for:
share of the district population employed in agriculture (1967 Census) and for per capita popu-
lations of cattle, sheep, goats and donkeys (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Education control is for
school enrollment rate in 1967. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the
1978 district boundaries.
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2.7 Channels of Persistence
The discussion thus far presents villagization as a package of institutional reforms in
the Tanzanaian countryside which has resulted in long-term effects on education, house-
hold consumption and local community participation. In this section, I attempt to unpack
the specific components of the reform program which may be important. I provide some
preliminary evidence to explain the decline in consumption and the increased availability
of local public goods.
2.7.1 Consumption and Economic Activities
The OLS results presented earlier indicate an approximate 38 percent decline in con-
sumption today in moving the district treatment measure from zero to 1. The IV results
indicate even more severe declines in consumption. A possible explanation for the per-
sistence of the consumption losses is the decline in agriculture and the relative lack of
economic diversification in areas which experienced large village formation in the 1970s.
Putterman (1995a) observes that although the villagization program increased access of vil-
lages to government administration and local public goods, it increased distances to farm-
lands. The withdrawal of government transportation and marketing sevices in the 1980s
increased transportation costs for peasant farmers in less accessible areas, resulting in a
decline in cash crop farming.11
There has been a notable lack of economic diversification away from peasant agriculture
in many rural districts in Tanzania following the villagization campaigns of the 1970s (see
Collier et al, 1986, Chapter 6). I am able to shed some light on the lack of economic
diversification by examining a differences-in-differences regression across various year-
of-birth cohorts using microdata from the 2002 Tanzania National Census. I focus here
on the respondent’s employment activity, and examine the fraction of the population which
transitions away from agriculture into manufacturing, construction services, trading activity
11Future work would possibly examine more closely the impact of villagization on access to rural trans-
portation infrastructure. There are detailed cartographic records prior to, and following, villagization which
should permit a detailed exercise of settlement patterns for some regions in Tanzania.
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or public administration. As in section 2.5, I examine a regression of the form:
Yidcs = β(Y oungc × TreatmentIntensityd) + δd + δc + ((Y oungc ×X ′d)λ+ idc (2.8)
where Yidc is a dummy for whether individual i, in district d, and year-of-birth cohort, c,
is employed in sector, s; the dummy Y oungc = 1 if year of birth occured after 1968 (and
thus likely to have been exposed to villagization), and δd and δc are respectively district and
birth cohort fixed effects. Xd is a vector containing various district-level controls such as
time-invariant geographic controls. In robustness checks, I control for other pre-treatment
characteristics such as pre-1970 primary school enrollment and health infrastructure, which
enter into the equation above interacted with the dummy for Y oungdc.
The results from equation (2.8) above are presented in Table 2.17. I report results on the
coefficient for Young × TreatmentIntensity in Panel A, and for male and female subsamples
in Panels B and C respectively. The results in column (1) of Panel A, indicate an increase
in government public employment, suggesting that the central and local government bu-
reaucracy remain sources of employment in previously high treatment areas. Employment
in trading activities (retail and wholesale trade) decline, and this effect is significant in the
results reported in Panel A. The decline in trading activity is driven by the effect for the
male subsample (see Panel B). The effects for transitioning to employment in manufactur-
ing and construction services are not precisely estimated, but decline (with significant point
estimates) in the female subsample (see Panel C).
2.7.2 Public Goods Provision
The OLS results in Section 2.6.1 also point to an increased availability of local public
goods in villages which experienced a high level of treatment villages. The creation of
new villages in the 1970s in Tanzania in many cases involved the integration of diverse
ethnic and religious groups into new communities. Evidence from the recent literature
suggests that ethnic heterogeneity may inhibit collective action and thus lower economic
outcomes and the provision of local public goods (Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and La-
Ferrara 2000; Miguel and Gugerty 2005). However, if village formation was higher in
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more ethnicially homegeneous districts, then we can expect high public good provision in
high treatment areas today. The results reported in Section 2.6.1 already include controls
for pre-villagization ethnolinguistic fragmentation, suggesting that additional mechanisms
may be at work.
The historical account suggests two channels which may be important in explaining
public good provision today, namely: electoral participation (Cliffe, 1967; Barker and Saul,
1974) and the development of local government fiscal capacities (Fortmann, 1980; Ngware
and Haule, 1992). First, the widespread mobilization in developmental villages in the late
1970s raised the political consciousness of many Tanzanian citizens, and encouraged high
levels of participation in national elections. In particular, areas which historically had a high
fraction of the population in development villages tend to support the ruling TANU/CCM
party which has dominated national and local politics in Tanzania. Support for the ruling
party, may therefore be one channel which explains the relatively higher availability of
public goods in high treatment districts today.
Second, the developmental villages introduced some form of (informal) taxation among
village residents for most of the 1970s. Such taxation occurred either via working on village
farms, participating in self-help communal activities to maintain village infrastructure such
as granaries, or selling produce to village cooperatives (Fortmann, 1980; Collier, Radwan
and Wangwe, 1986). The poll tax introduced by British colonial officials proved highly
unpopular and had been abolished by Nyerere’s TANU government in the years following
Independence. Thus besides the implicit taxation of agricultural produce (by state market-
ing co-operatives), the informal taxation imposed by village councils constituted the next
major form of taxation imposed on peasants in the countryside. Households and officials
in highly villagized districts therefore historically obtained greater experience in taxation,
and it is plausible that these effects may persist today.
In Table 2.18, I present some initial results exploring the electoral participation and lo-
cal government tax channel. Tanzania remained a one-party state from 1960 to 1992, and
the nationalist TANU/CCM party dominates both parliamentary and presidential elections
in Tanzania. I therefore use the combined share of votes received by opposition parties as a
measure of electoral competition. In Panel A of Table 2.18, I report results using data from
the 2010 presidential elections. Conditional on region fixed effects, I find that treated dis-
Chapter 2: The Legacy of State Planning: Evidence from Villagization in Tanzania 55
tricts are associated today with a reduced vote share for opposition parties. The preferrred
specification is provided in column (6) in which I include controls for the pre-1970 vote
share of the TANU party, as well as time-invariant geographic controls and various pre-
1970 district characteristics. The magnitude of the point estimate indicates that increasing
district-level treatment variable from zero to 1 results in a 13 percentage point decrease
in the opposition vote share. The results in Panel A suggest that treated districts which
experienced high levels of government-planned villagization in the late 1970s remain loyal
supporters of the governing TANU/CCM party. In a model of distributive politics in which
elected officials reward their loyal bases (Cox and McCubbins, 1986), then the continued
allegiance of treated districts to the TANU/CCM may partly explain the higher provision
of public goods available in these districts. In Panel B, I provide some preliminary evi-
dence on current local government revenues derived from taxing agricultural produce (i.e.
the produce cess). The outcome variable is the per capita agricultural taxes collected in
units of Tanzanian shillings, and normalized by the fraction of the population employed in
agriculture. In the specification in column (6), I find that a one standard deviation increase
in the treatment intensity measure increases per capita produce cess collected by about 78
Tanzanian Shillings today.
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TABLE 2.17: CHANGES IN OCCUPATIONS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE
Employed in manufacturing -0.000704 -0.000656 -0.00279 0.00131
(0.00463) (0.00464) (0.00608) (0.00264)
Employed in construction industry 0.000463 0.000514 0.000660 0.000981
(0.000999) (0.00100) (0.00107) (0.00112)
Employed in trading -0.0150** -0.0146** -0.0137* -0.0154*
(0.00669) (0.00642) (0.00719) (0.00781)
Employed in public administration and other services 0.0430*** 0.0430*** 0.0412*** 0.0420***
(0.00467) (0.00469) (0.00518) (0.00561)
PANEL B: MALE SUBSAMPLE
Employed in manufacturing -0.00108 -0.00105 -0.00588 0.00521
(0.00965) (0.00969) (0.0134) (0.00456)
Employed in construction industry -0.000879 -0.000809 -0.000199 0.00129
(0.00217) (0.00218) (0.00242) (0.00244)
Employed in trading -0.0356*** -0.0355*** -0.0335*** -0.0348***
(0.00741) (0.00736) (0.00829) (0.00973)
Employed in public administration and other services 0.0551*** 0.0551*** 0.0540*** 0.0585***
(0.00698) (0.00701) (0.00833) (0.00866)
PANEL C: FEMALE SUBSAMPLE
Employed in manufacturing -0.00551*** -0.00548*** -0.00557*** -0.00590***
(0.00171) (0.00169) (0.00184) (0.00197)
Employed in construction industry -0.00110*** -0.00111*** -0.00118*** -0.00128***
(0.000382) (0.000377) (0.000379) (0.000391)
Employed in trading 0.00170 0.00265 0.00286 0.000246
(0.00782) (0.00734) (0.00817) (0.00834)
Employed in public administration and other services 0.0199*** 0.0199*** 0.0177*** 0.0181***
(0.00501) (0.00494) (0.00498) (0.00584)
Young dummy * primary enrollment rate in 1970 NO YES YES YES
Young dummy * health infrastructure in 1970 NO NO YES YES
Young dummy * other pre-treatment district characterstics NO NO NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sectoral classifications are as follows: agriculture (farming, fishing and forestry),
manufacturing (mining, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water), construction industry (construction services), trading
(wholesale and retail trade) and public administration and other services (public administration (80 percent) and defense,
transportation and communications, financial services and insurance). Results are presented for the coefficient on Young
* TreatmentIntensity. The difference-in-difference model compares outcomes for a younger cohort born after 1968 (and
thus exposed to villagization) versus an older cohort born prior to 1960. Data is obtained from IPUMS microsample of
2002 Tanzania Census. All columns include fixed effects for year of birth cohorts and districts. Controls enter the re-
gression interacted with the young dummy. Column 2 controls for pre-treatment primary enrollment in 1970. Column 3
includes controls for health infrastructure in 1970. Column 4 includes various geographic and demographic controls (for
latitude, slope, altitude, ethnic fragmentation, share of christians, livestock populations, and local government revenues
— see Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district boundaries.
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TABLE 2.18: CHANNELS OF PERSISTENCE
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A
Dep. Var: Opposition Vote Share (mean = 0.35)
TreatmentIntensity -0.0251 -0.0457 -0.102* -0.118** -0.131** -0.131**
(0.0665) (0.0668) (0.0534) (0.0529) (0.0524) (0.0545)
Observations 110 110 106 106 104 104
R-squared 0.576 0.621 0.799 0.799 0.821 0.824
PANEL B
Dep. Var: Produce cess per capita (mean = 454.7 TSh)
TreatmentIntensity 421.8 554.1** 636.5** 384.4 490.5* 393.8*
(270.6) (267.7) (289.7) (259.6) (283.8) (225.7)
Observations 105 105 102 102 100 100
R-squared 0.505 0.559 0.663 0.673 0.641 0.651
Geographic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Agricultural controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Education and health controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Local gov’t revenues controls NO NO NO NO YES YES
TANU party (1970) controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In Panel A, dependent variable is the share of the vote in a given dis-
trict received by opposition parties in the 2005 Tanzanian Presidential Elections. Electoral results are
obtained from the National Electoral Commission of Tanzania. In Panel B, the dependent variable is
the per capita agricultural taxes collected (produce cess) in units of Tanzanian Shillings, and normalized
by the share of district population employed in agriculture in the 2002 Tanzanian Agricultural Census.
Data on local government tax revenues is obtained from the Tanzanian Prime Ministers Office Regional
Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG, TAMISEMI). All columns include region fixed ef-
fects, and control for ethnic fragmentation and geographic characteristics (latitude, slope, altitude, mean
and standard deviation of long-term precipitation). Additional pre-treatment controls (pre-1970) are as
follows: demographic controls (population density, fraction of moslem population and Christian popula-
tion), agricultural controls (share of population employed in agriculture, per capita population of cattle,
sheep, goats and donkeys), education controls (primary school enrollment rate), health controls (number
of inhabitants per dispensary, number of hospital beds per capita), and local government revenues con-
trols (per capita total local government revenue). TANU party (1970) controls are for 1970 electoral out-
comes (fraction of population voting in favor of Nyerere/TANU and for voter turnout). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district boundaries.
Chapter 2: The Legacy of State Planning: Evidence from Villagization in Tanzania 58
2.8 Conclusions
Combining historic data from various years in the 1960s and 1970s with contempo-
rary datasets, this Chapter has provided evidence of the impact of Tanzania’s villagiza-
tion program on contemporary development outcomes. Using IPUMS microdata from the
1988 Tanzania national census, I first documented that districts with a high fraction of the
population living in development villages increased educational outcomes (primary school
completion rates, literacy rates and total years of schooling) for both males and females.
In addition, using results from the Afrobarometer survey, I provide some evidence that a
higher level of the treatment variable is associated today with greater political participation
and greater support for democracy, but a rejection of one-party rule and worse perception
of corruption among government officials. Next, using various pre-1970 district controls
and recent household surveys, I report OLS results which confirm the decline in household
consumption in areas which experienced a high intensity of the villagization treatment mea-
sure. I also present results on community participation and the availability of some local
public goods. To address the endogeneity in village formation, I exploit the incidence of
droughts in the 1970s which facilitated the re-settlement of peasants to provide instrumen-
tal variable estimates.
Finally, I provide some preliminary evidence on possible channels of persistence. To
account for the severe consumption losses reported, I document that economic diversifi-
cation (i.e. a transition away from peasant agriculture) has been limited in areas which
historically experienced high levels of villagization. I present additional evidence that,
conditional on various controls, the treatment measure is correlated with lower oppostion
vote shares today. This suggests that districts which experienced high levels of villagization
in the 1970s remain loyal supporters of the ruling TANU/CCM party, partly explaining the
higher availability of public goods in these districts today. The experience of late 1970s vil-
lagization transformed the Tanzanian countryside, and the results in this preliminary project
suggest that the institutional developments during this period have persistent effects across
Tanzanian districts today.
Chapter 3
Penicillin and Yaws Control: Some
Evidence from Ghana
3.1 Introduction
The recent focus of donor agencies and the public health community on tackling three
major diseases — tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and malaria — has resulted in a reduced prior-
ity being accorded to other widespread tropical diseases. These illnesses — commonly re-
ferred to as “neglected tropical diseases” — receive only about 0.6 percent of global health
development assistance but afflict nearly 96 percent of the “bottom billion” of the world’s
population who may not have HIV (Liese and Schubert, 2009). The list of these diseases
varies, but often includes: blinding trachoma, Buruli ulcer, Chagas disease, dengue, dra-
cunculiasis, human African trypanosomiasis, Japanese encephalities, leishmaniases, lep-
rosy, lymphatic filiarisis, onchocerciasis, schistosomiases, soil-transmitted helminthiasis
and yaws. The neglect partly arises because existing methods of prioritizing disease sever-
ity rely on the calculation of DALYs (disability adjusted life years) which are heavily
weighted by mortality rates. Neglected tropical diseases, on the other hand, tend to be
rarely fatal and consequently are often not highly prioritized. The treatment of these dis-
eases, however, is often highly cost-effective and successful control could also provide
other economic benefits such as higher education attainment and increased worker pro-
ductivity (Canning, 2006). Public health experts argue that neglected tropical diseases
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constitute the “low hanging fruit” diseases, and could also be successfully eradicated with
cost-effective interventions (Molyneux, 2008).
There is however little evidence which systematically evaluates the impact of treating
such diseases. In this paper, I contribute to this debate by studying a historical example of
the successful control of a neglected tropical disease, yaws, and examining its impacts on
educational attainment in Ghana. A highly infectious disease, yaws was highly prevalent
in many parts of the tropics in the first half of the twentieth century. In the Gold Coast
colony (now Ghana), it accounted for about 51 percent of reported infectious diseases in
hospitals in 1935. Although not fatal, yaws created painful lesions on the skin and joints,
and in some sufferers could result in paralysis or permanent disfigurement of the face. The
disease is spread through skin contact and was highly prevalent among children aged 5-
15 years. Moreover, crowded environments — notably schools and playgrounds — were
known to be common sites of yaws transmission (de Vries, 1961; Keeny and Gaan, 1961).
Following World War II, yaws was successfully controlled in many countries in tropcial
Africa and Asia, under a global campaign led by the World Health Organization and the
United Nations Children’s Fund. The WHO/UNICEF campaign was made possible due to
the availability of cheap and mass-produced penicillin which was available in commercial
quantities following World War II. Records from the WHO/UNICEF yaws campaign in
Ghana indicate that a single dose of intramuscular penicillin was successful in treating
overt and latent yaws cases.
This paper examines the long-term impact of successful yaws control in Ghana on ed-
uation outcomes. The identification strategy relies on the cross-district variation in pre-
eradication yaws incidence and the observation that penicillin caused an almost immediate
reduction in the prevalence of the disease. Following the penicillin campaigns, high yaws
prevalence districts, which faced more widespread impairment from yaws, were more likely
to benefit from the disease eradication compared with low prevalence regions. Using inter-
nal records from the global yaws campaign and microdata from the 2000 Ghana Census, I
examine the long-term impact of yaws eradication on educational attainment (specifically,
primary school completion, literacy, ability to speak English, and total years of schooling
completed). I focus on education outcomes as yaws was most prevalent among children
(aged 0-12 years), and schools and playgrounds were known to be a site of yaws disease
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transmission — partly explaining UNICEF’s readiness to support the campaign (de Vries,
1961; Keeny and Gaan, 1961).
In my main results, I observe that a 1 percent decrease in infectious yaws prevalence
following the campaigns increased the probability of primary school completion, of be-
ing literate, and of being able to speak English by 2.1, 1.9 and 2.1 percentage points re-
spectively. The estimated effect is particularly robust for the female subsample. These
results are robust to the inclusion of various time-invariant geographic controls, controls
for pre-eradication district characteristics (such as educational attainment, health and agri-
cultural infrastructure) and controls for contemporaneous changes in education and health
infrastructure. Using the female subsample, I show that placebo campaigns occurring a
decade earlier or later than the actual penicillin campaigns do not result in siginificant in-
creases in the educational outcomes. By examining the impacts of the penicillin campaign
across different year-of-birth cohorts, I provide further evidence that the marked increases
in educational attainment coincide with cohorts born in the early 1950s just prior to the
commencement of the penicillin campaigns.
The results of this paper contribute to a recent literature which has examined the long-
term impact of past disease eradication programmes, such as hookworm (Bleakley, 2007),
and malaria (Bleakley, 2010; Cutler et al, 2010; Lucas, 2010). For hookworm (also, a ne-
glected tropical disease), Bleakley (2007) finds that succesful eradication of this disease
in the US south in the early twentieth century increased adult incomes and resulted in im-
proved school enrollment, school attendance, and literacy. For malaria, recent research
suggests that malaria eradication increased adult incomes in the Americas (Bleakley, 2010)
and also improved consumption for men in India (Cutler et al., 2010). The empirical evi-
dence also suggests that malaria eradication improved educational attainment of women in
India (Cutler et al., 2010) and also in Sri Lanka (Lucas, 2010).
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: section 3.2 provides a historical review
of the yaws penicillin campaign in Ghana. In section 3.3, I discuss the empirical strategy
adopted in this paper, and discuss the data used in section 3.4. The main results of this
study and robustness checks are presented in sections 3.5 and 3.6 respectively. I provide
some discussion of the results in section 3.7 and conclude in section 3.8.
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3.2 Yaws and Penicillin Campaign in Ghana
3.2.1 Yaws in Ghana (1900-1950)
Yaws is a disease caused by treponemes or spirochete bacteria called T. pertenue which
belongs to the family of bacteria that are also causative agents for syphillis and pinta. In the
early twentieth century, the disease was endemic in many warm and humid tropical areas of
Africa, Central and South America, and Indonesia. Although not fatal, yaws creates lesions
in the skin, bone and cartilage and is accompanied by intense pain and itching in the joints.
The disease is highly contagious, with the primary mode of transmission being via direct
person-to-person contact with the exudate from an infectious yaws lesion. The WHO noted
that up to 80 percent of persons exposed to infectious yaws cases contracted the disease and
about 10 percent of all yaws cases resulted in permanent disfigurement mostly of the limbs
and the face (Perine et al, 1984).
Yaws was highly prevalent in Ghana (Gold Coast colony) in the first half of the twen-
tieth century. The annual reports from the colony’s medical department suggest that three
diseases were of major concern to the authorities: malaria, yaws and Guinea worm in-
fection. Yaws and Guinea worm infestations caused tremendous morbidity, immobilized
communities and threatened food security, especially in the Northern parts of the country
(Waddy, 1956). Regarding prevalence, hospital attendance pointed to yaws as the lead-
ing cause of morbidity. In 1934, Selwyn-Clarke, the director of the Gold Coast Medical
Department noted in his annual report that:
Yaws continued to hold first pride of place as the condition most frequently
met. In point of fact, 60394 cases were treated. This represents about one
patient in every four attending for treatment...Malaria still occupied the high-
est position after yaws on the list of diseases treated at hospitals, dispensaries
and welfare centers. (Gold Coast Colony, Report on the Medical Department,
1934, p 9).
Yaws was primarily a disease which afflicted children, with peak incidence occurring the
5-15 year age group. The spread of the disease was also enhanced by crowding and poor
sanitation. Upon infection, an initial lesion - called the mother yaw - appeared on the skin
after an incubation period of about 21 days. Additional lesions, called secondary yaws,
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emerge as the bacteria spreads systematically, with each lesions lasting up to 6 months
at a time. Overall, the total period of infectiousness of an untreated yaws patient ranged
between 12 and 18 months. The disease finally enters an inactive latent phase which can be
very destructive: in about 10 percent of cases, it results in crippling and or other permanent
disfigurement.
The treatment of yaws in the first half of the twentieth century largely involved the use
of intramuscular arsenic injection and oral bismuth preparations. This course of treatment
had three major drawbacks: first, the treatments were administered over a three month
period, and required repeated vists to the hospitals or dispensaries so there was incomplete
adherence to the full course. Second, with arsenic and bismuth preparations side effects
such as gingivitis and stomatitis were often reported. Third, and most importantly, these
treatments conferred no prophylactic effects so relapses were very common. The treatment
was only given to overt yaws cases, neglecting many cases in a latent or incubation state of
infection, thus a high level of yaws infection persisted in local communities. As discussed
in the next section, all this changed in the 1950s with the successful mass-production of
penicillin which proved to be a superior form of treatment, both in efficacy and cost.
3.2.2 WHO/UNICEF Penicillin Campaign (1956-1963)
Penicillin was arguably the most notable medical innovation of the first half of the
twentieth century and was able to treat a broad spectrum of bacterial diseases. Although
previously isolated by Flemming in 1928, penicillin entered into widespread use only in
the 1950s following its succsessful mass production by the US Department of Agriculture
during World War II. Following the war, the WHO and UNICEF provided large supplies
of penicillin to support a large-scale global anti-yaws campaign in various yaws-endemic
countries. In December 1955, at the start of the Global Yaws Campaigns, Time Magazine
noted that ”the word of penicillin’s magic has spread: a single shot, costing only 12 cents,
cures a victim of yaws.” (Africa v. Yaws, Time Magazine, 26 December, 1955).
In Ghana, the yaws campaign was implemented by teams of mobile public health offi-
cials organized as the Medical Field Units (MFU) which had been established in the 1930s
by the colonial government. Penicillin used during the campaign was long-acting mix-
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ture (procaine penicillin in aluminium monostearate, or PAM) which conferred immunity
on asymptomatic household members and supposed latent cases. Compared with prior
treatments, penicillin was more efficacious, cheaper and also could be administered very
quickly. Besides yaws, a single dose of penicillin would also have effectively treated other
bacterial diseases such as pneumonia, meningitis and syphilis (Waddy, 1958). However,
the incidence of these diseases was generally low in the Gold Coast, and their concurrent
treatment with yaws infections should only introduce very little bias in the analysis below.
For the yaws campaign, the treatment regimen proceeded as follows: villages were
given prior notice of the pending MFU visits, and the health officials moved systematically
from village to village, examining all residents present. The MFU health officials were
comprised of two technical staff: an examiner and an injector. The entire population of
a village filed past the examiner, who noted the individual’s yaws diagnosis on a piece of
paper. An injector further down the queue administered the necessary dosage of penicillin,
based on age as well as state of yaws infection1. Each village was also re-visited over
the next year, and additional penicillin treatments were administered where necessary. The
MFU staff documented yaws prevalence rates prior to penicillin treatments, and also during
long-term surveys (see Figure 3.1 for map of infection rates). The treatments proved to
be very popular and turnouts were often high with long queues of local village residents
showing up for treatments early in the morning2.
3.2.3 Related Studies
There has been recent interest in examining the economic burden and long-term con-
sequences of tropical diseases. Much of the recent work has focused on two diseases:
malaria (Bleakley, 2010; Lucas, 2010; Cutler et al, 2010) and helminthic infections (Bleak-
ley, 2007; Miguel and Kremer, 2004). The combined evidence on malaria suggests that
1The most common method recommended by the WHO was the Total Mass Treatment regimen, in which
adult yaws cases received 4cm3 of penicillin and children received 2cm3. Non-yaws cases received half of
this dosage (Scott, 1959).
2Yaws was never completely eradicated in Ghana, and there was a brief resurgence in isolated villages in
the early 1980s (Agadzi et al, 1985). The overall incidence in affected regions was however always below
the WHO threshold of 0.5 percent.
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malaria eradication improved adult incomes in the Americas (Bleakley, 2010) and also im-
proved consumption for men in India (Cutler et al., 2010). On education outcomes, existing
evidence suggests that malaria eradication improved educational attainment of women in
India (Cutler et al., 2010) and also in Sri Lanka (Lucas, 2010). For helminthic infections
(also considered neglected tropical diseases), Bleakley (2007) estimates that hookworm
eradication in the American South resulted in increases in various education outcomes and
increased incomes. Miguel and Kremer (2004) similarly find positive treatment externali-
ties in treating parasitic worm infections in Kenya, and this treatment also improved school
attendance by children.
More broadly, there has been recent policy interest in work on neglected tropical dis-
eases which encompass all major tropical diseases apart from the three diseases frequently
funded by donor agencies, namely: tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and malaria3. Public health
analysts have argued about the potential socioeconomic benefits of tackling such diseases
which afflict the majority of the world’s poor (Hotez et al., 2009). However there is only
limited work which examines the economic consequences of the control of any such dis-
eases. In this context, the largely successful yaws penicillin campaign in Ghana provides a
useful historical case study.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
The identification strategy adopted here exploits the cross-district differences in yaws
infection prior to the WHO/UNICEF penicillin campaign to examine the long term effect
of yaws control. I use a differences-in-differences model to compare human capital attain-
ment of various year-of-birth cohorts from various districts of Ghana. Since the penicillin
campaign effectively reduced infectious yaws rates to less than 0.01 percent in all districts,
areas with high initial yaws prevalence were likely to experience greater benefits from yaws
eradication compared with low prevalence areas. Moreover, the introduction of the peni-
3Specifically, the World Health Organization classifies the following as neglected tropical diseases:
blinding trachoma, Buruli ulcer, Chagas disease, dengue, dracunculiasis, human African trypanosomiasis,
Japanese encephalities, leishmaniases, leprosy, lymphatic filiarisis, onchocerciasis, schistosomiases, soil-
transmitted helminthiasis and yaws (Liese et al, 2010)
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cillin treatment by an international agency eliminates potential endogeneity concerns which
may have arisen, for example, if yaws eradication was triggered by increases in incomes
of farmers of cash crop-growing regions. Following the recent literature on the economic
impact of tropical disease eradication, this study also focuses on childhood exposure since
the medical literature noted yaws as a disease which predominantly afflicted children and
could potentially discourage school attendance given its contagiousness and its ability to
inflict permanent deformities.
I specifically compare outcomes at a given point in time for various year-of-birth co-
horts from districts with distinct pre-campaign yaws infection levels. I construct a binary
treatment variable which equals one for cohorts born after the penicillin campaigns4. Al-
though yaws infection data is available at the village level, pre-campaign yaws infection
is aggregated to the district level since our outcomes data only provide us with each indi-
vidual’s district of residence (see section 3.4 for further discussion). Thus, an identifying
assumption in this study is that an individual’s district of residence is highly correlated with
their district of birth and education.
I omit cohorts born during the active years of the campaigns (1955-65), and restrict my
analysis to the sample of individuals born a decade prior to, and a decade following, the
penicillin campaigns. For a given individual i, in district, d, and year-of-birth cohort, c, I
run a regression of the following form:
Yidc = β(Postdc × Infd) + δd + δc + ((Postdc ×X ′d)λ+ idc (3.1)
where the dummy Postdc = 1 if year of birth occurred after the commencement of the
penicillin campaign in district d for members of cohort, c; Infd refers to pre-campaign
yaws prevalence rate in district d; and δd and δc are respectively district and birth cohort
fixed effects. Xd is a vector containing various district-level controls such as time-invariant
4Previous work which utilize a similar difference-in-difference estimation strategy to examine disease
eradication impacts adopt a dose response model to study the precise effect of exposure to the disease erad-
ication campaigns, see for example, Bleakley (2010). Such an approach requires precise data on the imple-
mentation dates for the treatment in various districts in the country. The majority of the penicillin campaigns
were implemented in Ghana over the period 1956-1960, however, the timing of the program roll out across
various districts in the country are not exactly known (see Fasquelle, 1973) thus making it difficult to imple-
ment an approach based on precise dose of exposure.
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geographic controls, and distance from the centroid of each cocoa district to the nearest
agricultural station, railway station and hospital, as at 1948. The geographic controls in-
clude latitude, longitude, and mean area-weighted elevation and slope. The coefficient
of interest is β which provides the difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of the
penicillin campaign on the outcome variable. I report results in equation (3.1) above as
my baseline specification, and further run it separately for various demographic subgroups
(namely: males, females, the Akan ethnic group, and Christians). In robustness checks, I
control for several other pre-treatment characteristics (which enter into equation (3.1) inter-
acted with the dummy for Postdc campaign), for contemporaneous changes in health and
education infrastructure, and for possible mean reversion.
Next, I extend the analysis to examine a more flexible specification which allows the
impact of the penicllin campaigns to vary for different age cohorts. Using the female
subsample, I examine cohorts aged between 15 and 90 grouped into 14 age categories at





(Postdg × Infd) + δd + δc + ((Postdg ×X ′d)λ+ idc (3.2)
where the dummy Postdg = 1 if an individual in district, d, was born within the five-year
age interval, g; Infd refers to pre-campaign yaws prevalence rate in district d; and δd and
δc are respectively district and birth cohort fixed effects. Xd is a vector containing various
district-level controls such as time-invariant geographic controls.
With this specification, I am able to examine how the relationship between yaws in-
fection rates and the outcome variable changed for cohorts born in various years prior to
and following the penicillin campaigns. In this case, I interact the control variables with
a dummy for each age category cohort, so that the effects of the controls are allowed to
vary across different cohorts. For each cohort, the coefficient βc provides the impact of
the yaws eradication. Thus, we expect no impact of the treatment for cohorts born prior
to 1950 when the penicillin campaigns begun, and for the coefficient to be positive and
significant in subsequent periods. As the penicillin campaigns were implemented across
various districts in Ghana over the period 1956 to 1963, we would expect the trend in βc
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to change for cohorts born around 1950, who were most likely to be exposed to penicillin
during the age period of primary school attendance.
How plausible is the assumption that the risk of yaws infection served to reduce school
enrollments and thus lower human capital investments in childhood? This assumption ap-
pears credible as yaws was predominantly a disease contracted by children, and was known
to be highly contagious. Moreover, it was also known that crowded environments — no-
tably schools — provided an ideal setting for the disease transmission (Soetopo and Wasito,
1953; De Vries, 1961). Schools, supported by the colonial government as well as mission-
ary organizations, had been established in most towns in Ghana by the 1960s, even in the
relatively poorer northern regions (Scott, 1959). The debilitating effects of yaws in the
Gold Coast were noted by Saunders (as cited in Hackett (1953, pp 150)):
Dr. G. F. T. Saunders regards the suffereing from yaws as very great and
includes rheumatic pains in children, and chronic ”rheumatism”, ulcers, and
deformities in adults. He regards yaws as a constant drain on the economic
resources of a community. In one area, after mass treatment, there was a re-
duction in tertiary yaws, and it was said that the chief had less difficulty in
getting work done at periods of intensive farm-work; the population attributed
this to the effects of the anti-yaws campaign.
The popularity of the penicillin campaign and the nearly perfect turnout rates encountered
during treatment further suggests that many households were eager to avoid the long-term
debilitating effects of yaws infection.
A main identification assumption for this study is that apart from the WHO/UNICEF
campaign, there were no differential changes in human capital investments across locali-
ties which were correlated with existing yaws infection rates. This assumption needs to
be addressed since the decade 1950-1960 also marked a period of rapid expansion in pub-
lic goods infrastructure in the newly independent Ghanaian state. Areas with higher yaws
infections tended to be poorer and also in the northern parts of the country (see Table 1)
where standards of hygiene were generally lower due to inadequate water supplies. Any
concurrent expansion of public services in these regions during the campaigns may there-
fore lead to an upward bias in the estimates of the penicillin treatment effect. I therefore
utilize controls for contemporaneous health and infrastructure investments in the 1950s and
1960s in additional robustness checks later in this chapter.
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3.4 Data
3.4.1 Yaws Infection Rates
Data on yaws infection prevalence is obtained from published annual reports of the
Gold Coast/Ghana Medical Field Units (MFUs) and from internal publications of WHO
epidemiologists. The MFU annual reports from 1959-1964 provided aggregate data for
yaws infections throughout the country. Data from the annual reports were complemented
by epidemiological data summarized by physicians working on the yaws campaign (Scott
(1959), Christiansen (1963), Rosei (1963) and Fasquelle (1973)). The internal epidemi-
ological reports provides details of pre- and post-eradication yaws infection rates at the
village/town level and aggregated to the district and regional levels. The yaws campaign
proceeded with an initial treatment survey in which all members of a given community
were initially examined, with various cases of yaws diagnosed and treated. The initial sur-
vey was followed by two surveillance surveys and concluded with a long term survey after
about a year to track any outstanding latent or reservoir infections. Data on yaws preva-
lence was presented in two forms: either as the prevalance rate of infectious yaws or as the
prevalence of total yaws which comprised of infectious and non-infectious cases (such as
late-stage hyperkeratosis).
Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 provide a summary of yaws infection rates across all districts
and regions in Ghana circa 1960. The mean (simple average) prevalence rates of total yaws
and infectious yaws across all districts were 8.9 and 0.7 percent respectively. The disease
prevalence was higher in northern districts which tended to be poorer and more distant
from existing transport infrastructure. Since yaws was predominantly a disease affecting
children, and prevalence rates are calculated for the entire population, the incidence of the
disease among children was probably nearly twice as high as the recorded prevalence rates.
The regressions conducted in this study use data on infectious yaws (rather than total yaws)
which were consistently provided for all districts during the penicillin campaign. Table 3.1
presents summary statistics.
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TABLE 3.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
All Low High P-value
VARIABLES Districts Districts Districts (2) vs (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yaws infection rates
Infectious yaws prevalence rate (in percent) 0.721 0.326 1.129 0.0000
Geographic characteristics
Longitude -0.992 -1.185 -0.795 0.0878
Latitude 6.936 6.602 7.280 0.1030
Slope (in degrees) 2.899 2.753 3.049 0.4025
Elevation (in meters) 158.6 127.2 190.9 0.0012
Landarea (sq. km.) 1,971 1,404 2,554 0.0352
Cocoa suitability index 37.02 31.94 42.25 0.2476
Fraction of land as forest reserve 0.071 0.072 0.070 0.9551
Proximity to infrastructure
Distance to railway (km) 113,227 109,699 116,858 0.8376
Distance to road (km) 49,884 55,683 43,915 0.6171
Distance to mission station (km) 68,666 73,554 63,634 0.5494
Distance to cocoa station (km) 102,978 113,362 92,287 0.4420
Distance to agricultural station (km) 29,966 29,491 30,456 0.8237
Distance to Accra (km) 224,989 222,042 228,024 0.8833
Economic characteristics
Fraction of pop. employed in cocoa, (1948 census) 0.127 0.109 0.145 0.1530
Fraction of pop. employed in farming, (1948 census) 0.585 0.595 0.575 0.6696
Fraction of pop. employed in mining, (1948 census) 0.0551 0.0692 0.0406 0.4469
Fraction of pop. employed in manufacturing 0.0580 0.0591 0.0569 0.7750
Fraction of pop. employed in services 0.1034 0.1072 0.0996 0.6316
Acreage under cocoa cultivation (sq. km.) 190.9 154.4 228.6 0.1506
Local government revenue (1948, Sh/capita) 0.460 0.415 0.506 0.3960
Demographic characteristics
Fraction of Christians (1940 estimates) 0.5913 0.6218 0.5608 0.3378
Fraction of Moslems (1940 estimates) 0.1571 0.1109 0.2032 0.0410
Fraction of Akan ethnic group (1940 estimates) 0.4062 0.4591 0.3532 0.1569
Primary school completion (1940 estimates) 0.185 0.199 0.169 0.2730
Literacy rate (1940 estimates) 0.264 0.274 0.254 0.5580
Able to speak english, in percent (1940 estimates) 0.224 0.2380 0.2099 0.3684
Years of schooling completed (1940 estimates) 2.354 2.5432 2.1650 0.2521
Observations 69 35 34
NOTES: This table provides descriptive statistics for pre-treatment characteristics. Data on yaws
infection rates are compiled from Scott (1959) for the Northern territories, Onori (1962) for the
Volta region, and Rosei (1963) for the Brong Ahafo region, and from Fasquelle (1973) and Chris-
tiansen (1963). Data on geographic characteristics obtained by overlaying administrative map
of Ghana/Gold Coast on elevation (slope) data obtained from SRTM, and computing mean area-
weighted elevation (slope). Other demographic characteristics obtained from the 1948 Gold Coast
Census, and author’s calculations based on IPUMS microsample for the 2000 Ghana census.
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Legend











Figure 3.1: Yaws Prevalence Rate in Ghana, 1956. Data on yaws infection rates are
compiled from Scott (1959) for the Northern territories, Onori (1962) for the Volta region,
and Rosei (1963) for the Brong Ahafo region, and from Fasquelle (1973) and Christiansen
(1963).
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3.4.2 Outcomes
For outcome measures, I utilize data from the IPUMS microsample of the 2000 Ghana
census. The IPUMS microsample of the 2000 Ghana Census provides data on various
measures of human capital attainment (primary school completion, literacy, ability to speak
English, and years of total schooling), and comprises observations on about 1.3 million
persons.
3.4.3 District Pre-treatment characteristics
Data on pre-treatment district population and economic characteristics are obtained
from the Gold Coast Census of 1948. Data on various time-invariant geographic char-
acteristics are obtained by overlaying the 1948 administrative map of Ghana/Gold Coast
on elevation and slope data obtained from SRTM/ArcMaps and computing the mean area-
weighted elevation and slope, as well as the longitude and latitude of the centroid of each
district. I also calculate various district-level geographic controls, including the distance
from the centroid of each district to the nearest railway line, to the nearest protestant mis-
sion, to the nearest agricultural station and to the nearest hospital in 1948. The 1948 Gold
Coast Census also provides data on pre-treatment economic activity such as the fraction of
the population employed in cocoa, in agriculture and in mining. I compute the suitability
index of each district for cocoa cultivation using the cocoa suitability index developed by
the Ghana Soil Research Institute. The index provides a 0-100 score of the suitability for
cocoa farming on a GIS grid raster, taking into account local precipitation, temperature
and soil quality. I also calculate various demographic characteristics such as religious and
ethnic compositions, and educational attainment, using data from the IPUMS microsample
of the 2000 Ghana census.
3.4.4 Education and health infrastructure investments
Data on number of schools, classrooms, teachers are obtained from publications by
the Ministry of Education for the years 1962, 1968, and 1972. Education districts differ
from administrative districts used in census, and so I aggregate results to the regional level.
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To calculate teachers per capita and classrooms per capita, I normalize by children in the
relevant age category. School density is the number of schools divided by land area of
administrative region (in square kilometers).
Health infrastructure data is obtained from 2 sources. For 1951, I use government
findings as published in the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Health Needs
of the Gold Coast. For 1963, I obtain data from Pawel (1963). I calculate hospital density
(number of hospitals divided by land area of administrative region), and per capita number
of hospital beds. For both 1951 and 1963 health data are for general hospitals (comprised
of government hospitals, mission hospitals and hospitals run by mining companies). Data
on cocoa production in 1951 and 1963 for various cocoa-producing regions are obtained
from the Analysis of Cocoa Purchases by Societies, Districts and Regions for 1947-1965
published by the Ghana Cocoa Board.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Difference-in-Differences Analysis
Results of the difference-in-difference specification in equation (3.1) are presented in
Table 3.2. I report results for the baseline specification in Panel A, while Panel B presents
results separately for various demographic subgroups. The baseline results include controls
only for time-invariant district geographical characteristics (longitude, latitude, slope and
land area). These controls enter equation (3.1) interacted with the dummy for Postdc. In
each panel, I present results for the probability of primary school completion, for literacy
rates, ability to speak English, and total years of schooling completed. The results based
on the specification in equation (3.1) indicate that yaws treatment improved various edu-
cational outcomes, with the baseline results significant at the 5 percent level in columns
(1)-(4). The reported point estimates are for the coefficient, β, on the (Postdc × Infd)
term, which provides the impact of being born a decade following the penicillin campaigns
versus a decade prior to the campaigns in a high endemicity district, compared to the effect
in a low endemicity district. A one percentage point increase in initial infectious yaws in-
cidence was associated with a post-campaign increase in the probability of primary school
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completion of 2.1 percentage points. Literacy and the ability to speak English similarly
increased by 1.9 and 2.1 percentage points. In the baseline regression, I also find that a one
percentage point increase in yaws prevalence prior to the campaigns resulted in an increase
of 0.22 years of schooling. Prior to the penicillin campaigns, the median infectious yaws
incidence rate was 0.78 percent. Thus, for the hypothetical district with the median level of
yaws incidence, mean schooling attainment improved by 0.17 years following the penicillin
campaigns. Results for the demographic subgroups are reported in Panel B. The baseline
results appear to be driven by the impact of the penicillin campaigns on females. For the
case of girls, I find that the probability of primary school completion, of being literate and
being able to speak English increased by 2.1, 2.3 and 2.1 percentage points respectively. In
addition, a 1 percentage point increase in initial infectious yaws prevalence resulted in an
increase of total years of schooling completed by 0.2 years for girls following the penicillin
campaigns.
3.6 Robustness Checks
I conduct a number of robustness checks to address several sources of bias in the es-
timates reported above. I show that the results obtained in the previous section are not
sensitive to controlling for a number of pre-treatment district controls, for restricting the
sample to the population of non-movers, as well as to controlling for mean reversion.
3.6.1 Sensitivity Analyses
In this section, I present results which introduce additional controls into the baseline
specification reported above. This is important for four reasons. First, the pre-treatment
levels of yaws infections are geographically clustered in northern districts of the country.
The pre-existing disease intensity levels may therefore be correlated with the expansion
of economic activity and missionary influences which occurred in Ghana in the first half
of the twentieth century but mostly in southern districts. Thus, the first set of robustness
exercises report results controlling for various pre-treatment district characteristics such as
proximity to the existing railway network, to mission stations, to agricultural stations and
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TABLE 3.2: PENICILLIN EXPOSURE AND HUMAN CAPITAL ATTAINMENT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Primary school Literacy Able to Years of
completion speak English schooling
PANEL A: MAIN RESULTS
Baseline 0.0214*** 0.0193*** 0.0205*** 0.223***
(0.00696) (0.00621) (0.00642) (0.0797)
Observations 447,408 447,408 447,408 447,408
R-squared 0.185 0.212 0.198 0.168
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year of birth fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Geographical controls YES YES YES YES
PANEL B: DEMOGRAPHIC SUBGROUPS
Males 0.0174* 0.0108 0.0153** 0.200*
(0.00914) (0.00659) (0.00732) (0.115)
Females 0.0210*** 0.0231*** 0.0212*** 0.201**
(0.00688) (0.00704) (0.00739) (0.0785)
Akan 0.0343*** 0.0331*** 0.0403*** 0.473***
(0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0126) (0.139)
Christian 0.0292*** 0.0243*** 0.0286*** 0.290***
(0.00826) (0.00796) (0.00812) (0.0982)
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year of birth fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Geographical controls YES YES YES YES
NOTES: Data is obtained from the IPUMS microsample of the 2000 Ghana cen-
sus. Results are based on the regression model in equation (3.1). The coefficient on
(Postdc×Infd) provides the difference-in-difference estimate comparing the mean out-
come variable for younger cohorts (born a decade following the penicillin campaigns)
to an older cohort (born a decade prior to the penicillin campaigns) in a high endemicity
district, compared to the difference in a low endemicity district. Geographic controls
are for latitude, longitude, land area and mean area-weighted slope. Clustered stan-
dard errors, using the 2000 district administrative boundaries, are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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to hospitals as well as controls for district cocoa soil suitability.
Second, the 1950s also marked a period of rapid expansion in public infrastructure in
the Ghana/Gold Coast colony. If such investments were primarily targeted at localities
with high yaws infection rates, then such programs may confound the estimates obtained
above, and lead to an overestimation of the human capital gains attributable to the penicillin
campaigns. I therefore repeat the regressions using specifications in equation (1) but now
with region-of-birth controls for changes in health and education infrastructure. The health
controls are for changes in hospital density (i.e. number of hospitals divided by land area of
the administrative region) and per capita number of hospital beds. The education controls
are for changes in school density, teachers per capita and schools per capita.
Third, legislative elections were also introduced in the Gold Coast colony in the 1950s,
resulting in the development of local political movements (Austin, 1964). The results in this
paper could also be biased if areas with higher yaws infection, which were poorer, tended
to support the nationalist movement of Nkrumah’s Conventions People’s Party (CPP) and
therefore received larger targeted transfers from the central government. I therefore report
results from additional specifications which control for the CPP vote share in the 1956 Gold
Coast Legislative Elections.
Finally, I also explore the possibility of expansion in cocoa production as a possible
explanation for our results. Although cocoa production had commenced in the Gold Coast
colony at the start of the twentieth century, there were substantial expansions in cultivated
acreages in the 1960s. The frontier for cocoa production moved westwards as new forests
in the Western and Brong Ahafo regions were cleared for cultivation. Other cocoa-growing
areas (particularly in the Eastern Region) experienced a temporary decline in output as a
result of the swollen shoot disease which attacked cocoa trees (Ross and Broatch, 1951;
Tanburn, 1957). The logarithmic change of cocoa output (for the period 1953-1961) is
therefore included as an additional control to the base specification. All controls enter
equation (1) interacted with a dummy for post-campaign.
In Table 3.3 Panels A-D, column (1) repeats the previous baseline results controlling
only for time-invariant geographical characteristics5. Consider Panel A on primary school
5These controls enter equation (3.1) interacted with the dummy for Postdc.
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completion. In column (2), when controls for cocoa soil suitability are introduced, the
point estimate remains highly significant, although slightly reduced in magnitude. Next,
in columns (3) and (4), to account for the relative remoteness of various districts, I control
for proximity to the rail transport infrastructure (as at 1948) and for distance to Accra. The
point estimates remain robust to the inclusion of these additional controls. In columns (5)
and (6), I further control for proximity to mission stations, hospitals and agricultural sta-
tions, which may serve as a proxy for pre-eradication availability of various social services.
Column (7) includes all controls above. Comparing columns (1) and (7) for Panels A-D,
the results remain robust and significant in both columns, although the magnitude of the
point estimates are slightly reduced in the case of primary school completion and years of
schooling attained.
Table 3.4 repeats the baseline specification in equation (1) but with controls for contem-
poraneous changes in health and education infrastructure (over the period 1955-1965), for
changes in cocoa output, as well as for the CPP vote share in the 1956 Elections. Column
(1) of Table 3.4 repeats the regression specification from column (7) of Table 3.3. Next, in
columns (2) to (4), I successively control for changes in the number of schools, number of
teachers, and number of hospitals. Columns (5) and (6) control for changes in cocoa output
and the CPP vote share respectively. For Panels (A) to (D), the results remain robust and
significant when viewed across from columns (1) to (6), and thus provide further support
for the impact of the penicillin campaign in improving educational attainment.
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3.6.2 Non movers
I also conduct additional robustness checks where I repeat the baseline specification
but omitting all migrants, and examine the results for the nonmover sample. The estimates
of the effect of the penicillin campaign would be biased upwards if selective migration
occurred with healthier or more capable persons migrating to previously endemic regions
following the campaign. Using the IPUMS data, I restrict the sample to persons who live
in their same district of birth. Results for this nonmover sample is presented in Table 3.5,
Panel A. The point estimates of the effect of the penicillin campaigns remain positive and
significant for the various education outcomes examined.
3.6.3 Mean Reversion
Panel B of Table 3.5 present results which correct for possible mean reversion in edu-
cational attainment. Mean reversion may be a concern if for example older cohorts in high
endemic areas experienced a temporary shock which resulted in higher yaws infections,
reduced schooling and low productivity. In this case, increases in educational attainment
would have been expected from highly infected areas even in the absence of the penicillin
campaign. To correct for possible mean reversion, I include the pre-treatment level (as at
1940) of the outcome variable as controls (interacted with the dummy for Postdc). Thus, in
Panel B of Table 5, I report results which control for the pre-1940 levels of primary school
completion, literacy, ability to speak English and years of schooling in columns (1) to (4)
respectively. The point estimates controlling for mean reversion are somewhat smaller in
magnitude, but remain significant as in my main results in Table 3.3.
3.6.4 Placebo Eradication Campaigns
Using the female subsample, I examine the impact of two placebo eradication cam-
paigns which may have occurred a decade prior, or decade following, the actual penicillin
campaigns. I focus on two outcome variables — the probability of primary school com-
pletion and the total years of schooling completed. Panels (A), (B) and (C) respectively
report difference-in-difference results for the actual penicillin campaigm (1955-1965), for
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TABLE 3.4: CONTROL FOR CONTEMPORANEOUS CHANGES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A: Primary school completion
Postdc × Infd 0.0165** 0.0157** 0.0138** 0.0152** 0.0166*** 0.0168**
(0.00643) (0.00637) (0.00685) (0.00633) (0.00633) (0.00644)
PANEL B: Literacy
Postdc × Infd 0.0191*** 0.0196*** 0.0161** 0.0198*** 0.0191*** 0.0205***
(0.00603) (0.00612) (0.00617) (0.00627) (0.00604) (0.00599)
PANEL C: Ability to speak English
Postdc × Infd 0.0204*** 0.0206*** 0.0171** 0.0207*** 0.0204*** 0.0222***
(0.00640) (0.00647) (0.00658) (0.00658) (0.00641) (0.00639)
PANEL D: Years of schooling
Postdc × Infd 0.182** 0.171** 0.134* 0.170** 0.184** 0.201***
(0.0764) (0.0740) (0.0786) (0.0750) (0.0749) (0.0759)
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year of birth fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls from Table 3, Col. (7) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Change in number of schools NO YES NO NO NO NO
Change in number of teachers NO NO YES NO NO NO
Change in number of hospitals NO NO NO YES NO NO
Change in cocoa output NO NO NO NO YES NO
Vote share for CPP Party NO NO NO NO NO YES
NOTES: Data is obtained from the IPUMS microsample of the 2000 Ghana census. Results are based on the
regression model in equation (3.1), and include controls for contemporaneous changes in education and health
infrastructure, and for political support for Nkrumah’s CPP party. The coefficient on (Postdc × Infd) pro-
vides the difference-in-difference estimate comparing the mean outcome variable for younger cohorts (born
a decade following the penicillin campaigns) to an older cohort (born a decade prior to the penicillin cam-
paigns) in a high endemicity district, compared to the difference in a low endemicity district. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses, and clustered using district administrative boundaries (as at 2000). *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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an early placebo campaign (1945-1955) and for a later placebo campaign (1965-1975). As
before, the point estimates for the actual campaign are statistically significant (as in Table
3.5, controlling for mean reversion). In both placebo campaigns, the coefficient β, on the
(Postc × Infd) term is much smaller in magnitude and never statistically significant.
3.6.5 Cohort Analysis
In this section, I examine how the impact of the penicillin campaign on human capital
attainment varied across year of birth cohorts. As shown in equation (3.2) in section 3.3,
I use the IPUMS Ghana 2000 Census microsample to examine cohorts aged between 15
and 90 grouped into 14 age categories at five-year intervals. The omitted category refers to
individuals aged above 80. For each five-year cohort, the coefficient βc of (Postdc× Infd)
provides the difference-in-difference estimate of yaws eradication.
We would expect no impact of the treatment for cohorts born prior to 1950 when the
penicillin campaigns begun, and for the coefficient to be positive and significant in subse-
quent periods. Specifically, as the penicillin campaigns were implemented across various
districts in Ghana over the period 1956 to 1963, we would expect the trend in βc to change
for cohorts born around 1950, who were most likely to be exposed to penicillin during the
age period of primary school attendance.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 plots the coefficients βc for female cohorts born between 1920 and
1985, for two outcome variables: the probability of primary school completion and the
total years of schooling completed. Each data point represents the cohort specific βc while
the x-axis refers to the year of birth (in five-year bins). The rise in the magnitude of the
coefficients begins for cohorts born between 1935-1940, however, the coefficients βc are
small and insignificant for cohorts born prior to 1950. In Figure 3.2, the coefficient becomes
statistically significant for cohorts born precisely in the early 1950s who were most likely
exposed to the penicillin campaigns during the period of primary school enrollment.
Notice that the results reported in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 include various controls (for dis-
trict pre-treatment characteristics, for contemporaneous changes in cocoa output, health
and education infrastructure, and also for the CPP vote share from the 1956 Legislative
Elections), and also control for possible mean reversion as shown in Table 3.4. Thus con-
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cern that the results might reflect pre-existing trends or contemporaneous public infras-
tructure investments is partly ameliorated by the robustness of the difference-in-difference
effects to the extensive set of controls.
3.7 Discussion
Taken together, the results obtained in this study suggest that the WHO/UNICEF yaws
campaign improved education outcomes of cohorts born following the penicillin treat-
ments. To provide some broader context, the WHO/UNICEF yaws campaign was also con-
ducted in several other countries in other endemic countries Africa, Asia and the Caribbean
- many of which had much higher yaws disease burdens than reported in the Ghana. For
example, in the Nsukka region of Eastern Nigeria, Zahra (1956) reported a mean inci-
dence rate of infectious yaws of about 2.5 percent and total yaws infection rates of nearly
20 percent. For such high prevalence rates as recorded in Nsukka, the results from this
study suggest that yaws eradication improved the probability of primary school completion
and total years of education by about 5.3 percentage points and 0.5 years respectively. The
magnitude of these increases are comparable with the estimates from the possible education
benefits from control of say, malaria. For example, Lucas (2010) estimates that complete
eradication of malaria in Uganda (which recorded the highest malaria prevalence of 47.8
percent in 2005) would result in individual gains of about 0.5 years of additional schooling.
It is difficult to extend the results above on yaws control in Ghana to the possible ben-
efits that may arise from the eradication of other neglected tropical diseases. However,
a common feature of yaws eradication in the mid-twentieth century and some neglected
tropical diseases today (such as onchocerciasis and filariasis) is that they are both highly
cost-effective interventions, which can be readily administered to entire communities or
integrated into existing health campaigns. For example, for the Global Yaws Campaign,
UNICEF estimated per capita treatment costs of about $0.67 in 1958 dollars or about $
4.60 in 2008 dollars (Keeny and Gaan, 1961). These costs exceed existing cost estimates
of about $1.26 (in 2006) per treatment with invermectin for the WHO onchocerciasis con-
trol program in Africa (Conteh et al., 2010).
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TABLE 3.5: NON MOVER SAMPLE AND CONTROLS FOR MEAN REVERSION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary school Literacy Able to Years of
completion speak English schooling
Panel A: Non-mover sample
Postdc × Infd 0.0184*** 0.0220*** 0.0237*** 0.210***
(0.00642) (0.00595) (0.00647) (0.0745)
Observations 414,430 414,430 414,430 414,430
R-squared 0.187 0.215 0.202 0.170
Panel B: Controls for Mean Reversion
Postdc × Infd 0.0130* 0.0154** 0.0165** 0.128*
(0.00665) (0.00594) (0.00644) (0.0746)
Observations 447,408 447,408 447,408 447,408
R-squared 0.185 0.212 0.198 0.168
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year of birth fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Geographical controls YES YES YES YES
Controls for cocoa soil suitability YES YES YES YES
Controls for dist. to Accra YES YES YES YES
Controls for dist. to missions/hospitals YES YES YES YES
Controls for dist. to agricultural station YES YES YES YES
NOTES: Results in Panel A are for the non-mover sample, repeating the specification in equation
(3.1) with all controls but omitting all migrants. Panel B reports results controlling for mean rever-
sion by including the pre-1940 level of the outcome variable as a control. Data is obtained from the
IPUMS microsample of the 2000 Ghana census. The coefficient on (Postdc × Infd) provides the
difference-in-difference estimate comparing the mean outcome variable for younger cohorts (born a
decade following the penicillin campaigns) to an older cohort (born a decade prior to the penicillin
campaigns) in a high endemicity district, compared to the difference in a low endemicity district.
Geographic controls are for latitude, longitude, land area and mean area-weighted slope. Cocoa soil
suitability controls is based on an index computed by the Ghana Soil Research Institute, which pro-
vides a measure for the overall suitability for cocoa farming. Additional controls are for the distance
from the centroid of each district to the nearest railway line, to Accra, to the nearest mission sta-
tion/hospital, and to the nearest agricultural station. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and
clustered using district administrative boundaries (as at 2000). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE 3.6: PLACEBO CHECKS
(1) (2)
Primary school Years of
completion schooling
Panel A: Actual Penicillin Campaign




Panel B: Placebo Penicillin Campaign (Decade Earlier)




Panel C: Placebo Penicillin Campaign (Decade Later)




District fixed effects YES YES
Year of birth fixed effects YES YES
Geographical controls YES YES
Controls for cocoa soil suitability YES YES
Controls for dist. to Accra YES YES
Controls for dist. to missions/hospitals YES YES
Controls for dist. to agricultural station YES YES
Controls for mean reversion YES YES
NOTES: Panels (A), (B) and (C) respectively report difference-in-difference results
based on equation (3.1) for the actual penicillin campaign (1955-1965), for an early
placebo campaign (1945-1955) and for a later placebo campaign (1965-1975). Re-
sults use data for the female subsample of the IPUMS Ghana 2000 census, and in-
clude controls for geographcial characteristics, cocoa soil suitability, proximity to
mission stations, hopsitals, agricultural station and to Accra, and controls for mean
reversion. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and clustered using district ad-
ministrative boundaries (as at 2000). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.

























YEAR OF BIRTH, BY 5-YEAR COHORTS 
Figure 3.2: Female Years of Schooling. This chart plots the βc coefficient of (Postdc ×
Infd) in equation 3.2 for female cohorts born between 1925 and 1985, and grouped into
5-year age bins. Omitted category is for cohorts born prior to 1920. Outcome variable is






































YEAR OF BIRTH, BY 5-YEAR COHORTS 
Figure 3.3: Female Primary School Completion. This chart plots the βc coefficient of
(Postdc × Infd) in equation 3.2 for female cohorts born between 1925 and 1985, and
grouped into 5-year age bins. Omitted category is for cohorts born prior to 1920. Outcome
variable is probability of primary school completion.
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3.8 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the impact of the mass treatment campaign of yaws using
penicillin which occurred in Ghana over the period 1959-64. The identification exploited
the cross-region differences in yaws incidence prior to the campaign, and the fact that the
penicillin treatment successfully reduced yaws prevalence in Ghana in the early 1960s. In
the main results of this study, I find that a 1 percent decrease in the prevalence of yaws fol-
lowing the penicillin treatment increased the probability of primary school completion, of
being literate, and of being able to speak English by 2.1, 1.9 and 2.1 percentage points re-
spectively. In further robustness checks, I observe that the results reported are robust to the
inclusion of various time-invariant geographic controls, controls for pre-eradication district
characteristics (such as educational attainment, health and agricultural infrastructure) and
controls for contemporaneous changes in education and health infrastructure. The results
reported in this Chapter motivate the need to re-prioritize eradication of “neglected tropical
diseases”, given the relatively low cost of such treatment interventions.
Chapter 4
Pests and Politics: Impacts of the Cocoa
Swollen Shoot Disease in Ghana
4.1 Introduction
A large literature in empirical social science examines the subject of political partisan-
ship and investigates its formation, its persistence and its implications for political behavior
(Campbell et al, 1960; Niemi and Jennings, 1991; Gerber, Huber and Washington, 2010).
The traditional debate since the 1970s concerned whether partisanship developed due to af-
fective ties to a social grouping, or rather was the result of instrumental actions influenced
by contemporary political events. Motivated by work in the social psychology literature,
some scholars viewed party affiliation as the result of political socialization which may
be the result of early childhood experiences (for example, within the family or one’s im-
mediate community) or due to inherited genetic traits (Campbell et al, 1960; Converse,
1969; Settle et al, 2009). Partisan affiliation may also be the result of a Bayesian updat-
ing mechanism based on observations derived from personal experience of political events
and politicians’ behavior (Fiorina, 1981; Popkin, 1991; Achen, 1992). For example, in
a recent contribution, Madestam and Yanagizawa-Drott (2011) investigate the impacts of
childhood participation in Fourth of July celebrations in the United States on adult politi-
cal views. They argue that a higher number of rain-free Fourth of July celebrations in an
individual’s county during childhood increases the likelihood of voting for the Republican
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party in adulthood, and results in higher turnout in presidential elections.
Regardless of its mode of formation or transmission, the literature generally finds that
partisan affiliations tend to be persistent — over an individual’s adult life span, and also
across generations (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002; Niemi and Jennings, 1991).
Persistence of partisan loyalties may be partly explained if these affiliations are viewed as
inherited norms which serve as heuristics or ”rules-of-thumb” in assessing the platforms of
political parties or the quality of individual politicians. The study of partisan affiliation is
also of direct importance as it has implications for observed political opinions and behavior
(Gerber et al, 2009), as well as for distributive politics (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit
and Londregan, 1995, 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987).
In this chapter, I contribute to this broad literature by studying the development of
partisanship in colonial Ghana, and its implications for distributive politics today. Specif-
ically, I trace the development of political opposition to center-left (Nkrumahist ideology)
in southern Ghana to political disturbances which occurred in the late colonial period fol-
lowing outbreaks of the swollen shoot disease which infected cocoa farms. The British
colony of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) served as a leading producer of cocoa in the early
twentieth century. Following World War II, the cocoa industry in the colony was severely
threatened by the outbreak of the swollen shoot disease caused by the cocoa swollen shoot
virus (CSSV) and transmitted by mealybugs (Pseudococccidae). The disease transmission
mechanism has been extensively studied in the cocoa entomology literature: the mealybug
vectors are wingless insects, and spread of the disease occurs by radial growth of infected
areas and by wind dispersion of the mealybug. The only control means available was to
cut down diseased trees wherever outbreaks occurred, resulting in widespread riots in the
cocoa-growing regions in the 1940s. The Watson Commission, which was appointed by
the colonial government to investigate riots in Ghana sparked by the cocoa swollen shoot
disease, confirmed the political motivations of the disturbances (Colonial Office, 1948, pp
49). However, the short- and long-term implications of these disturbances have not been
empirically examined.
Using novel historical data from the late colonial period on cultivated cocoa acreages
and the spatial variation in CSSV pest infection, I construct a treatment variable of the
intensity of the disease shock. The CSSV pest spread in a plausibly random way, and
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I provide evidence that the disease treatment measure is uncorrelated with various pre-
epidemic district characteristics. Today, based on data from the Afrobarometer surveys,
I find that districts which experienced a high intensity of the disease pest report stronger
anti-government opinions in survey responses. Specifically, they are more likely to attribute
success in life to individual effort rather than government support.
Next, I trace the historical roots of these political views. OLS regression results show
that higher pest infection was correlated with higher levels of anti-Nkrumah (center-left)
votes in the 1956 Legislative Election — a pivotal election in pre-independence Ghana.
These results remain robust to controlling for various pre-epidemic district characteristics
such as geographical characteristics, cocoa soil suitability, and proximity to agricultural
stations, missionary centers, local hospitals, and transport infrastructure.
Following decades of military rule, the Constitution of the Fourth Republic in Ghana
re-introduced multiparty elections and strengthened local government administration by
introducing central government transfers to all districts under the District Assembly Com-
mon Fund. I show that districts which historically experienced high pest infection still vote
against the center-left party in both the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections. Using both
OLS and 2SLS regressions, I examine the impact of government opposition on district
transfers, and find that opposition areas receive lower transfers from the central govern-
ment during this period. I examine possible violations to the exclusion restrictions of the
2SLS strategy by investigating the impact of the CSSV pest on other economic and social
outcomes. I do not find any persistent impacts on cocoa output, educational attainment or
economic activity. Using the approach developed by Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012), I
also document that the 2SLS results remain robust to moderate forms of violations to the
exclusion restriction assumptions.
This study contributes to two strands of work in the literature. First, as noted ear-
lier, it examines the subject of the formation and persistence of political partisanship. It
contributes to the broader literature which examines the impact of personal experience on
preferences and behavior. For example, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) argue that indi-
viduals who are exposed to macroeconomic recessions in early adulthood are more likely
to state preferences in support of state redistribution and view luck rather than effort as im-
portant determinants of success. Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007) also document that
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East Germans who lived under a centrally planned economy, have preferences in favor of
greater state redistribution. More broadly, the subject of persistence of cultural norms has
been previously discussed in the literature (see for example, Salaman (1980), Greif (1994),
and Cohen et al., (1996)), and reviewed by Nunn (2009, 2012). Nunn (2012) argues that
historical shocks may have persistent effects via a cultural channel, and discusses recent
empirical research on cultural persistence. As an example, using data from the Afrobarom-
eter surveys, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) provide evidence that ethnic groups in Africa
which historically experienced high levels of the slave trade report lower levels of trust
in others today. Guiso et al. (2008) also observe the persistence of social capital of Ital-
ian city states dating from 1000-1300 AD. Tabellini (2008) similarly examines the impact
of trust in others and belief in individual effort on comparative economic development in
Europe today, using nineteenth century literacy rates and historical political institutions as
instruments.
Second, this study also contributes to the literature on distributive politics by examin-
ing the patterns of distribution of transfers across districts in Ghana today. Since Laswell
(1936), scholars examining the fiscal allocation of government resources among groups
have been concerned with one central question: who gets what, when and how? Theoreti-
cal models of distributive politics have two main predictions. One school of thought argues
that rational incumbent politcians behave as risk averse agents, and consequently target
resources to loyal constituencies in order to maximize their vote shares (Cox and McCub-
bins, 1986). An alternate model views incumbent politicians as channelling resources to
swing voters who could be pivotal in deciding the outcome of elections (Dixit and Lon-
dregan, 1995, 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). These models have been empirically
tested in various settings. For example, in India, Khemani (2007) observes that intergovern-
mental allocations made via a central political executive are targeted to politically aligned
states, while transfers allocated by an independent body reduce such partisan influences.
Similarly, using a panel of US local government transfers for the period 1957-1997, An-
solabehere and Snyder (2002) observe that state governments target transfers to counties
which provided the strongest electoral support. In contrast, Dahlberg and Johansen (2002)
also provide evidence that electorally pivotal regions in Sweden receive the largest con-
centration of allocated environmental grants. This paper sheds further light on distributive
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politics in the case of Ghana, building on earlier contributions by Banful (2009).
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In section 4.2, I provide a brief
historical background examining the growth of the cocoa industry in Ghana in the first half
of the twentieth century, and the commencement of the swollen shoot campaigns. Section
4.3 presents the empirical strategy, and in section 4.4, I summarize the data sources used in
this paper. Section 4.5 presents OLS and 2SLS results, and section 4.6 discusses possible
violations of the 2SLS exclusion restriction assumptions. Conclusions are presented in
Section 4.7.
4.2 Historical Background
4.2.1 Cocoa in Ghana (1900-1945)
The British colony of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) served as a leading producer of co-
coa in the early twentieth century. Cocoa accounted for about three-quarters of the colony’s
GDP, and provided an important source of dollar-denominated earnings for the British gov-
ernment. The crop was introduced in southern Ghana in the late nineteenth century in Ak-
wapim by a Ghanaian farmer, Tetteh Quarshie, and the Basel Missionaries. The adoption
of this cash crop was widespread in the forest regions of southern Ghana where the soils
and climate were best suited for cocoa cultivation. Propagation of cocoa was made possible
by seedlings distributed from the Aburi Botanical Gardens and various agricultural stations
established in the forest zone.
A striking feature of the growth of the cocoa industry in the Gold Coast was that the
colony’s cocoa output was dominated by smallholder farmers who depended on cocoa in-
comes to finance imported goods and other food purchases. In some cases, bands of Ak-
wapim farmers migrated westwards to acquire new forest lands for cocoa cultivation (Hill,
1963). Dickson (1969) surveys the expansion of cocoa cultivation in southern Ghana in
the first half of the twentieth century, and observes that without adequate knowledge of
the appropriate soil and climatic conditions for cocoa cultivation, the spread of new farms
was largely via a process of trial and error (pp 304). The rapid adoption of the crop in the
colony was also documented by Cardinall in the 1931 Gold Coast Census:
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So easy is cacao to grow and so remunerative that a false idea of com-
mercial values has been forced upon the native peasant. He has yet to learn
to think in pence instead of pounds, and once that lesson has been thoroughly
learnt, the only limit to his continued prosperity is that of the supply of labour.
(Cardinall, 1932, pp 99).
Prior to World War II, Ghana accounted for about a half of global cocoa production, with
the purchase of the local crop dominated by international firms, such as Cadbury and Fry.
Export agriculture in the country was essentially cocoa cultivation and many other previous
cash crops such as coffee, rubber, cotton and gum copal had reduced economic importance
(Dickson, 1969).
4.2.2 Swollen Shoot Campaign (1948-55)
After World War II, however, the cocoa industry in the colony was threatened by the
outbreak of the swollen shoot disease. The disease was first reported by local farmers in
1936 around Effiduase, and identified to be a viral infection in 1939. The disease transmis-
sion mechanism has been extensively studied in the cocoa entomology literature as being
caused by the CSSV virus (genus badnavirus) and transmitted by mealybugs (pseudococc-
cidae). The mealybug hosts are wingless insects, and spread of the disease occurs by wind
dispersion of the insect hosts and radial growth of infected areas (Cornwell, 1958; 1960).
Infected trees generally died within 24 months and there was no scientific cure for tackling
the plant virus. Thus, wherever outbreaks occurred, the only control means available was to
cut down diseased trees as well as immediate neighbors of diseased trees even if these were
symptomless. The potential destruction of the colony’s cocoa industry created considerable
panic for both the colonial government as well as foreign commercial interests which had
dominated marketing of West African cocoa (Danquah, 2003; Cocoa Conference, 1951).
The disease was concentrated around the Eastern Region, but with scattered infections
all through the cocoa-growing regions. The control measures implemented by the colonial
government commenced in 1946 with the cutting-out policy in which state agricultural of-
ficials forcibly destroyed infected trees in cocoa growing areas. The policy proved to be
extremely unpopular and resulted in widespread protests in southern parts of the country.
Consequently, over the period 1948-1951, two major Commissions (the Watson Commi-
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sion and the 1951 Swollen Shoot Commission) were appointed by the colonial government
and the Nkrumah-led administration to investigate the concerns of local farmers and pro-
pose remedial actions1. The Watson Commission noted the political motivations of the
riots in 1948, and reported that ”the Government’s scheme for eradication of the disease is
scientifically sound but politically inexpedient” (Colonial Office, 1948, pp 49).
Moreover, there were various rumors associated with the government policy of com-
pulsory tree cutting which spread in the cocoa-growing regions, and which the Watson
Commission noted as generating distrust of the central government. Following the riots of
1948, several rumors concerning the future of the country’s cocoa industry circulated in the
cocoa belt. For example, the Watson Commission reported comments by local farmers that
”Britain intends to the sell the Gold Coast to the United States but wished to ensure the
death of the cocoa industry to avoid subsequent competition” (Colonial Office, 1948, pp
49). The 1951 Commission similarly documented rumors that the cutting-out policy was
”to wipe out the cocoa industry from the Gold Coast”, and ”surveying and demarcation of
farms has led to the fear that the farmers’ land is to be confiscated”.
By 1951, the Nkrumah administration halted the cutting-out policy, dissolved the Co-
coa Rehabilitation Department, and commenced new programs of grassroots campaigns
educating farmers on remedial measures needed to tackle the cocoa swollen shoot disease.
Under a revised program, A New Deal for Cocoa, the administration re-commenced com-
pulsory cutting-out of infected trees but with compensation paid to farmers for trees cut,
and replanting grants also provided to encourage rehabilitation of destroyed farms (Austin,
1964).
4.3 Empirical Strategy
This section presents the empirical strategy adopted in this chapter. Using data from the
Afrobarometer Survey, I first examine the relationship between the CSSV disease intensity
1First was the Colonial Office (1948), Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast led
by Aiken Watson in 1948 [Watson Commission] and second, the Committee of Enquiry into the Existing
Organisation and Methods for the Control of Swollen Shoot Disease by the Compulsory Cutting Out of the
Infested Cocoa Trees (1951).
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and political views today by running a regression of the form:




d + id (4.1)





contain individual and district level controls. (High)d and (Medium)d refer to the fraction
of district land area classified as being under high and medium pest infection respectively. I
examine the outcome variable related to perceptions of the relative role of individual effort
and government support. Specifically, Yid is a dummy equal to one if the individual views
personal effort as more important than government support in determining success in life.
I proceed to trace the historical origins of these political views by examining the impacts
of the disturbances arising from the cocoa swollen shoot riots on the 1956 Legislative
Elections. I run a regression of the form:
OppV oteShared = β1(High× CocoaShare)d + β2(Medium× CocoaShare)d (4.2)
+ γX ′d + δr + d
whereOppV oteShared refers to the opposition vote share in the 1956 Legislative Election.
β1 and β2 provide coefficients on the treatment measure for high and medium pest infec-
tion areas. The vector X ′d contains various district level controls including time-invariant
geographic controls, and distance from the centroid of each cocoa district to the nearest
agricultural station, railway station and hospital, as at 1948. δr is a region fixed effect,
allowing for separate intercepts for the three existing regions in southern Ghana in 1956,
namely: the Colony, Ashanti and Transvolta Togoland. The district borders employed
here refer to electoral boundaries for the 1956 Gold Coast Legislative Assembly Elections
(Austin, 1964, pp 204).
Next, the instrumental variable 2SLS strategy of the impact of opposition vote share
on government transfers is subsequently implemented as follows. Specifically, I use the
CSSV pest intensity interacted with the share of total acreage under cocoa cultivation (in
1947) as an instrument for the opposition vote share, controlling for the district mean area-
weighted cocoa suitability index, and other geographic characteristics. I examine the first
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stage relationship between historial disease intensity and opposition vote share today in the
regression:
OppV oteShared = β1(High× CocoaShare)d + β2(Medium× CocoaShare)d (4.3)
+ γX ′d + δr + d
where OppV oteShared refers to the opposition vote share in the 1992 or 1996 Presidential
Elections. Next, I examine the impact of the oppostion vote share on government transfers
as in the regression below:
GovtTransferd = αOppV oteShared + γX
′
d + δr + d (4.4)
where GovtTransferd refers to central government transfers from the District Assembly
Common Fund to district, d. Here, I use the CSSV intensity measure as an instrument for
the opposition vote share.
This instrumental variable (IV) strategy relies on two conditions (Angrist and Pischke,
2008). First, the CSSV treatment measure must be correlated with the opposition vote
share, i.e. the existence of a first stage relationship. If the first stage relationship is weak,
then the IV estimates are likely to be noisy, and biased towards the OLS results (Bound,
Jaeger, and Baker 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997). The second requirement of the IV strat-
egy is the exclusion restriction which requires that the CSSV pest treatment be uncorrelated
with other determinants of the outcome measure of interest, i.e. corr(CSSV Trmtd, d) =
0. This requirement is comprised of two parts: that the CSSV treatment be as good as
randomly assigned conditional on covariates, and that the treatment measure affects gov-
ernment transfers today only via the opposition vote share channel.
The exclusion restriction is not directly testable. However, I examine its plausibility
in a number of ways. The historical accounts indicate that the CSSV disease propagation
was plausibly random following wind dispersal of the insect hosts. I confirm the lack of
correlation between the CSSV shock and pre-existing district characteristics by regressing
various pre-epidemic district characteristics obtained from the 1948 Gold Coast Popula-
tion Census on the CSSV intensity measure (see Table 4.1B). In section 4.6, I also present
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further checks for violations of the exclusion restrictions by examining the impacts of the
pests on other outcomes such as cocoa output, educational attainment and employment.
Finally, I implement the approach proposed by Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2002) to exam-
ine the sensitivity of my IV/2SLS results to violations of the assumptions of the exclusion
restrictions.
4.4 Data
Data on cocoa swollen shoot virus (CSSV) prevalence is obtained from maps prepared
by the Gold Coast Agricultural Department and presented at the conferences of the Cocoa,
Chocolate, and Confectionery Alliance (1957), see Figure 4.1. The map provides five lev-
els of increasing intensity of the pest infection: areas with no recorded infections; areas
with few small scattered outbreaks; areas with numerous, large, scattered outbreaks; dev-
astated areas; and abandoned areas. Data on cultivated cocoa areas circa 1947 is obtained
from the Report on the Progress of Swollen Shoot Control, see Figure 4.2. I construct a
measure of the disease intensity by superimposing district boundaries (from the 1948 Gold
Coast census) on maps of the CSSV prevalence and cultivated cocoa areas. I consider two
measures of the treatment. The first measure examines the fraction of a district’s landarea
which is classified as under high, medium or low CSSV infestation. I aggregate areas with
large outbreaks, devastated areas and abandoned areas as high treatment intensity; and ar-
eas with few scattered outbreaks as medium intensity areas; and uninfected areas as low
treatment areas.
I also consider a second measure of the treatment intensity in which I interact the CSSV
disease severity with the fraction of land under cocoa cultivation in 1947. The observations
from Cardinall (1931) and Dickson (1969) above suggest that the cultivation of the crop
was extensive in many parts of southern Ghana, but without much understanding of the soil
and climactic suitability of specific locations. The second treatment measure provides an
index of the relative severity of the disease across districts in the cocoa belt by weighting
the disease severity with the fraction of land area under cocoa cultivation in 1947. In using
this second measure, I also control for the mean area-weighted cocoa suitability index for
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the district. The cocoa suitability index is computed by the Ghana Soil Research Institute
and provides a measure for the overall suitability for cocoa farming on a GIS grid raster.
The index provides a 0-100 score of cocoa suitability for each grid cell, taking into account
local precipitation, temperature and soil quality (see Figure 4.3).
Data on pre-treatment district population and economic characteristics are obtained
from the Gold Coast Census of 1948. For post-treatment education and labor force out-
comes, I use the IPUMS microsample from the 2000 Census of Ghana. Data on geographic
characteristics is obtained by overlaying the 1948 administrative map of Ghana/Gold Coast
on elevation and slope data obtained from SRTM/ArcMaps and computing the mean area-
weighted elevation and slope. I also calculate various district-level geographic controls,
including the distance from the centroid of each district to the nearest railway line and
major road, to the nearest protestant mission, and to the nearest hospital in 1948.
I use data from the Afrobarometer Surveys for Ghana to examine questions related to
perceptions of the role of individual effort versus government support in attaining personal
success. The Afrobarometer Surveys are nationally representative surveys of social and
political opinions of voting age citizens in African countries, and used in previous research
in the literature (see Nunn and Wantchekon, 2009). I utilize data from Rounds 2 and 3
of the Ghana surveys, where the question on the relative importance of individual effort
versus government support was posed to respondents.2
Data for outcomes of the 1956 Gold Coast Legislative Elections is obtained from vari-
ous issues of the Daily Graphic newspaper from July 1956. From these sources, I calculate
the combined opposition vote shares as (1− CPPV oteShare)3. Electoral outcomes data
for the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections in Ghana are obtained from the Ghana Elec-
2Specifically, the outcome variable here is coded from the following Afrobarometer question (see Bauer
(2005), Afrobarometer Data Codebook for Ghana (Round 2, Q61), pp 41): Lets talk for a moment about
the kind of society we would like to have in this country. Which of the following statements is closest to
your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. (A). People should look after themselves and be responsible
for their own success in life. (B). The government should bear the main responsibility for the well-being of
people.
3Nkrumah’s Conventions Peoples Party (CPP) won 57 percent of the overall votes cast, but faced opposi-
tion from other parties viz.: NLM (National Liberation Movement), MAP (Muslim Association Party), NPP
(Northern People’s Party), TC (Togoland Congress), FYO (Federated Youth Organization), and the WYA
(Wassaw Youth Association) — see Austin (1964) pp 354.
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Figure 4.1: Source: Cocoa, Chocolate, and Confectionery Alliance Conference (1957)
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Legend
Cocoa Areas
Figure 2: Gold Coast/Ghana Cocoa Areas, September 1947
Figure 4.2: Source: Report on the Progress of Swollen Shoot Control
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Figure 3: Cocoa Soil Suitability Index







Figure 4.3: Source: Boateng et al., (1999), Soil Research Institute, Ghana
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toral Commission, while data on national government transfers to districts for the period
1994-2000 are obtained from the Ghana District Assembly Common Fund (see Banful
(2009)). Data limitations imply that I am able only to examine 2 elections in the 1990s.
Finally, I compile data on cocoa output spanning the period 1927-2007 from a variety
of sources. Data is compiled for the years 1927, 1936, 1947-1965, 1969-1973, 2003-
2007 as follows: from Dickson (1969, pp 168-9) for 1927 and 1936; Analysis of Cocoa
Purchases by Societies, Districts and Regions for 1947-1965; the Ghana Cocoa Marketing
Board Newsletter for 1969-1973; and the Ghana COCOBOD district-level purchases for
the period 2003-2007. The Ghana COCOBOD demarcates the cocoa-growing areas in
Ghana into 7 cocoa regions: Eastern, Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Central, Volta, Western North
and Western South, which are subdivided into cocoa districts distinct from administrative
districts. The data spanning most decades in the twentieth century are organized into 28
cocoa districts.
Table 4.1A provides summary statistics for various outcome variables and covariates
used in this paper, comparing cocoa and non-cocoa districts. In Table 4.1B, I regress var-
ious pre-epidemic district characteristics on the disease intensity variables. The disease
intensity measure is orthogonal to most district characteristics, the only exceptions be-
ing population density in column (1). This is potentially a concern for my identification
strategy as initially high population density may be correlated with other factors (such as
income) which influence my outcome variables. In subsequent regressions, I therefore con-
trol directly for pre-epidemic population density. The significant correlation in column (1)
is however driven result of two influential observations in the highly devastated districts
in the Eastern Region, and the correlation disappears when I omit these two districts. In
specifications using the disease treatment interacted with the share of cocoa acreage, I also
control for distance to railways and to church missions.
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TABLE 4.1A: SUMMARY STATISTICS
All districts Cocoa districts
(1) (2)
Fraction of land area under high pest infection ... 0.161
(0.279)
Fraction of land area under medium pest infection ... 0.419
(0.349)
Fraction of district land area under forest reservation 0.0517 0.0837
(0.0885) (0.100)
Population (1948 Census) 59,585 54,181
(33,605) (26,383)
Population density (persons per sq. km., 1948 Census) 74.11 76.96
(106.2) (94.58)
Fraction of population employed in agriculture (1948 Census) 0.712 0.677
(0.132) (0.0748)
Fraction of population employed in mining (1948 Census) 0.0564 0.0810
(0.159) (0.186)
Fraction of population employed in manufacturing (1948 Census) 0.0986 0.112
(0.0477) (0.0355)
Local government revenue (Sh. per capita, 1948 Census) 0.476 0.522
(0.501) (0.524)
Cultivated cocoa acreage per capita (sq. km per capita) ... 0.0081
(0.0068)






Mean area-weighted elevation (in meters) 155.8 166.8
(90.31) (85.28)
Mean area-weighted slope (in degrees) 2.639 3.492
(1.449) (1.185)
Cocoa soil suitability index 20.35 33.19
(27.51) (28.20)
Distance to railway (in km) 138.2 47.6
(161.8) (45.0)
Distance to protestant mission (in km) 72.6 41.9
(72.8) (35.4)
Distance to hospital (in km) 18.8 19.3
(11.1) (11.2)
CPP vote share (1956 Legislative Elections) 62.10 66.10
(25.10) (25.30)
Government vote share (1992 Presidential Elections) 58.77 57.46
(18.50) (18.31)
Government vote share (1996 Presidential Elections) 61.56 56.98
(19.57) (19.01)
Log per capita government transfers (1996) 8.011 8.035
(0.343) (0.321)
Log per capita government transfers (2000) 9.298 9.288
(0.417) (0.394)
Observations 102 63
NOTES: Cocoa districts defined as districts with cocoa farms as at September, 1947. Data on intensity of cocoa
swollen shoot outcomes are obtained from reports of the Cocoa, Chocolate, and Confectionery Alliance Conference
(1957), see Fig. 1. Population data and employment shares in various sectors are obtained from the 1948 Gold Coast
Census. Data on geographic characteristics obtained by overlaying administrative map of Ghana/Gold Coast on el-
evation (slope) data obtained from SRTM, and computing mean area-weighted elevation (slope). Data on CPP vote
shares in 1956 Legislative Elections is obtained from Daily Graphic newspapers of July 1956. Data on government
vote shares and transfers to local governments (1992, 1996, and 2000) is obtained from Banful (2009).
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 OLS Results
In this subsection, I report results on the impacts of the disturbances following the
CSSV on political outcomes using data from the Afrobarometer survey and the 1956 Gold
Coast Legislative Elections. Table 4.2 presents results of the relationship between the
CSSV pests intensity and the dummy for whether individual effort rather than government
support is important for personal success. In column (1), I present the baseline correlation
between the outcome variable and the CSSV treatment intensity, controlling only for indi-
vidual characteristics (age and gender). In column (2), I include time invariant geographic
controls (for latitude, slope and cocoa soil suitability). Columns (3) to (5) successively
include controls for distance from the centroid of each district to the nearest cocoa stations,
agricultural stations and railway line as at 1948. Considering columns (3) to (5), there is a
robust, positive and significant relationship between the CSSV intensity variable and sup-
port for the view about the importance of individual effort (rather than government support)
in determining personal success.
Table 4.3 documents the impact of the CSSV treatment intensity on the outcomes of
the Gold Coast 1956 Legislative Elections controlling for various pre-treatment character-
istics. Robust standard errors are presented in brackets. Given the spatial clustering of
the CSSV pests, I also report Conley standard errors in square brackets, which correct for
two-dimensional spatial dependence. The Conley covariance matrix provides a weighted
average of spatial autocovariances, with the weights starting at one and decaying linearly to
zero within a cutoff region. I set the cutoff to 2 degrees (or roughly 220 kilometers) in both
longitude and latitude dimensions. Column (1) examines the baseline relationship between
the CSSV disease intensity and opposition vote share in 1956. Columns (2) to (6) present
results with region fixed effects, geographic controls, and additional controls for proximity
to the nearest agricultural station, railway station and hospital infrastructure in 1948. There
is a robust and statistically significant relationship for specifications in columns (2) to (6).
Using the preferred specification in column (3), a one standard deviation increase in the
high pest treatment measure results in a 4 percentage point increase in the opposition vote
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share. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the medium pest treatment measure
increases opposition vote share by 5 percentage points.
4.5.2 2SLS Results
In this subsection, I use an instrumental variables approach to examine the impact of
supporting the government opposition on transfers received from the District Assembly
Common Fund (DACF) in Ghana. Following the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution, the DACF
was established to decentralize public expenditures and strengthen local government ad-
ministration. Transfers from the DACF forms nearly 80 percent of the total expenditures of
local governments. Although DACF allocations to local governments are formula-based,
the disbursement formula has been subject to revisions annually since 1994. These changes
arise largely from changes in the allocation criteria and relative weights used in computing
the size of transfers to various districts. Banful (2009) observes that allocations from the
DACF in Ghana over the period 1994-2000 were subject to political manipulation, with
transfers being targeted to reward loyal constituencies. This follows one strand of the the-
oretical predictions in the distributive politics literature in which elected political parties
behave as risk-averse investors and target resources at loyal supporters (Cox and McCub-
bins, 1986).
Table 4.4 reports the relationship between the CSSV intensity measure and electoral
outcomes from 1992 and 1996 Presidential Elections. This serves as the first stage of the
2SLS strategy. Column (1) presents the baseline unconditional relationship between the
opposition vote shares and the various treatment measures. Columns (2) to (6) provide
additional specifications with region fixed effects, and controlling for geographical charac-
teristics, economic activity, proximity to agricultural stations, mission stations, and hospital
infrastructure, and for local government revenues in 1948. Again, we observe a robust and
statistically significant relationship between the opposition vote share today and the treat-
ment measure of CSSV pest intensity. For the 1992 presidential elections, the results from
the preferred specification in column (3) indicate that a one standard deviation increase in
the high pest intensity treatment measure increases the opposition vote share today by about
3 percentage points, while the corresponding increase in medium pest treatment variable
Chapter 4: Pests and Politics: Impacts of the Cocoa Swollen Shoot Disease in Ghana 106
increased the opposition vote share by 6 percentage points.
There is typically a first stage relationship between the measure of the CSSV pest treat-
ment and opposition vote share today with the F-statistic ranging from 6.71 to 13.98 for
the 1996 election results. In the preferred specification in column (3), the F-statistic equals
13.98, falling within the range needed to avoid weak instrument concerns (Stock, Wright,
and Yogo; 2002).
Table 4.5 reports the OLS and IV estimates of the effect of opposition vote shares on
the magnitude of DACF allocations. The dependent variable is the mean log per capita
government allocations for the period 1997-99 obtained from the District Assembly Com-
mon Fund. All specifications include geographic controls and region fixed effects which
provide separate intercepts for the 3 colonial administrative regions in the cocoa-growing
regions in 1956. Specifications in columns (2) to (6), successively introduce controls for
economic activity (share of the population in manufacturing and in mining form the 1948
Census), controls for proximity to agricultural stations, to mission stations and to hospital
infrastructure, and for local government revenues as at 1948.
The OLS results presented in Table 4.5, Panel A provides a negative relationship be-
tween support for the opposition parties and DACF transfers. Consistent with our hypothe-
ses, the estimates for oppvoteshare are all negative, and statistically significant in specifi-
cations (1), (2), (3) and (6). The point estimates range from -0.59 to -0.72, implying that a
one standard deviation increase in opposition vote share reduces district per capita DACF
allocations between 11.2 and 13.6 percent. Next, Table 4.5, Panel B reports the results of
the relationship between opposition vote share and DACF transfers using the IV strategy.
This is the second-stage results, with the corresponding first stage results previously re-
ported in Table 4.4. The IV point estimates are larger in magnitude than the corresponding
OLS results, and range between -1.19 and -1.49. Thus, a one standard deviation increase
in opposition vote share reduces per capita government transfers between 22.4 and 28.2
percent. The increase in the magnitude of the point estimate may be partly explained by an
upward bias in the OLS results due to omitted variables.
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4.6 Robustness Checks
The exclusion restrictions for the IV strategy require the CSSV pest treatment to be
uncorrelated with other determinants of the outcome measure of interest. In particular, we
expect the treatment measure to affect government transfers today only via the opposition
vote share channel. However, the requirement of perfect exogeneity of the instrument is
a strict condition, which in many instances, is unlikely to hold exactly. For example, it is
plausible that the CSSV pest shock of the 1940s altered the agricultural endowment of the
cocoa districts and thus led to changes in cocoa ouput and prevailing economic activity in
these districts. The historical accounts however suggest that the impact of the CSSV pest
was temporary, and the major cocoa-related Commissions of the period provided various
re-planting grants to farmers in affected areas (see section 4.2.2).
In this section, I provide two checks to examine plausibility of the exclusion restrictions.
First, using a panel dataset of cocoa output spanning the period 1927-2007, I investigate
the response of cocoa output to the CSSV pest. In addition, I retrospectively examine the
evolution of education outcomes and economic activity following the CSSV pest using the
IPUMS microsample of the 2000 Ghana Census. Second, I adopt an approach developed
by Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012) in which inference is conducted but with gradual
relaxation of the exclusion restrictions. This approach enables us to obtain bounds on the
effect of the CSSV pest instrument even when we deviate from the assumption of perfect
exogeneity.
4.6.1 Cocoa Output
In this section, I examine the evolution of cocoa output since the early twentieth century
using panel data covering all 28 cocoa districts in southern Ghana4. I examine the impact
of the CSSV pest on successive cross-sections of cocoa output data for the 80-year period
4As noted earlier in section 4.4, boundaries of cocoa districts differ from regular administrative districts.
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TABLE 4.4: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (1992, 1996)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: OppositionVoteShare1992
FractionHighPest * ShareCocoaArea 0.204* 0.208* 0.215* 0.222* 0.226* 0.191
(0.118) (0.121) (0.126) (0.129) (0.133) (0.133)
[0.063] [0.062] [0.066] [0.071] [0.072] [0.072]
FractionMediumPest * ShareCocoaArea 0.302*** 0.298*** 0.296*** 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.227***
(0.0668) (0.0681) (0.0690) (0.0724) (0.0736) (0.0742)
[0.055] [0.057] [0.057] [0.051] [0.051] [0.051]
Dependent variable: OppositionVoteShare1996
FractionHighPest * ShareCocoaArea 0.200* 0.204* 0.223* 0.232* 0.225* 0.197
(0.103) (0.112) (0.120) (0.125) (0.129) (0.130)
[0.059] [0.061] [0.066] [0.074] [0.077] [0.076]
FractionMediumPest * ShareCocoaArea 0.298*** 0.307*** 0.302*** 0.220*** 0.221*** 0.218***
(0.0611) (0.0634) (0.0630) (0.0653) (0.0656) (0.0663)
[0.045] [0.046] [0.045] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034]
F-stat 13.27 13.35 13.98 7.89 7.84 7.25
Geographical Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Economic activity (1948) NO YES YES YES YES YES
Controls for agricultural stations NO NO YES YES YES YES
Controls for mission stations NO NO NO YES YES YES
Controls for hospital infrastructure NO NO NO NO YES YES
Controls for local government revenues (1948) NO NO NO NO NO YES
Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77
R-squared 0.344 0.580 0.643 0.643 0.661 0.663
NOTES: Dependent variable is the opposition vote share in 1992 or 1996 Presidential Elections. FractionHighPest
and FractionMediumPest respectively refer to the fraction of a district’s land area classified as exposed to high and
medium pest infection respectively. ShareCocoaArea is the fraction of district’s land area under cocoa cultivation as at
1947. Region fixed effects provide separate intercepts for the 3 colonial administrative regions in the cocoa-growing
regions in 1956, namely: the Colony, Ashanti, and Transvolta Togoland. Geographical controls are for longitude, lat-
itude, slope and landarea. Controls for economic activity are for the share of the population in manufacturing and
in mining (1948 Census). Controls for agricultural stations controls for distance to nearest agricultural station. Con-
trols for mission station and hospital infrastructure controls for distance to nearest protestant mission and hospital as
at 1948. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Conley standard errors, correcting for spatial dependence, are in
square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 4.5: 2SLS RESULTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Log per capita government allocations (1997-1999)
PANEL A: OLS RESULTS
OppVoteShare1996 -0.669* -0.678* -0.721** -0.646 -0.597 -0.694*
(0.355) (0.353) (0.358) (0.399) (0.391) (0.402)
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77
R-squared 0.143 0.148 0.172 0.175 0.203 0.226
PANEL B: 2SLS RESULTS
OppVoteShare1996 -1.192* -1.214** -1.196** -1.344* -1.212* -1.490*
(0.627) (0.604) (0.578) (0.724) (0.691) (0.857)
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77
R-squared 0.109 0.114 0.145 0.128 0.167 0.168
Geographical Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Economic activity (1948) NO YES YES YES YES YES
Controls for agricultural stations NO NO YES YES YES YES
Controls for mission stations NO NO NO YES YES YES
Controls for hospital infrastructure NO NO NO NO YES YES
Controls for local government revenues (1948) NO NO NO NO NO YES
Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
NOTES: Dependent variable is the mean log per capita government allocations for the period 1997-99, ob-
tained from the District Assembly Common Fund. Region fixed effects provide separate intercepts for the 3
colonial administrative regions in the cocoa-growing regions in 1956, namely: the Colony, Ashanti, and Trans-
volta Togoland. Geographical controls are for longitude, latitude, slope and landarea. Controls for economic
activity are for the share of the population in manufacturing and in mining (in 1948). Controls for agricultural
stations controls for distance to nearest agricultural station. Controls for mission station and hospital infras-
tructure controls for distance to nearest protestant mission and hospital as at 1948. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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[(Medium× CocoaShare)d × φt)]β2t
+ γ(X ′d × φt) + δd + δt + dt
where Cdt refers to cocoa output in district, d, in year, t; X
′
d is a vector containing district
level controls; δd and δt refer to district and year fixed effects and φt is a dummy for year
t. As before, the CSSV treatment variable is given by the fraction of district land area
classified as high or medium pest intensity interacted with the fraction of cultivated cocoa
area as at 1947. Here, I am interested in how the coefficients β1t and β2t vary over time.
The regression above provides estimates for the beta coefficients for 15-year observations
between 1949 and 2007. The omitted categories are cocoa output for four observations
which preceded the cutting-out policy: for 1927, 1936, 1947 and 1948.
Table 4.A1 in the appendix provides the coefficients β1t and β2t. There is some evidence
that the impact of the shock was temporary: cocoa output initially declines in areas which
experienced a high intensity of the CSSV pest. The magnitude of β1 coefficient is negative
and significant up to the late 1950s. Subsquently, the point estimate remains negative al-
though the 90 percent confidence intervals now include zero. For areas which experienced
a medium intensity of the pest, the β2 coefficient is never significant, and in some instances
the point estimate is positive. The negative magnitude for the β1 coefficient appears to be
driven largely by one influential observation in the ”abandoned” region around Koforidua.
Excluding the abandoned region shows even weaker effects of the CSSV pest on cocoa
output. Overall, this account is consistent with qualitative evidence which document that
following the initial political disturbances, the CSSV disease was largely contained. With
the introduction of new disease-resistant cocoa varieties, and financial support via replant-
ing grants paid to local farmers, the effect of the pest infestation on cocoa output was only
temporary.
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4.6.2 Education and Employment Outcomes
The exclusion restrictions would also be violated if the impact of the pests in the 1950s
resulted in changes in educational attainment in cocoa districts, or the reallocation of labor
from agriculture to the manufacturing or service sectors. Detailed panel data on educa-
tional attainment and employment outcomes (for example, from waves of the Ghanaian
census), are not available. However, I am able to shed light on changes in educational at-
tainment and employment activity by retrospectively examining microsample data of the
2000 Ghanaian Census. The IPUMS microsample for the Ghanaian Census provides data
on educational attainment and employment activity for about 1.8 million individuals. Un-
der the assumption that the district of current residence (observed in the 2000 Census) is
highly correlated with the district of birth and education, I am able to examine changes
in educational attainment and employment activity across various year-of-birth cohorts in
districts exposed to varying intensity of the CSSV disease pest.








[(Medium× CocoaShare)d × φt)]β2t
+ γ(X ′d × φt) + δd + δt + dt
In separate regressions, the outcome variable Ydt refers to various education and em-
ployment outcome variables. For education outcomes, I examine: primary school comple-
tion, years of schooling, literacy and ability to speak English. For economic activities, the
outcome variable is a dummy for employment in manufacturing or a dummy for employ-
ment in services (employment in agriculture is the omitted category). For ease of presenta-
tion of the coefficients, I group observations into into 10 age bins with five-year intervals,
i.e. for cohorts aged 21-25 years (born 1975-1979), aged 26-30 years (born 1970-1974),
aged 31-35 years (born 1965-1969) and so on. The omitted category refers to individuals
aged above 70 years (i.e. born before 1930).
Table 4.A2 provides estimates for the β1 and β2 coefficients for the outcome variables
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examined. The peak of the tree-cutting exercises occurred in 1950-55 (see Table 4.A1).
First, consider the education outcomes reported in columns (1) to (4) of Table 4.A2. In the
presence of a sharp impact of the cocoa pests on the outcomes, we would have expected the
treatment variable to have no impact on the outcomes examined for cohorts born prior to
1935, and for the impact of the treatment to exert some influence in subsequent years. The
impact of the CSSV pest on educational outcomes would be most severe for cohorts born
in the 1940s who would have made education investment decisions in the 1950s during
the most active years of the CSSV campaigns. From columns (1) to (4), there is some
suggestive evidence about a temporary effect on cohorts born in the 1940s in high pest
infection areas. For example, for the cohort born in 1940-44, the probability of primary
school completion is 6 percentage points higher, and overall schooling attainment increases
by about 0.9 years. Literacy and the ability to speak English are however lower by about 9
percentage points for the subsequent cohort born between 1945-49 in these high treatment
areas5
Overall, however, looking across cohorts born between 1930 and 1980, there appears
to be no marked impact of the CSSV pest in both high or medium infection areas. Next,
columns (5) and (6) also provide results on the impacts of the CSSV pests on economic ac-
tivity, specifically examining if the occurrence of the pest outbreaks resulted in a transition
away from agriculture into manufacturing or services. In both high and medium intensity
areas, I do not observe a marked transition away from agriculture for cohorts born in the
1940s.
4.6.3 Violations of Perfect Exogeneity
In this section, I implement an approach developed by Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012)
to examine the sensitivity of the IV results to violations of the exclusion restriction as-
sumptions. Consider the local-to-zero procedure proposed by Conley et al. This method
involves directly altering the asymptotic variance matrix, and thus adjusting the computed
standard errors, by introducing a term that captures the extent to which the perfect exo-
5Again, these results appear to be driven largely by influential observations from the abandoned areas
around Koforidua. Additional results available upon request.
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geneity assumption is violated. The procedure is implemented by re-running the second
stage regression of government DACF transfers on opposition vote share and exogenous
covariates, but now directly including the instruments (CSSV pest intensity) as shown in
the regression below:
GovtTransferd = αOppV oteShared + γX
′
d + δr + θ ∗ CSSVd + d (4.7)
Recall, as in previous specifications, that the CSSV instruments are the interaction of the
fraction of land under high or medium pest infection and the share of land under cocoa
cultivation in 1947, i.e. the fraction High × CocoaShare and Medium × CocoaShare.
In the case of perfect exogeneity, we would expect the coefficients on the CSSV instrument
to be unidentified. Under the assumption that the coefficient is distributed as N(0, δ2),
Conley et al. suggest that sensitivity analyses may be conducted by gradually varying the
magnitude of the exogeneity error and investigating the robustness of the 2SLS results.
In the sensitivity analyses, δ is set as q percent of the reduced form impact of govern-
ment DACF transfers on the CSSV pest intensity and other covariates. I vary the magnitude
of the exogeneity error by increasing q in steps of 2 percent between zero and 100 percent.
The reduced form estimates forHigh×CocoaShare and fractionMedium×CocoaShare
are respectively: 0.223 (se=0.121) and 0.302 (se=0.064). For values of q below 48 percent
of the reduced form impact, the 2SLS results remain robust as the coefficient for opposition
vote share is still negative and statistically significant. The analysis above suggests that the
results presented in Table 4.5 appear robust to moderate levels of imperfect exogeneity,
further increasing confidence in the IV results.
4.7 Conclusions
This study examined the impacts of the cocoa swollen shoot disease in southern Ghana,
investigating its short- and long-run impacts on local political developments. It contributes
to the literature examining the formation and persistence of partisanship, and how parti-
sanship influence the distribution of resources. More broadly, it contributes to a grow-
ing literature which investigates the historical origins of various norms and beliefs (Nunn,
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2012).
The Watson Commission which investigated the 1948 riots in colonial Ghana noted the
political import of these disturbances, but the consequences of these riots have not been
empirically examined. Using new data on cultivated cocoa acreages and spatial variation
in the incidence of the CSSV pest, I examine the impacts of the disease intensity on local
politics. I find that today, individuals in districts which historically experienced a high
intensity of the disease pest report stronger anti-government opinions in the Afrobarometer
surveys, and are more likely to attribute success in life to individual effort than government
support. I trace the historical roots of these political views by examining electoral results
from the 1956 Legislative Elections in colonial Ghana. I find that districts which were
severely affected were more likely to vote against Nkrumah’s CPP party in the 1950s, and
further against the center-left party in multiparty elections in the late 1990s.
Next, I examine the implications of this result for distributive politics in Ghana in the
1990s by examining the impact of support for the opposition party on allocated transfers
from the central government. I report both OLS and 2SLS results showing that an increase
in opposition vote share is associated with reductions in government transfers. Finally, I
conduct various checks of the plausibility of the assumptions of the exclusion restrictions of
my 2SLS strategy. I do not find any persistent impacts of the CSSV pest on other outcomes
such as cocoa output, educational attainment or sector of employment. Moreover, using the
approach developed by Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012), I also document that the 2SLS
results remain robust to moderate forms of violations to the assumptions of the exclusion
restrictions.
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TABLE 4.A1: IMPACTS ON COCOA OUTPUT (see equation (4.5))
































NOTES: Dependent variable is cocoa output (in metric tonnes). Table presents co-
efficients on the interaction between CSSV disease pest intensity and year (see equa-
tion (4.5)). The CSSV treatment variable is given by the fraction of district land area
classified as high or medium pest intensity interacted with the fraction of cultivated
cocoa area as at 1948. Regression includes controls only for districts’ geographical
characteristics: longitude, latitude, slope and land area. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses, and clustered at district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 4.A2: IMPACT ON EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Primary Years of Literacy Able to speak Employed in Employed in
school schooling English manuf. services
High*CocoaShare*Born (1975-79) 0.0101 0.205 -0.0542 -0.0363 -0.0279 0.0628**
(0.0405) (0.504) (0.0516) (0.0477) (0.0340) (0.0303)
High*CocoaShare*Born (1970-74) 0.0476 0.535 -0.0267 -0.0136 -0.0289 0.0657
(0.0424) (0.523) (0.0454) (0.0453) (0.0290) (0.0472)
High*CocoaShare*Born (1965-69) 0.0338 0.324 -0.0303 -0.0194 -0.0239 0.107
(0.0404) (0.529) (0.0409) (0.0390) (0.0231) (0.0738)
High*CocoaShare*Born (1960-64) 0.0118 0.176 -0.0442 -0.0354 -0.0227 0.116
(0.0383) (0.519) (0.0359) (0.0363) (0.0225) (0.0764)
High*CocoaShare*Born (1955-59) 0.0278 0.445 -0.0181 -0.0107 -0.0389* 0.0737
(0.0413) (0.539) (0.0477) (0.0470) (0.0209) (0.0808)
High*CocoaShare*Born (1950-54) 0.0504 0.597 -0.0107 0.00544 -0.0268 0.0626
(0.0399) (0.545) (0.0315) (0.0328) (0.0205) (0.0761)
High*CocoaShare*Born (1945-49) -0.0531 -0.579 -0.0886*** -0.0885*** 0.0129 0.0451
(0.0339) (0.443) (0.0317) (0.0321) (0.0181) (0.0714)
High*CocoaShare*Born (1940-44) 0.0585* 0.918** -0.0151 0.000453 -0.0117 0.0793
(0.0306) (0.409) (0.0313) (0.0291) (0.0178) (0.0638)
High*CocoaShare*Born (1935-39) 0.0269 0.184 -0.0309 -0.0180 0.0217 0.0280
(0.0243) (0.331) (0.0322) (0.0321) (0.0167) (0.0419)
High*CocoaShare*Born (1930-34) 0.0215 0.240 -0.0264 0.00102 -0.0180* 0.0340
(0.0242) (0.339) (0.0213) (0.0231) (0.0108) (0.0286)
Medium*CocoaShare*Born (1975-79) 0.0324 0.309 -0.101* -0.0764 -0.0658 0.0623***
(0.0341) (0.391) (0.0597) (0.0511) (0.0440) (0.0213)
Medium*CocoaShare*Born (1970-74) 0.0625 0.678 -0.0774 -0.0475 -0.0509 0.125***
(0.0379) (0.451) (0.0569) (0.0496) (0.0366) (0.0411)
Medium*CocoaShare*Born (1965-69) 0.0197 0.0675 -0.0891* -0.0689 -0.0402 0.128**
(0.0390) (0.496) (0.0512) (0.0467) (0.0317) (0.0632)
Medium*CocoaShare*Born (1960-64) 0.0453 0.439 -0.0671 -0.0440 -0.0365 0.138*
(0.0403) (0.510) (0.0555) (0.0494) (0.0306) (0.0695)
Medium*CocoaShare*Born (1955-59) 0.0246 -0.0206 -0.0650 -0.0375 -0.0315 0.114
(0.0384) (0.525) (0.0543) (0.0484) (0.0293) (0.0767)
Medium*CocoaShare*Born (1950-54) 0.0119 0.139 -0.0790* -0.0629 -0.0305 0.0966
(0.0403) (0.552) (0.0456) (0.0392) (0.0249) (0.0834)
Medium*CocoaShare*Born (1945-49) 0.0170 0.119 -0.0358 -0.0119 -0.00853 0.102
(0.0414) (0.508) (0.0423) (0.0385) (0.0222) (0.0776)
Medium*CocoaShare*Born (1940-44) 0.0330 0.242 -0.0347 -0.00676 -0.0332 0.0874
(0.0291) (0.368) (0.0469) (0.0421) (0.0228) (0.0655)
Medium*CocoaShare*Born (1935-39) 0.00316 0.00555 -0.0812** -0.0799** -0.0319 0.0661*
(0.0305) (0.387) (0.0372) (0.0379) (0.0221) (0.0334)
Medium*CocoaShare*Born (1930-34) 0.0196 0.212 -0.0392 -0.0381 -0.0359** 0.0288
(0.0264) (0.331) (0.0256) (0.0242) (0.0154) (0.0207)
Observations 567,336 567,336 567,336 567,336 567,336 567,336
R-squared 0.128 0.111 0.133 0.128 0.039 0.110
NOTES: Table presents coefficients on the interaction between CSSV disease pest intensity and age cohort bins (see equa-
tion (4.6)). The CSSV treatment variable is given by the fraction of district land area classified as high or medium pest
intensity interacted with the fraction of cultivated cocoa area as at 1948. Regression includes controls only for districts’
geographical characteristics: longitude, latitude, slope, land area and cocoa soil suitability. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses, and clustered at district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendices
5.1 Appendix A: Data Description for Chapter 2
Treatment Intensity. I calculate treatment intensity using village gazetteers from the
Tanzania 1978 Census. The treatment measure for each district is calculated as the faction
of the population living in developmental villages i.e. the ratio Pd,r
Pd,t
where Pd,r refers to
population in all registered villages in district, d and Pd,t is the total population in district,
d. Note that some parts of Tanzania with already high density of nucleated settlements
experienced limited resettlements such as in the Kilimanjaro region, Bukoba district and
Kyela district.
The 1978 Tanzania National Census involved new and major cartographic work due to
the widespread relocations in the countryside since the previous census from 1967. Use-
ful background notes on data compilation for the census are available by Thomas (1982)
Population Data and Development Planning in Tanzania: Tanzania 1978 Population Cen-
sus User Notes and related documents available in the Africa Studies Collection at Boston
University. The 1978 Census also provides additional data on scattered, migratory, and
institutional populations following the re-settlement programs.
There was a debate among planners in the 1970s to estimate the precise number of
persons re-settled (Thomas (1982); Maro and Mlay (1982); McCall (1985)). For example,
Maro and Mlay (1982) estimate that re-settlements involved about 8 km of movement to
newly cleared and communally usable land. Precise cartographic records are now available
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to enable estimation. Detailed maps covering the entire land surface of Tanzania (at the
level of 1:100,000, prior to and following re-settlement) and available at the Harvard Map
Library enable the estimation of the entire populations re-located. However, in this paper,
the treatment refers to the experience of living in a formally registered or developmental
village during the 1970s. I therefore use the share of the district population enumerated as
being in registered villages by 1978.
It is important to control for the share of the urban population in each district prior
to the villagization re-settlements so that the estimated effects of treatment do not simply
reflect the degree of rural character of a given district. Prior to 1970, less than 6 percent of
the total population lived in towns with a population of more than 5000 persons (Moore,
1973). Following the re-settlements of the 1970s, the 1978 census adopted very broad
criteria in the definition of an urban area (see Tanzania 1978 Census Volume 1, pp 22)
based on the judgment of the local census committee. For example, wards were demarcated
as urban if they were judged by census officials as having urban characteristics such as the
presence of a school, dispensary or market, or as being close to urban centers. There is
therefore some flexibility in defining what constitutes an urban district (see Thomas, 1982
Note 5; McCall, 1985). This definition of urban areas adopted in the census differs from the
official government classification as stipulated by the Tanzanian Local Government (Urban
Authorities) Act of 1982 (see Thomas, 1982; Muzzini and Lindeboom, 2008).
To provide a clear and consistent definition of urban localities across various districts,
I follow Thomas (1982, Note 5) and the Tanzanian Local Government (Urban Authorities)
Act of 1982, in defining urban localities as cities, regional capitals (municipalities) and
other townships (or town councils). To obtain a measure of urbanization prior to formation
of villages, I calculate this urban share using returns for the 1967 Census (Volumes I and
II). The regional capitals listed are: Arusha, Bukoba, DSM, Dodoma, Iringa, Kigoma,
Lindi, Mbeya, Morogoro, Moshi, Mtwara, Musoma, Mwanza, Tabora, and Tanga; while the
former townships are: Bagamoyo, Chunya, Kahama, Kilosa, Kimamba, Kondoa, Korogwe,
Lushoto, Mkoani, Mpwapwa, Mwadui, Nachingwea, Nansio, Pangani, Shinyanga, Singida,
Songea, and Tukuyu. Nearly three-quarters of districts have no urban populations, and
government administration is often concentrated in the single major city in each region
(the regional capital). Thus, to compare districts in various parts of the country, I calculate
Chapter 5: Appendices 121
the regional urbanization rate (the share of the population in the regional capital divided by
the total regional population) which is common to all districts in the region.
District Mapping. The analyses presented in this project are based on 1978 district
boundaries which were in use at the time of village formation. Pre-treatment and outcomes
data are obtained from various time periods, namely: 1967, 1978, 1988, 2002 and 2009.
Specifically, the number of districts in mainland Tanzania increased over time as follows:
74 (in 1967), 95 (in 1978), 103 (in 1988), 119 (in 2002) and 123 (in 2009). By super-
imposing maps of district boundaries from the various time periods, I am able to assign
contemporary districts to their historical districts. The mapping is summarized in Table
A.1 below.
Education. Microdata from the 1988 Tanzania National Census provides data on ed-
ucational attainment. I utilize microdata from the Integrated Public Use Micro Sample
(IPUMS). The 10 percent microsample for Tanzania provides a dataset with about 2.4 mil-
lion observations. Each observation lists an individual’s level of educational attainment
(primary, secondary, university), total years of scholing completed, and whether or not
they are literate (defined as being able to read and write). The data is based on district
administrative boundaries for 1988 which I subsequently map on to 1978 boundaries.
Occupation Outcomes. The occupational outcomes are obtained form the IPUMS mi-
crodata from the 2002 Tanzania National Census with about 3.7 million observations. The
data is based on district administrative boundaries for 2002 which I subsequently map on
to 1978 boundaries. The industry classifications are roughly based on the International
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). I group these into five main categories with the
following sub-divisions agriculture (agriculture, fishing and forestry), manufacturing (min-
ing, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water), construction (construction services), trading
(wholesale and retail trade), and public administration and other services (public adminis-
tration, defense and other services, not specified).
Pre-treatment characteristics. Pre-treatment district characteristics are obtained from
Jensen and Mkama (1968). The authors served in the UN Team in Physical Planning in the
Tanzanian Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water Development. They compile district-
level data based on various primary sources available in Tanzania in the 1960s (see Jensen
and Mkama, 1968, pp 81). Specifically, they document district-level data on the following:
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population, employment sectors (agriculture, manufacturing and mining, services), indus-
trial establishments, marketed agricultural production, livestock holdings (cattle, sheep,
goats, donkeys and pigs), cooperative membership size, health facilities (number of beds in
hospitals and dispensaries), education enrollment (primary school enrollment rates), trad-
ing activities, local government revenues and estimates of district level GDP.
Consumption. Per capita household consumption data is obtained from the Tanzania
Household Budget Survey (THBS) 2000. THBS is a nationally representative survey of
22,178 households conducted by the Tanzanian Statistical Service. The consumption ag-
gregate used in the analyses refers to the total consumption per adult equivalent (standard-
ised for a 28-day period), and stated in nominal Tanzanian Shillings. This is the standard
measure used in the poverty analysis in Tanzania. The 2000 HBS provides extensive data
covering a large sample of 22,178 households, compared with 10,752 households covered
in the 2007 Household Budget Survey.
Rainfall Data. Rainfall data is obtained from the Tanzania Meteorological Agency
(TMA) in Dar es Salaam. The network of rainfall stations on mainland Tanzania was main-
tained by the East Africa Meteorological Department for the period 1930-1960, and sub-
sequently by the Tanzania Meteorological Agency (see Johnson, 1962; Nieuwolt, 1977).
Data is provided from three main types of stations: synoptic stations, agrometeorological
stations and rain gauge stations. There are two main agroclimatic areas in Tanzania — with
unimodal and bimodal rainfall areas. Bimodal rainfall areas have two planting seasons: the
minor short-rains cropping season (or vuli) and the long-rains season (or masika). For both
areas, the main period of agricultural activity occurs during the masika season (or long-
rains) with peak rainfall around March to June each year. I examine the masika season
rainfall in this project.
I analyze monthly rainfall data for 108 rainfall stations covering most districts (based on
2009 administrative boundaries) for the period 1960-2010. Below, I document a few excep-
tions. For the rainfall dataset obtained from TMA, Meatu district is the only district without
a rainfall gauge or station. I replace this district with data from the nearby Itinje Dispensary
on the border between Meatu and Maswa districts, both in Shinyanga Region. Based on
2009 administrative boundaries, the following three districts: Nkasi, Sumbawanga Urban
and Sumbawanga Rural all comprised Sumbawanga in 1978. There is only one reliable sta-
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tion in Sumbawanga Urban, and this is used for the entire district. Rainfall data is lacking
in Tabora Rural which completely surrounds Tabora Urban. I therefore assign data for the
Tabora Urban synoptic station to Tabora Rural (as defined in 1978). Today, Tabora Rural
is comprised of Sikonge and Uyui. There is no continuous rainfall data for Igunga district,
so I replace this with data for the neighboring Nzega district. Continuous rainfall data is
available for Kiteto district, but missing only for 1976. Thus for 1976, I replace Kiteto data
with the average of two nearby stations, namely Kondoa Maji and Kongwa PRS.
Electoral Data. Electoral results for the 2005 Presidential Elections are obtained from
the National Electoral Commission of Tanzania (results also published online). I also com-
pile election results from the 1970 Tanzanian National Election to assess variation in sup-
port for Nyerere’s TANU Party across districts, prior to village formation. The results of the
1970 elections are publised by the Election Study Committee (1974), and provides district
level data on fraction of eligible voters who registered to vote; voter turnout; and fraction
of population voting yes in support of Nyerere in the one-party presidential election.
Local Government Tax Revenues. Local government budget summaries is obtained
from PMO-RALG (Prime Ministers Office Regional Administration and Local Govern-
ment, TAMISEMI) in Dodoma, Tanzania. I use data beginning in 2005/6 financial year.
This is the earliest year for which data is available from PMO-RALG. This data is available
online at the Tanzanian Government website: http://www.logintanzania.net/ (downloaded
as at 1 January 2012). I use cumulative totals at the end of the fourth quarter of each fiscal
year. The agricultural taxes (produce cess) is in units of Tanzanian shillings per capita,
and normalized by the fraction of the population employed in agriculture, based on 2002
Tanzanian Agricultural Census.
Geographic controls. Data on geographic characteristics is obtained by overlaying the
1978 district administrative map of Tanzania on elevation and slope data obtained from
SRTM/ArcMaps and computing the mean area-weighted altitude and slope. I also compute
the latitude and longitude coordinates at the centroid of each district, and the distance from
the centroid to the coast and to the nearest railway line (in 1975).
Community Participation and Public Goods Provision. Data on community par-
ticipation and public goods provision is obtained from the Tanznaian National Household
Panel Survey of 2008/9. The household survey is comprised of a nationally representa-
Chapter 5: Appendices 124
tive sample of 3,280 households and 16,710 individuals and conducted by the Tanzanian
National Bureau of Statistics. The survey instruments include questions on respondents’
districts of birth, enabling me to link migrants to their initial districts of origin.
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation. I calculate ethnolinguistic fragmentation, ELFd as:
(1 − ∑ e2id), where ei is the fraction of the population in district, d, belonging to ethnic
group, i. ELFd measures the probability that any two randomly chosen individuals in
district, d, belong to different ethnic group (Mauro, 1995; Posner 2004). A high ELFd
implies a more ethnically diverse polity. In this project, I computeELFd based on the 1957
Census, which is the most recent census with data on district-level ethnic populations.
Afrobarometer Data. For outcomes on political participation, and perceptions on cor-
ruption, democracy, and nationalism, I utilize individual level responses from the Afro-
barometer Surveys for Tanzania. The Afrobarometer survey is nationally representative,
and based on interviews with citizens of voting age in Tanzania. I base the analyses in this
paper on three rounds of surveys conducted in 2001 (Round 1, n = 2,198), 2005 (Round 3,
n = 1,304), and 2008 (Round 4, n = 1,208). I am unable to use Round 2 of the Tanzania
surveys as the publicly available dataset lacks district identifiers.
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5.2 Appendix B: Additional Tables
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Table A1: Mapping of Districts
REGION DISTRICT NAME
NAME (2009) 2009 2002 1978 1967
Dodoma Kondoa Kondoa Kondoa Kondoa
Dodoma Mpwapwa Mpwapwa Mpwapwa Mpwapwa
Dodoma Kongwa Kongwa Mpwapwa Mpwapwa
Dodoma Dodoma Rural Dodoma Rural Dodoma Rural Dodoma
Dodoma Dodoma Urban Dodoma Urban Dodoma Urban Dodoma
Dodoma Bahi Dodoma Rural Dodoma Rural Dodoma
Arusha Monduli Monduli Monduli Masai
Arusha Arumeru Arumeru Arumeru Arusha
Arusha Arusha Arusha Arusha Arusha
Arusha Karatu Karatu Mbulu Mbulu
Arusha Ngorongoro Ngorongoro Monduli Masai
Kilimanjaro Rombo Rombo Rombo Kilimanjaro
Kilimanjaro Mwanga Mwanga Pare Pare
Kilimanjaro Same Same Pare Pare
Kilimanjaro Moshi Rural Moshi Rural Moshi Rural Kilimanjaro
Kilimanjaro Hai Hai Hai Kilimanjaro
Kilimanjaro Moshi Urban Moshi Urban Moshi Urban Kilimanjaro
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Table A1: Mapping of Districts (contd.)
REGION DISTRICT NAME
NAME (2009) 2009 2002 1978 1967
Tanga Lushoto Lushoto Lushoto Lushoto
Tanga Korogwe Korogwe Korogwe Korogwe
Tanga Muheza Muheza Muheza Tanga
Tanga Tanga Tanga Tanga Tanga
Tanga Pangani Pangani Pangani Pangani
Tanga Handeni Handeni Handeni Handeni
Tanga Kilindi Kilindi Handeni Handeni
Tanga Mkinga Muheza Muheza Tanga
Morogoro Kilosa Kilosa Kilosa Kilosa
Morogoro Morogoro Morogoro Morogoro Rural Morogoro
Morogoro Kilombero Kilombero Kilombero Ulanga
Morogoro Ulanga Ulanga Mahenge Ulanga
Morogoro Morogoro Urban Morogoro Urban Morogoro Urban Morogoro
Morogoro Mvomero Mvomero Morogoro Rural Morogoro
Pwani Bagamoyo Bagamoyo Bagamoyo Bagamoyo
Pwani Kibaha Kibaha Kisarawe Kisarawe
Pwani Kisarawe Kisarawe Kisarawe Kisarawe
Pwani Mkuranga Mkuranga Kisarawe Kisarawe
Pwani Rufiji Rufiji Rufiji Rufiji
Pwani Mafia Mafia Mafia Mafia
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Table A1: Mapping of Districts (contd.)
REGION DISTRICT NAME
NAME (2009) 2009 2002 1978 1967
Dar es Salaam Kinondoni Kinondoni Kinondoni Mzizima
Dar es salaam Ilala Ilala Ilala Mzizima
Dar es Salaam Temeke Temeke Temeke Mzizima
Lindi Kilwa Kilwa Kilwa Kilwa
Lindi Lindi Rural Lindi Rural Lindi Rural Lindi
Lindi Nachingwea Nachingwea Nachingwea Nachingwea
Lindi Liwale Liwale Liwale Nachingwea
Lindi Ruangwa Ruangwa Lindi Rural Lindi
Lindi Lindi Urban Lindi Urban Lindi Urban Lindi
Mtwara Mtwara Rural Mtwara Rural Mtwara Rural Mtwara
Mtwara Newala Newala Newala Newala
Mtwara Masasi Masasi Masasi Masasi
Mtwara Tandahimba Tandahimba Newala Newala
Mtwara Mtwara Urban Mtwara Urban Mtwara Urban Mtwara
Ruvuma Tunduru Tunduru Tunduru Tunduru
Ruvuma Songea Rural Songea Rural Songea Rural Songea
Ruvuma Mbinga Mbinga Mbinga Mbinga
Ruvuma Songea Urban Songea Urban Songea Urban Songea
Ruvuma Namtumbo Namtumbo Songea Rural Songea
Iringa Iringa Rural Iringa Rural Iringa Rural Iringa
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Table A1: Mapping of Districts (contd.)
REGION DISTRICT NAME
NAME (2009) 2009 2002 1978 1967
Iringa Mufindi Mufindi Mufindi Mufindi
Iringa Makete Makete Njombe Njombe
Iringa Njombe Njombe Njombe Njombe
Iringa Ludewa Ludewa Ludewa Njombe
Iringa Iringa Urban Iringa Urban Iringa Urban Iringa
Iringa Kilolo Kilolo Iringa Rural Iringa
Mbeya Chunya Chunya Chunya Chunya
Mbeya Mbeya Rural Mbeya (R) Mbeya Rural Mbeya
Mbeya Kyela Kyela Kyela Rungwe
Mbeya Rungwe Rungwe Rungwe Rungwe
Mbeya Ileje Ileje Ileje Rungwe
Mbeya Mbozi Mbozi Mbozi Mbozi
Mbeya Mbarali Mbarali Mbeya Rural Mbeya
Mbeya Mbeya Urban Mbeya Urban Mbeya Urban Mbeya
Singida Iramba Iramba Iramba Iramba
Singida Singida Rural Singida Rural Singida Rural Singida
Singida Manyoni Manyoni Manyoni Manyoni
Singida Singida Urban Singida Urban Singida Urban Singida
Tabora Nzega Nzega Nzega Nzega
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Table A1: Mapping of Districts (contd.)
REGION DISTRICT NAME
NAME (2009) 2009 2002 1978 1967
Tabora Igunga Igunga Igunga Nzega
Tabora Uyui Uyui Tabora Rural Tabora
Tabora Urambo Urambo Urambo Tabora
Tabora Sikonge Sikonge Tabora Rural Tabora
Tabora Tabora Urban Tabora Urban Tabora Urban Tabora
Rukwa Mpanda Mpanda Mpanda Mpanda
Rukwa Sumbawanga Rural Sumbawanga Rural Sumbawanga Rural Sumbawanga
Rukwa Nkasi Nkasi Sumbawanga Rural Sumbawanga
Rukwa Sumbawanga Urban Sumbawanga Urban Sumbawanga Urban Sumbawanga
Kigoma Kibondo Kibondo Kibondo Kibondo
Kigoma Kasulu Kasulu Kasulu Kasulu
Kigoma Kigoma Rural Kigoma Rural Kigoma Rural Kigoma
Kigoma Kigoma Urban Kigoma Urban Kigoma Urban Kigoma
Shinyanga Bariadi Bariadi Bariadi Maswa
Shinyanga Maswa Maswa Maswa Maswa
Shinyanga Shinyanga Rural Shinyanga Rural Shinyanga Rural Shinyanga
Shinyanga Kahama Kahama Kahama Kahama
Shinyanga Bukombe Bukombe Kahama Kahama
Shinyanga Meatu Meatu Maswa Maswa
Shinyanga Shinyanga Urban Shinyanga Urban Shinyanga Urban Shinyanga
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Table A1: Mapping of Districts (contd.)
REGION DISTRICT NAME
NAME (2009) 2009 2002 1978 1967
Shinyanga Kishapu Kishapu Shinyanga Rural Shinyanga
Kagera Karagwe Karagwe Karagwe Karagwe
Kagera Bukoba Rural Bukoba Rural Bukoba Rural Bukoba
Kagera Muleba Muleba Muleba Bukoba
Kagera Biharamulo Biharamulo Biharamulo Biharamulo
Kagera Ngara Ngara Ngara Ngara
Kagera Bukoba Urban Bukoba Urban Bukoba Urban Bukoba
Kagera Chato Biharamulo Biharamulo Biharamulo
Kagera Misenye Bukoba Rural Bukoba Rural Bukoba
Mwanza Ukerewe Ukerewe Ukerewe Ukerewe
Mwanza Magu Magu Magu Mwanza
Mwanza Nyamagana Nyamagana Mwanza Mwanza
Mwanza Kwimba Kwimba Kwimba Kwimba
Mwanza Sengerema Sengerema Sengerema Ukerewe
Mwanza Geita Geita Geita Geita
Mwanza Missungwi Missungwi Kwimba Kwimba
Mwanza Ilemela Ilemela Mwanza Mwanza
Mara Tarime Tarime Tarime Mara
Mara Serengeti Serengeti Serengeti Musoma
Mara Musoma Rural Musoma Rural Musoma Rural Musoma
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Table A1: Mapping of Districts (contd.)
REGION DISTRICT NAME
NAME (2009) 2009 2002 1978 1967
Mara Bunda Bunda Musoma Rural Musoma
Mara Musoma Urban Musoma Urban Musoma Urban Musoma
Manyara Babati Babati Hanang Mbulu
Manyara Hanang Hanang Hanang Mbulu
Manyara Mbulu Mbulu Mbulu Mbulu
Manyara Simanjiro Simanjiro Kiteto Masai
Manyara Kiteto Kiteto Kiteto Masai
kaskazini Kaskazini ’A’ Kaskazini ’A’ Zanzibar Zanzibar
kaskazini Kaskazini ’B’ Kaskazini ’B’ Zanzibar Zanzibar
Kusini Kati Kati Zanzibar Zanzibar
Kusini Kusini Kusini Zanzibar Zanzibar
Mjini Magharibi Magharibi Magharibi Zanzibar Zanzibar
Mjini Magharibi Mjini Mjini Zanzibar Zanzibar
Kaskazini Pemba Wete Wete Pemba Pemba
Kaskazini Pemba Micheweni Micheweni Pemba Pemba
Kusini Pemba Chake Chake Pemba Pemba
Kusini Pemba Mkoani Mkoani Pemba Pemba
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TABLE B.1: COEFFICIENTS OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DUMMIES INDICATING THE AGE
IN 1974 AND FRACTION OF DISTRICT POPULATION LIVING IN DEVELOPMENT VILLAGES
Dep. Variable: Primary School Completion
Age in 1974 (1) (2) (3) (4)
1 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.133*** 0.102***
(0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0370) (0.0297)
2 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.151*** 0.123***
(0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0343) (0.0251)
3 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.159*** 0.129***
(0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0337) (0.0244)
4 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.147*** 0.117***
(0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0345) (0.0263)
5 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.149*** 0.119***
(0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0329) (0.0253)
6 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.118*** 0.0878***
(0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0345) (0.0276)
7 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.154***
(0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0298) (0.0299)
8 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.143*** 0.138***
(0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0317) (0.0317)
9 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.126***
(0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0305)
10 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.111***
(0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0304)
11 0.0968*** 0.0968*** 0.0973*** 0.0935***
(0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0277) (0.0276)
12 0.0801*** 0.0801*** 0.0798*** 0.0743**
(0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0287) (0.0287)
13 0.0744*** 0.0744*** 0.0745*** 0.0691**
(0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0269) (0.0268)
14 0.0482* 0.0482* 0.0477* 0.0431
(0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0273)
15 0.0303 0.0303 0.0299 0.0269
(0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0246)
16 0.0163 0.0163 0.0166 0.0154
(0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0276)
17 0.00629 0.00624 0.00615 0.00258
(0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0227)
18 -0.00298 -0.00303 -0.00336 -0.00296
(0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0206)
19 0.00233 0.00226 0.00203 0.00282
(0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0239)
20 -0.000859 -0.000906 -0.00133 -0.00266
(0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0205)
21 0.0205 0.0205 0.0213 0.0242
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0216) (0.0219)
22 0.00742 0.00734 0.00754 0.00690
(0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0243)
23 -0.0122 -0.0123 -0.0117 -0.0104
(0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0222)
24 0.00204 0.00201 0.00222 0.00471
(0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0190)
Observations 827,027 827,027 820,852 798,324
R-squared 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.155
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is dummy for primary school completion. Data is
obtained from IPUMS microsample of 1988 Tanzania Census. All columns include fixed effects for year
of birth cohorts and 1978 districts. Controls enter the regression interacted with the young dummy. Col-
umn 2 controls for pre-treatment primary enrollment in 1970. Column 3 includes controls for health in-
frastructure in 1970. Column 4 includes various geographic and demographic controls. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district boundaries.
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TABLE C.1: COHORT EFFECTS FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A
Dep. Var: Contacted local government official in the past year?
Born 1980-1989 0.149* 0.168* 0.137 0.148 0.139 0.138
(0.0762) (0.0856) (0.101) (0.101) (0.103) (0.104)
Born 1970-1979 0.222*** 0.219*** 0.270** 0.288*** 0.285*** 0.285***
(0.0747) (0.0815) (0.108) (0.106) (0.108) (0.108)
Born 1960-1969 0.211*** 0.208** 0.229** 0.257** 0.252** 0.251**
(0.0725) (0.0858) (0.105) (0.101) (0.103) (0.103)
Born 1950-1959 0.206** 0.171 0.163 0.188 0.181 0.186
(0.103) (0.111) (0.134) (0.135) (0.136) (0.136)
Observations 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,189 4,189 4,189
R-squared 0.119 0.122 0.125 0.129 0.129 0.129
PANEL B
Dep. Var: Contacted any government civil service official in the past year?
Born 1980-1989 0.0815 0.125* 0.133* 0.153* 0.141* 0.138*
(0.0678) (0.0735) (0.0782) (0.0821) (0.0808) (0.0773)
Born 1970-1979 0.0915* 0.110* 0.129** 0.135** 0.124* 0.119*
(0.0489) (0.0577) (0.0645) (0.0663) (0.0661) (0.0620)
Born 1960-1969 0.0739 0.0975 0.106 0.127 0.111 0.105
(0.0671) (0.0755) (0.0788) (0.0825) (0.0783) (0.0745)
Born 1950-1959 0.0115 0.0201 0.0540 0.0800 0.0578 0.0666
(0.0922) (0.0948) (0.0983) (0.102) (0.0979) (0.0960)
Observations 4,278 4,278 4,278 4,184 4,184 4,184
R-squared 0.079 0.082 0.084 0.085 0.087 0.089
PANEL C
Dep. Var: Able to correctly name local MP?
Born 1980-1989 0.273*** 0.309*** 0.225* 0.195 0.218* 0.193
(0.0989) (0.103) (0.114) (0.120) (0.120) (0.123)
Born 1970-1979 0.144 0.143 0.100 0.0885 0.119 0.128
(0.106) (0.111) (0.112) (0.113) (0.114) (0.117)
Born 1960-1969 0.150 0.167 0.0704 0.0475 0.0832 0.103
(0.168) (0.156) (0.156) (0.150) (0.147) (0.148)
Born 1950-1959 0.0335 -0.0133 -0.0536 -0.0943 -0.0718 -0.0574
(0.160) (0.160) (0.181) (0.184) (0.182) (0.180)
Observations 2,277 2,277 2,277 2,246 2,246 2,246
R-squared 0.205 0.209 0.215 0.219 0.222 0.226
Geographic Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Agricultural Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Education Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES
Local Govt Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
NOTES: Data is obtained from the Afrobarometer Tanzania Surveys: Rounds 3 and 4 data are used in Panels A and B;
and Round 1 data for Panel C. Results are presented for coefficients on four birth cohorts above compared to the omit-
ted category which was born prior to 1950. Geographic controls are for latitude, mean weighted slope and altitude.
Demographic controls are for mean pre-treatment ethnolinguistic fragmentation, fraction of moslems and fraction of
christians in the population based on the 1967 Tanzania Census. Agricultural controls are for per capita populations of
cattle, sheep, and goats (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Education control is for school enrollment rate in 1967 and local
government controls are for per capita local government revenues in 1968-1970 (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Robust
standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district boundaries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE C.2: COHORT EFFECTS ON ONE-PARTY RULE AND DEMOCRACY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A
Dep. Var: Dummy for supporting one-party rule
Born 1980-1989 -0.138 -0.179 -0.316* -0.283* -0.297* -0.287*
(0.137) (0.148) (0.173) (0.161) (0.158) (0.159)
Born 1970-1979 -0.0709 -0.144 -0.319** -0.268* -0.277* -0.280*
(0.121) (0.139) (0.154) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
Born 1960-1969 -0.140 -0.216 -0.258 -0.266* -0.277* -0.296*
(0.133) (0.151) (0.158) (0.158) (0.157) (0.162)
Born 1950-1959 -0.176 -0.225* -0.299** -0.275* -0.276* -0.296*
(0.115) (0.127) (0.149) (0.150) (0.153) (0.150)
Observations 2,014 2,014 2,014 1,950 1,950 1,950
R-squared 0.163 0.172 0.179 0.180 0.182 0.185
PANEL B
Dep. Var: Dummy for supporting democracy
Born 1980-1989 0.0164 0.144 0.281 0.291 0.305* 0.320*
(0.138) (0.144) (0.178) (0.177) (0.179) (0.181)
Born 1970-1979 -0.0820 0.0176 0.136 0.116 0.123 0.139
(0.109) (0.118) (0.140) (0.142) (0.147) (0.144)
Born 1960-1969 -0.0227 0.133 0.118 0.137 0.150 0.173
(0.112) (0.123) (0.132) (0.139) (0.144) (0.145)
Born 1950-1959 -0.0191 0.0917 0.175 0.165 0.169 0.174
(0.106) (0.114) (0.141) (0.145) (0.149) (0.141)
Observations 2,014 2,014 2,014 1,950 1,950 1,950
R-squared 0.202 0.208 0.219 0.223 0.225 0.226
Geographic Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Agricultural Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Education Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES
Local Govt Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
NOTES: Data is obtained from Round 1 of the Tanzania Afrobarometer Survey. Results are presented for
coefficients on four birth cohorts above compared to the omitted category which was born prior to 1950. Ge-
ographic controls are for latitude, mean weighted slope and altitude. Demographic controls are for mean pre-
treatment ethnolinguistic fragmentation, fraction of moslems and fraction of christians in the population based
on the 1967 Tanzania Census. Agricultural controls are for per capita populations of cattle, sheep, and goats
(Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Education control is for school enrollment rate in 1967 and local government con-
trols are for per capita local government revenues in 1968-1970 (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district boundaries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE C.3: COHORT EFFECTS FOR PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if corruption is prevalent among elected leaders (MPs)?
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.531
Born 1980-1989 0.214 0.259 0.288 0.327* 0.285 0.282
(0.162) (0.167) (0.180) (0.179) (0.196) (0.197)
Born 1970-1979 0.109 0.235 0.224 0.326* 0.310 0.319*
(0.146) (0.158) (0.175) (0.163) (0.189) (0.191)
Born 1960-1969 0.210 0.315* 0.340* 0.363* 0.312 0.294
(0.184) (0.183) (0.191) (0.200) (0.217) (0.223)
Born 1950-1959 0.0308 0.0785 0.151 0.203 0.188 0.205
(0.191) (0.190) (0.218) (0.231) (0.237) (0.234)
Observations 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,207 2,207 2,207
R-squared 0.167 0.172 0.174 0.174 0.175 0.176
PANEL B
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if corruption is prevalent among government officials?
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.597
Born 1980-1989 0.308 0.332* 0.329 0.388* 0.365* 0.365*
(0.187) (0.185) (0.198) (0.195) (0.201) (0.205)
Born 1970-1979 0.126 0.157 0.0481 0.158 0.0972 0.103
(0.148) (0.164) (0.163) (0.144) (0.163) (0.165)
Born 1960-1969 0.127 0.161 0.202 0.228 0.174 0.156
(0.159) (0.160) (0.166) (0.167) (0.178) (0.184)
Born 1950-1959 0.0376 0.0739 -0.000521 0.0573 0.00804 -0.0127
(0.148) (0.151) (0.172) (0.173) (0.180) (0.184)
Observations 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,207 2,207 2,207
R-squared 0.138 0.141 0.146 0.147 0.148 0.149
Geographic Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Agricultural Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Education Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES
Local Govt Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
NOTES: Data is obtained from the Afrobarometer Tanzania Surveys (Rounds 3 and 4). Results are presented
for coefficients on four birth cohorts above compared to the omitted category which was born prior to 1950.
Geographic controls are for latitude, mean weighted slope and altitude. Demographic controls are for mean
pre-treatment ethnolinguistic fragmentation, fraction of moslems and fraction of christians in the population
based on the 1967 Tanzania Census. Agricultural controls are for per capita populations of cattle, sheep, and
goats (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Education control is for school enrollment rate in 1967 and local government
controls are for per capita local government revenues in 1968-1970 (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district boundaries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE C.3: COHORT EFFECTS FOR PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION (contd.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL C
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if corruption is prevalent among the police?
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.784
Born 1980-1989 0.134 0.234** 0.116 0.117 0.135 0.124
(0.122) (0.111) (0.124) (0.133) (0.148) (0.150)
Born 1970-1979 0.105 0.252** 0.134 0.190 0.180 0.198
(0.107) (0.0969) (0.117) (0.116) (0.132) (0.129)
Born 1960-1969 0.167 0.265** 0.174 0.165 0.0945 0.100
(0.122) (0.117) (0.126) (0.130) (0.148) (0.147)
Born 1950-1959 0.0569 0.178 0.0355 0.0792 0.0532 0.0255
(0.138) (0.132) (0.162) (0.173) (0.176) (0.185)
Observations 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,207 2,207 2,207
R-squared 0.102 0.111 0.117 0.123 0.126 0.128
Geographic Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Agricultural Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Education Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES
Local Govt Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
NOTES: Data is obtained from the Afrobarometer Tanzania Surveys (Rounds 3 and
4). Results are presented for coefficients on four birth cohorts above compared to the
omitted category which was born prior to 1950. Geographic controls are for latitude,
mean weighted slope and altitude. Demographic controls are for mean pre-treatment
ethnolinguistic fragmentation, fraction of moslems and fraction of christians in the
population based on the 1967 Tanzania Census. Agricultural controls are for per capita
populations of cattle, sheep, and goats (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Education control
is for school enrollment rate in 1967 and local government controls are for per capita
local government revenues in 1968-1970 (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district boundaries. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE C.4: COHORT EFFECTS FOR PERCEPTIONS ON ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if respondent prefers national to ethnic identity
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.753
Born 1980-1989 -0.0758 -0.162 -0.193* -0.181 -0.192 -0.196*
(0.104) (0.106) (0.114) (0.117) (0.116) (0.116)
Born 1970-1979 -0.0707 -0.174* -0.184* -0.179 -0.185* -0.179*
(0.101) (0.0934) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) (0.103)
Born 1960-1969 -0.154 -0.190* -0.229** -0.214* -0.225** -0.222**
(0.0991) (0.0998) (0.110) (0.112) (0.110) (0.107)
Born 1950-1959 -0.0218 -0.0922 -0.0366 -0.0177 -0.0261 -0.0250
(0.132) (0.123) (0.137) (0.139) (0.137) (0.139)
Observations 4,224 4,224 4,224 4,130 4,130 4,130
R-squared 0.072 0.076 0.079 0.081 0.081 0.083
PANEL B
Dep. Var: Dummy equal to one if respondent trusts Tanzanians of other tribes
Mean Dep. Var. = 0.672
Born 1980-1989 -0.0307 -0.0260 -0.0409 -0.0632 -0.0735 -0.0763
(0.0724) (0.0815) (0.0967) (0.100) (0.0981) (0.0977)
Born 1970-1979 0.00141 0.0526 0.0602 0.0401 0.0159 0.0201
(0.0708) (0.0695) (0.0751) (0.0756) (0.0715) (0.0696)
Born 1960-1969 0.0249 0.0213 0.0273 0.0238 0.0196 0.0195
(0.0716) (0.0761) (0.0836) (0.0804) (0.0788) (0.0803)
Born 1950-1959 -0.101 -0.125 -0.0888 -0.121 -0.128 -0.136*
(0.0670) (0.0765) (0.0919) (0.0783) (0.0783) (0.0783)
Observations 3,178 3,178 3,178 3,106 3,106 3,106
R-squared 0.101 0.106 0.108 0.111 0.113 0.114
Geographic Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Demographic Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Agricultural Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Education Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES
Local Govt Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
NOTES: Data is obtained from the Tanzania Afrobarometer Survey. Panel A is based on results from
Rounds 1, 3 and 4. Panel B is based on results from Rounds 1 and 3. Results are presented for coef-
ficients on four birth cohorts above compared to the omitted category which was born prior to 1950.
Geographic controls are for latitude, mean weighted slope and altitude. Demographic controls are for
mean pre-treatment ethnolinguistic fragmentation, fraction of moslems and fraction of christians in the
population based on the 1967 Tanzania Census. Agricultural controls are for per capita populations of
cattle, sheep, and goats (Jensen and Mkama, 1968). Education control is for school enrollment rate in
1967 and local government controls are for per capita local government revenues in 1968-1970 (Jensen
and Mkama, 1968). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district bound-
aries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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TABLE C.5: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Equation Control for Control for Controls for
Eqn. (2.4) Voter Turnout Share of Nyerere Turnout and Share
(1970) Vote (1970) of Nyerere vote (1970)
Contact Local Govt Official 0.156** 0.144** 0.140** 0.139**
(0.0633) (0.0628) (0.0639) (0.0649)
Contact Civil Service 0.0887* 0.0894* 0.0880* 0.0868*
(0.0455) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0477)
Identify MP 0.224** 0.214** 0.211** 0.211**
(0.0993) (0.0994) (0.101) (0.101)
Support one-party state -0.209* -0.178 -0.183 -0.192
(0.125) (0.121) (0.123) (0.121)
Support democracy 0.190* 0.165 0.170 0.178*
(0.107) (0.102) (0.103) (0.101)
Corrupt MPs 0.227* 0.265* 0.272* 0.272*
(0.135) (0.147) (0.152) (0.153)
Corrupt civil servants 0.300** 0.334** 0.335** 0.333**
(0.147) (0.158) (0.163) (0.165)
Corrupt police 0.196* 0.229* 0.244* 0.247*
(0.116) (0.120) (0.125) (0.126)
Nation or tribe -0.163** -0.161** -0.164** -0.167**
(0.0695) (0.0691) (0.0711) (0.0726)
Trust other tribes 0.0211 0.0237 0.0251 0.0254
(0.0550) (0.0544) (0.0545) (0.0547)
NOTES: This table presents additional robustness checks controlling for pre-villagization political turnout
at elections and support for Nyerere’s TANU Party. Results are presented for the coefficients on young x
treatment, which provides the difference-in-difference estimate comparing the mean outcome variable for
older cohorts born prior to 1960 to a younger cohort born after 1970. Column (1) repeats estimates using
a full set of controls as in column (6) of tables 5-8, chapter 2. Outcome variables are obtained from vari-
ous rounds of the Tanzania Afrobarometer Survey. Additional controls on pre-villagization election results
are obtained from results compiled by the Election Study Committee (1974). Robust standard errors are in
parentheses and clustered at the 1978 district boundaries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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